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SUMMARY 
Negotiations are an essential part of personal and professional life, and computer-support 
helps facilitate them as they become increasingly complex. Being aware of the priorities of 
the partner plays an essential role in successful negotiations. Two cognitive errors – the 
fixed-sum and the incompatibility error – hinder an integration of different priorities for 
achieving an economically beneficial outcome. Also, personality traits as well as figural 
intelligence and social value orientation interdependently influence the negotiator’s 
individual outcomes in such computer-supported negotiations. Two studies were 
conducted for this thesis resulting in three articles. Each study with 132 participants, 66 
dyads, negotiating in their roles as car seller or buyer. Priority awareness, the awareness 
about the priorities of the partner, is introduced as a solution approach. Non-interactive 
bar charts are used to facilitate such awareness without the need for special experience, 
training or instructions to diminish the two errors and improve different measures of 
negotiation performance. Performance awareness, a more detailed priority awareness, is 
a possible successor to the priority awareness approach and compared to it. It uses more 
of information and communication technologies interactive abilities with the intention to 
further improve negotiation outcomes and diminish the still existent incompatibility error. 
The actor-partner interdependence model is used for the analyzes of individual 
characteristics which may have a different influence on the negotiator’s individual 
outcomes under the two approaches. Results show that the priority awareness approach 
improves the joint outcome and pareto efficiency without adverse effects on fairness, 
satisfaction and duration. The performance awareness approach, although having the 
capability to outperform the priority awareness approach, does not further improve joint 
outcome and pareto efficiency and has adverse effects on satisfaction, fairness and 
deceptiveness. Individual analyses show only hints for different effects for these 
approaches. In general, a good individual outcome of one partner seems highly 
dependent upon the lower emotionality, prosocial behavior and higher figural intelligence 
of the opposing partner. Priority awareness is a useful approach which can already be 
implemented in current negotiation support system. Future studies building upon the 
findings of this thesis are discussed. 
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Verhandlungen als essenzieller Bestandteil des privaten und beruflichen Lebens werden 
stets komplexer und erfordern daher zunehmend eine computertechnische 
Unterstützung. Das Bewusstsein über die Prioritäten des Partners spielt bei erfolgreichen 
Verhandlungen eine wesentliche Rolle. Zwei kognitive Fehler – der Fixed-Sum-Error und 
der Incompatibility Error – behindern eine Integration unterschiedlicher Prioritäten, um 
ein wirtschaftlich vorteilhaftes Ergebnis zu erzielen. Zudem beeinflussen 
Persönlichkeitsmerkmale sowie figurale Intelligenz und soziale Wertorientierung die 
gegenseitigen individuellen Ergebnisse der Verhandlungsführer in solchen 
computerunterstützen Verhandlungen. Zwei Studien wurden für diese Dissertation 
durchgeführt und in drei Artikeln verschriftlicht. Jede Studie hatte 132 Teilnehmer, 66 
Dyaden, die in ihren Rollen als Autoverkäufer oder -käufer verhandelten. Priority 
Awareness, das Bewusstsein über die Prioritäten des Partners, wird als Lösungsansatz 
eingeführt. Nicht-interaktive Balkendiagramme werden verwendet, um ein solches 
Bewusstsein zu fördern, ohne dass spezielle Erfahrungen, Trainings oder Instruktionen 
erforderlich sind, um die beiden kognitiven Fehler zu verringern und verschiedene Maße 
des Verhandlungserfolgs zu verbessern. Performance Awareness, eine detailliertere 
Priority Awareness, ist ein möglicher Nachfolger für den Priority-Awareness-Ansatz und 
wird damit verglichen. Es werden hierbei mehr interaktive Fähigkeiten der Informations- 
und Kommunikationstechnologien verwendet mit der Absicht, die Verhandlungs-
ergebnisse weiter zu verbessern und den noch bestehenden Incompatibility Error zu 
verringern. Das Actor-Partner Interdependence Model dient der Analyse individueller 
Merkmale, welche unter den beiden Ansätzen, unterschiedlichen Einfluss auf die 
individuellen Ergebnisse haben können. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Priority-
Awareness-Ansatz das gemeinsame Ergebnis und die Pareto-Effizienz ohne negative 
Auswirkungen auf Fairness, Zufriedenheit und Dauer verbessert. Der Performance-
Awareness-Ansatz, obwohl er die Fähigkeit hätte, den Priority-Awareness-Ansatz zu 
übertreffen, verbessert das gemeinsame Ergebnis und die Pareto Effizienz nicht weiter 
und hat negative Auswirkungen auf Zufriedenheit, Fairness und Täuschung. Individuelle 
Analysen deuten nur unterschiedliche Effekte zwischen den Ansätzen an. Im Allgemeinen 
hängt ein gutes individuelles Ergebnis eines Partners stark von der geringeren 
Emotionalität, dem prosozialen Verhalten und der höheren figuralen Intelligenz des 
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gegnerischen Partners ab. Priority Awareness ist ein nützlicher Ansatz, der bereits in 
aktueller Software zur Unterstützung von Verhandlungen umgesetzt werden kann. 
Zukünftige Studien, welche auf den Ergebnissen dieser Arbeit aufbauen, werden 
diskutiert. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Negotiation occurs whenever people cannot achieve their own goals without the 
cooperation of others.” (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010, p. 491) 
Negotiations play a major role, not only for salespersons and professional life but also for 
one’s personal life and everyday human interaction. In business interactions the 
computer-supported negotiations are gaining traction, as mergers and acquisitions or 
trade agreements are getting more complex with multiple issues and options to be 
negotiated and high values at stake (Kersten & Lai, 2007). To achieve an economically 
beneficial agreement the negotiators have to deal with priorities if they are aware of them 
or not. In the case of a common business to customer or business to business negation of 
selling or buying a car or a whole car fleet, the seller may be interested in a high financing 
rate and selling many extras, and the buyer may be interested in an extended warranty 
and the latest multimedia system. As no side will just give in to the demands of the other 
without concessions from the other, the most profitable solution would therefore be to 
give in on less important issues and in exchange insist on more important ones. Giving in 
on issues that are less important and in return receiving concessions on issues that are 
more important is known as integrative negotiation (e. g. Barry & Friedman, 1998; De Dreu, 
Beersma, Steinel, & van Kleef, 2007). For such mutually beneficial trade-offs to take place, 
the negotiators must somehow be aware of their different priorities. 
Tacitly fostering such kind of awareness in computer-supported negotiations – 
without previous training or additional instructions – and analyzing its influence on 
different measures of negotiation performance is the center of the experimental studies in 
the three main articles constituting this thesis (Kolodziej, Hesse, et al., 2016; Kolodziej & 
Sassenberg, 2016; Kolodziej, Sassenberg, et al., 2016). 
The focus of this thesis does not only lie on “hard” measures of negotiation 
performance: 
 The joint outcome; the sum of the individual points of both negotiators assigned to 
their agreement. 
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 The pareto efficiency; a numerical value between 0 and 1 that shows if there are 
any better agreements possible for at least one negotiation party without the other 
being worse of. 
 The impasse rate; the number of aborted negotiations without agreement. 
 The duration; the time needed to arrive at an agreement. 
This thesis also takes multiple “soft” measures of negotiation performance into 
account, which are of equal importance and more “traditionally” psychological like 
satisfaction, fairness and deception. 
The interdependence of the individual characteristics of the negotiators is also part 
of this thesis. Dependent of the amount of awareness and the use of information and 
communications technologies interactive abilities within a computer supported 
negotiation, the negotiators’ individual characteristics may have a different influence on 
their individual outcome, which every negotiation party seeks to maximize. Not only are 
there indicators that one negotiator’s personality traits, social value orientation and 
figural intelligence affect his or her own individual outcome, this characteristics may also 
affect the individual outcome of the other negotiator. 
Neither where such tacit awareness approaches ever before envisioned nor 
examined but also investigating the negotiators’ individual characteristics and their 
interdependence in computer supported negotiations – especially the HEXACO 
personality scales – is a complete novelty. 
The following two sections “Priorities in Negotiations” and “Computer-Supported 
Negotiations” will start building up a basic understanding for to the actual studies and 
analyses of this thesis. First the importance of priorities in negotiations, their chances and 
challenges will be illuminated before explaining what the foundations of the actual 
priorities used in these studies are. Then follows a short presentation of computer-
supported negotiations and what graphical decision aid was used within the experimental 
negotiations support system in this thesis. 
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The next section “Awareness in Negotiations” will describe the content of the two 
experimental studies and the first two main articles of this thesis. The terms “priority 
awareness” and “performance awareness” are introduced as solution approach and their 
operationalization and hypotheses presented in a concise way. Then, the foundation of 
these awareness approaches is described. 
And finally, before specifying the objectives and expected output of the thesis and 
presenting the results and discussion, the role of individual characteristics in computer-
supported negotiations are emphasized and the actor-partner interdependence model 
used for the analyses in the third main article of this thesis presented. 
 
PRIORITIES IN NEGOTIATIONS 
The awareness about the differences in priorities is crucial for an integrative negotiation 
to take place. Although an integrative negotiation is the best possible way to achieve a 
beneficial agreement for both, there are also other, suboptimal ways of coming to an 
agreement. An equal split – “meeting in the middle” on each issue – seems fair but in fact 
leads to an inferior joint outcome because the negotiation partner do not exchange 
concessions – lower prioritized issues against higher prioritized ones (Van der Schalk, 
Beersma, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2009). The same holds true for so called distributive 
negotiations: Although there may be more than one issue to agree upon, the negotiators 
tackle each issue individually and do not take the possibility of beneficial trade-offs into 
account (e. g. Barry & Friedman, 1998; De Dreu et al., 2007).  
The non-awareness of differences in priorities has been shown to lessen the joint 
outcome of a negotiation. Thompson and Hastie (1990) have coined the terms fixed-sum-
error and incompatibility error which are a direct result of not being aware of the others 
priorities. Regarding the first error, the negotiators wrongly assume that they both have 
the same priorities of issues, although they do not. Regarding the second error, the 
negotiators wrongly assume that they have different priorities of options within the 
issues, although they do not. These errors are also made by experienced negotiators 
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(Thompson, 1990) and in the case of the incompatibility error, they sometimes lead to 
lose-lose-agreements in which both agree on a common loss (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). 
On the other hand, multiple studies have shown that some kind of awareness 
about the priorities of the other negotiation party leads to a higher joint outcome. These 
studies relied either on the previous experience of the negotiators and their knowledge 
about the importance of priorities (Hyder, Prietula, & Weingart, 2000; Schei, Rognes, & 
Mykland, 2006; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) or on explicit instructions to think about 
priorities (Foroughi, Perkins, & Jelassi, 1995). 
Tacitly fostering awareness about priorities – without the need for experience, 
training or instructions – seems to be a promising endeavor as it could improve different 
measures of negotiation performance. In experimental negotiation studies, the priorities 
are often founded in payoff schedules which create the core of every elaborated 
negotiation. 
 
Foundation of Priorities 
The foundation of priorities lies within the quantification of preferences, which rarely 
happens in real life negotiations but makes them evaluable: A payoff schedule, which is 
frequently used in experimental negotiation studies (Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik, 2004; e.g. 
Hyder et al., 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 2008; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Van der Schalk et al., 
2009). In this thesis, the payoff schedule of Thompson and Hastie (1990) for a car 
buying/selling scenario was modernized and used: Participants are given a scenario and a 
specific role (e. g. a potential car buyer and a seller) and they are asked to negotiate over 
predefined issues with multiple options. 
The payoff schedule is an individual table with the issues to be negotiated and 
their options, which have points attached to them. The issues and options are identical for 
both negotiators because they are negotiating over the same thing. The attached points 
may differ between the negotiators because they may prefer different options. This 
difference in points for options leads to different priorities of issues. The goal of each 
IMPROVING NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH AWARENESS 13 
negotiator is to maximize the sum of his or her individual points. Table 1 holds a full 
overview of the used payoff schedule throughout this thesis. 
The issues financing, extras, warranty and technology/audio can be integratively 
exchanged (relevant to the fixed-sum error). Color and CO2 emission are compatible issues 
where both negotiators prioritize exactly the same option (relevant for the incompatibility 
error). Delivery date and price are distributive issues were both argue for a bigger share. 
For the creation of priorities of issues only the modulus of the highest scoring 
option is relevant. For the issue price, the buyer’s loss of the highest scoring option 
“24,500 €, -6000 points” is higher than for the issue delivery date the gain of the highest 
scoring option “1 month, 2400 points”. Price would therefore be of higher priority than 
delivery date. Although omitted in many experimental negotiation studies, such negative 
point scores have a valid reason to exist because sometimes negotiators also have to 
agree on who loses less and not only who gains more. 
Raiffa, Richardson and Metcalfe (2002, p. 214) use this approach of creating 
priorities by ranking the issues by the modulus of their highest scoring option in their 
evaluation of two-party integrative negotiations. Assigning points to options to represent 
different priorities is advisable because this switches the foundation of the own priorities 
from feeling to fact. 
In real life negotiations the different parties come with their own priorities. In an 
experimental negotiation it would be possible to get closer to real life by letting the 
negotiators create their own priorities out of written descriptions. Unfortunately, this 
approach has been shown to lead to less priority consistent behavior where negotiators 
state priorities but do not behave according to them (Filzmoser, Rios, Strecker, & 
Vetschera, 2010). This approach also creates a huge variability in priorities between the 
different negotiation parties which does not allow for meaningful analyses.  
Computer-supported negotiations and graphical decision aids are common for 
negotiations where payoff schedules – either self-made or given by the experimenter – are 
of importance. 
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Table 1 
Overview of Payoff Schedule with all Issues and their Options with Attached Individual Points 
Financing Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
CO2 Emission Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Warranty Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Delivery 
Date 
Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
8 % 1600 4000 88 g/km 0 0 6 months 0 1600 5 months 0 2400 
6 % 1200 3000 126 g/km -600 -600 12 months 1000 1200 4 months 600 1800 
4 % 800 2000 164 g/km -1200 -1200 18 months 2000 800 3 months 1200 1200 
2 % 400 1000 202 g/km -1800 -1800 24 months 3000 400 2 months 1800 600 
0 % 0 0 240 g/km -2400 -2400 30 months 4000 0 1 month 2400 0 
Extras Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Technology/Audio Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Price Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Color Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
1 0 3200 None 0 800 24.500 € -6000 0 Grey 1200 1200 
2 200 2400 Audio base equipment 800 600 23.520 € -4500 -1500 White 900 900 
3 400 1600 Multimedia equipment 1600 400 22.540 € -3000 -3000 Red 600 600 
4 600 800 Multimedia equipment + car computer 2400 200 21.560 € -1500 -4500 Black 300 300 
5 800 0 Multimedia equipment + car computer + navigation 3200 0 20.580 € 0 -6000 Silver 0 0 
The buyer and the seller could only see their own points during the negotiation. There were no restrictions made on the communication of the negotiators, including the sharing of any of 
this information.  
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COMPUTER-SUPPORTED NEGOTIATIONS 
Decision makers are increasingly relying on negotiation support systems which facilitate 
communication and coordination of individual activities (Kersten & Lai, 2007). Multiple 
negotiation support systems exist in real life negotiation settings such as Zopaf (Andinian 
Inc., 2015) or Smartsettle (iCan Systems Inc., 2015) and in experimental negotiation 
settings such as Inspire (Kersten & Noronha, 1999) or Negoisst (Schoop, Jertila, & List, 
2003), which structure the negotiation and create awareness for crucial information. 
Multiple studies conducted on different negotiation support systems have 
confirmed the utility of these systems and their positive influence on different negotiation 
outcomes (Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997; Schoop et al., 2014; Weber, Kersten, & Hine, 2006). 
These negotiation support systems were not only communication platforms 
holding relevant information for the negotiation but also made extensive use of 
visualizations. 
 
Graphical Decision Aids 
To support the negotiators in their decision making, graphical decision aids are often 
implemented in negotiation support systems (Gettinger & Koeszegi, 2012). Hence, an 
appropriate form of visualization could be used to foster awareness of differences in 
priorities. 
Bar charts are used worldwide from regular newspapers to business reports to 
scientific articles; they therefore seem to be a good choice for fostering priority awareness 
as most people seem to have no problems handling them. Weber, Kersten and Hine (2006) 
have already discussed the potential of bar charts for such use. Rangaswamy and Shell 
(1997) used bar charts in their negotiation support system to visualize the own priorities of 
issues, but neither did they examine the specific effects of this visualization nor did they 
examine the effects of priority awareness. Bar charts have been shown to lead to shorter 
response times in information retrieval tasks (Quispel & Maes, 2014) and also to more 
accurate judgment of proportions than other forms of visualization (Simkin & Hastie, 
1987). Additionally they lead to better comparisons of values than tables (Jacobs, 1994, 
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1999) and are also the advised visualization format for larger numerators (McCaffery et al., 
2012). 
As most people know bar charts, they seem to be a good choice for a graphical 
decision aid to not only tacitly foster awareness of priorities in a computer-supported 
negotiation (Kolodziej, Hesse, et al., 2016) but also to foster a more detailed priority 
awareness, named performance awareness (Kolodziej, Sassenberg, et al., 2016). When 
using negotiation support systems with graphical decision aids it is obvious that 
individual characteristics like for example the figural intelligence could have an influence 
on the individual outcome (Kolodziej & Sassenberg, 2016). 
 
AWARENESS IN NEGOTIATIONS 
To investigate the effects of different kinds of awareness on different measures of 
negotiation performance and their ability to diminish the fixed-sum and incompatibility 
error, an experimental negotiation support system was created. Two comprehensive 
experimental studies create the data basis for the three main articles of this thesis. In each 
of both experimental studies 132 participants negotiated in 66 dyads within a car 
buying/selling scenario. Both times, half of the dyads were in an experimental condition 
and half of the dyads in a control condition.  
The following subsections summarize the ideas behind priority and performance 
awareness and how they were operationalized and then present the concept of awareness 
in which this thesis is founded. 
 
Priority Awareness 
Priority awareness is the awareness of the negotiator of their priorities. The term was 
formally coined by de Jong, Tuyls, Verbeeck and Roos (2008) in the context of 
negotiations. It is a way of making a negotiation algorithm aware of priorities and model it 
so as to mimic human behavior where sometimes trade-offs are made based on different 
priorities. Our definition replaces the algorithm with a human. 
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Priority awareness can be fostered in a computer-supported negotiation by 
presenting to the negotiators their different priorities of issues with bar charts, where the 
bars are larger where the priority of an issue is higher (Figure 1; the condition was 
compared to one without the priority awareness approach Figure 2). These bars do not 
change their size by the choice of different options in the negotiation. They look the same 
from the beginning to the end.  
The main idea behind this first experiment is that if awareness about priorities 
created through experience (Hyder et al., 2000; Schei et al., 2006; Thompson & Hastie, 
1990) or explicit instructions (Foroughi et al., 1995) could lead to integrative negations and 
thus improve negotiation performance, it could be possible to tacitly create such 
awareness with a well-known visualization, that does not require any experience , training 
or explicit instructions and with this reduce the fixed-sum and incompatibility error and 
also improve negotiation performance. 
The hypotheses and research questions for this experiment are:  
H1: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness agree on a higher joint outcome 
than dyads negotiating without priority awareness. 
H2: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness achieve a higher pareto 
efficiency than dyads negotiating without priority awareness. 
H3: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness arrive at a lower impasse rate 
than dyads negotiating without priority awareness. 
RQ1a/b: How does priority awareness affect the objective and subjective fairness of the 
agreement? 
RQ2: How does priority awareness affect the satisfaction with the negotiation? 
RQ3: How does priority awareness affect the duration of the negotiation? 
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Figure 1. Negotiation screen with graphical decision aid using the priority awareness 
approach (as seen by the seller). 
 
 
Figure 2. Negotiation screen with graphical decision aid without priority awareness 
approach (as seen by the seller).
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Performance Awareness 
Performance awareness is the awareness of the negotiator about the state of their current 
performance. In learning sciences this term is either understood as the quality of the 
estimation of performance accomplished in a learning setting (Hershey & Wilson, 1997; 
Pressley & Ghatala, 1988; Sağlam, 2010) or the monitoring of the current performance in a 
learning setting (Chen, Liu, Ou, & Lin, 2001; Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990; Wade & 
Reynolds, 1989). It is likewise relevant for negotiations. 
Performance awareness can be fostered in a computer-supported negotiation by 
presenting to the negotiators their different priorities of issues and different priorities of 
options with transparent bar charts (Figure 3; this condition was compared to the already 
presented priority awareness approach Figure 4). The bars here are at first only indicated 
by horizontal lines where the outermost horizontal lines represent the priorities of issues. 
The other horizontal lines represent the priorities of options which fill up to bars, 
dependent on the chosen options. These bars change in size during the process of the 
negotiation.  
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Figure 3. Negotiation screen with graphical decision aid using the performance awareness 
approach (as seen by the seller). 
 
 
Figure 4. Negotiation screen with graphical decision aid using the priority awareness 
approach (as seen by the seller). 
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The main idea behind this second experiment is to further build upon the findings 
of the previous study. If the priority awareness approach with its non-interactive bar 
charts could diminish the fixed-sum but not the incompatibility error and still improve 
negotiation performance, an interactive approach using more of information and 
communication technology’s abilities could also diminish the incompatibility error and 
even further improve different measures of negotiation performance. Performance 
awareness has the potential to outperform priority awareness in making more detailed 
awareness information available, but interactivity and more awareness do not 
automatically equal better outcomes. The cognitive load theory (Chandler & Sweller, 
1991), the regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), and the need for strategic 
misrepresentation (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004) give reason to assume negative effects and a 
limit to the effectiveness of awareness in negotiations. 
Because of these uncertainties, the hypotheses for this experiment are all 
undirected:  
H1: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in the economic outcome 
measures of the negotiation from dyads negotiating with available performance 
awareness. 
H2: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in their satisfaction with 
the negotiation and their partner from dyads negotiating with available performance 
awareness. 
H3: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in the fairness of the 
negotiation from dyads negotiating with available performance awareness. 
H4: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in their practiced and 
perceived deceitfulness during the negotiation from dyads negotiating with available 
performance awareness. 
H5: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in how they deal with 
information for future negotiations from dyads negotiating with available 
performance awareness. 
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Foundation of Awareness 
The idea of fostering these kind of awareness originated in the knowledge and 
information awareness approach which was part of the two side articles of this thesis 
(Engelmann, Kolodziej, et al., 2014; Engelmann, Kozlov, et al., 2014). 
Knowledge and information awareness is defined as the awareness of group 
members’ about what the other members know about and where they know it about 
from. It was shown in multiple studies that implicitly fostering knowledge and information 
awareness in computer-supported work groups, enhanced the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their solution to a complex problem (Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann, 
Tergan, & Hesse, 2010; Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010). It also guided their communication 
(Dehler, Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2011) and increased the discussion and processing of 
unshared information (Engelmann & Hesse, 2011). This approach reduced the undesirable 
effect of too much trust between the group members in such tasks in which they would 
not question the decisions of the others and achieve an inferior result (Engelmann, 
Kolodziej, et al., 2014). It was possible to implicitly foster the development of a group 
norm facilitating the creation of the concept maps responsible for the knowledge and 
information awareness: The group members were given the possibility to watch each 
other in the creation of their concept maps, which in turn fostered knowledge and 
information awareness and improved their collaborative problem solving (Engelmann, 
Kozlov, et al., 2014) 
The adaptation of such an awareness approach to a more organizational context, 
specifically negotiations, seemed promising. Creating awareness in a computer-supported 
negotiation, nudging the negotiators to engage in integrative negotiation (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009), signaling differences in priorities (Spence, 1973) by highlighting priorities 
in bar charts (Richter, Scheiter, & Eitel, 2016; Van Gog, 2014) could show similar results like 
the aforementioned knowledge and information awareness approach. Although the 
method of creating awareness differs between the approaches – concept maps and bar 
charts – the implicit nature of facilitating awareness stays the same. Contrary to the 
scripting approach, which explicitly structures the interactive processes between two 
parties in collaboration scripts (Kollar, Fischer, & Hesse, 2006), there are no explicit 
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instructions on how to use the graphical decision aid in a negotiation. There is no 
information about its benefits for the negotiators and there is no training in how to make 
use of it for integrative negotiations. There are different psychological steps involved in 
creating priority or performance awareness (Table 2): It is dependent on the negotiators 
perceiving the bar chart per se before understanding that it is about differences in 
priorities, and finally interpreting it accordingly, using this information to beneficially 
integrate their different priorities. The mere visualization of priority information – or more 
detailed priority information which creates performance awareness – should be enough to 
foster awareness and improve different measures of negotiation performance. 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS IN NEGOTIATIONS 
Partners enter a negotiation with their individual personality and other individual 
characteristics which might not only shape their own outcome but might also do so for the 
outcome of the partner. Only recently the focus of negotiation studies shifted to the 
interindividual influences using the actor-partner interdependence model (APIM; Kenny, 
Kashy, & Cook, 2006) as the appropriate statistical method for the analysis (Turel, 2010). 
Table 2 
Psychological Steps Involved in the Effectiveness of Methods of Creating Awareness 
Step Description Example for this Thesis 
1 Perception The method of creating awareness has 
to be perceived by a person 
The attention of the person has to be 
caught in some way by the bar charts. 
2 Understanding The person has to understand what 
the content of the perceived method is 
It is about the differences in priorities 
of issues (and, additionally, options for 
performance awareness) 
3 Interpretation The person has to interpret the 
content in the context of the situation 
Understanding what the differences in 
priorities mean for the negotiation 
4 Behavior The person has to change his/her 
behavior based on the interpretation 
Engaging in integrative negotiation 
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Studies concerning personality – as measured with the “big five” personality 
factors – and individual negotiation outcomes have shown inconsistent results (Barry & 
Friedman, 1998; Foo et al., 2004; Liu, Friedman, & Chi, 2005; Ma & Jaeger, 2005). The freely 
available HEXACO personality scales (Ashton & Lee, 2009) are comparable to the “big five” 
and operationalize the most up to date model of personality structure . They have never 
before been applied in any negotiation study and in this context, also never analyzed with 
the actor-partner interdependence model. 
It is not only the personality which plays an important role in computer-supported 
negotiations with a graphical decision aid at its core but also additional characteristics 
like the social value orientation (Murphy, Ackerman, & Handgraaf, 2011) and the figural 
intelligence (Liepmann, Beauducel, Brocke, & Amthauer, 2007). The social value 
orientation is a set of “motivations that underlie interdependent decision behavior” 
(Murphy et al., 2011, p. 711) and is a measure of the magnitude of the concern people have 
for others (Murphy et al., 2011). It already has a big influence on the joint outcome in 
negotiations (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). When using a graphical decision aid in a 
negotiation support system, there is a strong connection to one’s general ability to 
understand and process graphically represented information. The interindividual effects 
of the social value orientation and the figural intelligence on the individual outcome have 
not been tested until now. 
 
Actor-Partner Interdependence Model 
The data of the second study – comparing priority with performance awareness – were 
analyzed on the individual level with the actor-partner interdependence model. 
The negotiation dyads are not independent of each other and, therefore, the 
effects of different characteristics on the individual outcomes cannot be analyzed without 
taking the partner into account. The buyer and the seller have both an actor effect – the 
effect of one of the partner’s own characteristic on his or her own individual outcome – 
and a partner effect – the effect of one of the partner’s own characteristic on the 
individual outcome of the other partner (Figure 5). 
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Actor 
Negotiator A, the seller. 
 
 
Partner 
Negotiator B, the buyer. 
Figure 5. Simplified Schematic of the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model 
 
The main idea behind these analyses is to find out, how the personality traits – 
measured with the HEXACO – the social value orientation and the figural intelligence 
affect the negotiators’ individual outcomes in negotiation support systems with different 
amounts of information (awareness) and interactivity. 
Because of the heterogeneity of previous findings and the novelty of this endeavor 
only research questions are stated: 
RQ1: How does personality affect the individual outcomes? 
RQ2: How does the social value orientation affect the individual outcomes? 
RQ3: How does figural intelligence affect the individual outcomes? 
 
OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED OUTPUT OF THE THESIS 
The broad idea, starting this thesis was to implement the concept of the previously 
developed knowledge and information awareness approach (Engelmann, Kolodziej, et al., 
2014; Engelmann, Kozlov, et al., 2014) in a more organizational context, namely 
negotiations. The objective of the first article in this thesis (Kolodziej, Hesse, et al., 2016) 
can be seen as a proof of concept: Can priority awareness be tacitly facilitated with bar 
charts in a computer-supported negotiation? This tacit approach could diminish the fixed-
sum-error and incompatibility error – without the need for specific experience, training or 
Actor Effect 
Partner Effect 
Individual 
Characteristic 
Individual 
Outcome 
Individual 
Characteristic 
Individual 
Outcome 
IMPROVING NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH AWARENESS 26 
instructions – lead to more integrative negotiations and improve different hard and soft 
measures of negotiation performance. 
The second article (Kolodziej, Sassenberg, et al., 2016) builds upon the findings 
and shortcomings of the priority awareness approach. While a non-interactive priority 
awareness approach could diminish the fixed-sum error, the incompatibility error was still 
strong. Making more use of information and communication technologies capabilities to 
create performance awareness – a more detailed priority awareness – through the use of 
interactivity could also diminish the incompatibility error and further improve different 
measures of negotiation performance. Contrary to such positive effects stand the 
cognitive load theory, the regret theory and the need for strategic misrepresentation 
which foreshadow the limits of awareness in negotiations. 
The third article (Kolodziej & Sassenberg, 2016) goes deeper into individual 
characteristics which hugely influence the individual outcome in such computer-
supported negotiations with differing amounts of information (awareness) and 
interactivity. The objective of this study is how personality traits, social value orientation 
and figural intelligence interindividually affect the negotiators in such a negotiation 
support system. The actor-partner interdependence model is used to analyze the data 
from the second article on an individual level. 
In total this thesis introduces the priority awareness approach and shows that it 
leads to better negotiation performance. It also shows the limits of priority awareness in 
negotiations and explores the underlying individual characteristics, which show a 
surprising pattern for being beneficial to one or the other negotiator. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The same results and discussions mentioned here can also be found similarly in the three 
main articles attached to this thesis. Although the author of this thesis is mainly 
responsible for the creation of the articles their underlying studies and analyses, the 
articles were published in collaboration with other authors. Hence, the active use of “we” 
in the following sections to meet the demand to address the coauthors. 
For an overview of all hypotheses and research questions addressed in this thesis 
see Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Overview of all Addressed Hypotheses and Research Questions in This Thesis 
Article 1 – Priority Awareness 
H1 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness agree on a higher joint 
outcome than dyads negotiating without priority awareness. 
H2 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness achieve a higher pareto 
efficiency than dyads negotiating without priority awareness. 
H3 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness arrive at a lower impasse 
rate than dyads negotiating without priority awareness. 
RQ1a/b How does priority awareness affect the objective and subjective fairness of the 
agreement? 
RQ2 How does priority awareness affect the satisfaction with the negotiation? 
RQ3 How does priority awareness affect the duration of the negotiation? 
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Article 2 – Performance Awareness 
H1 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in the economic outcome 
measures of the negotiation from dyads negotiating with available performance 
awareness. 
H2 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in their satisfaction with the 
negotiation and their partner from dyads negotiating with available performance 
awareness. 
H3 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in the fairness of the 
negotiation from dyads negotiating with available performance awareness. 
H4 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in their practiced and 
perceived deceitfulness during the negotiation from dyads negotiating with available 
performance awareness. 
H5 Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in how they deal with 
information for future negotiations from dyads negotiating with available performance 
awareness. 
Article 3 – Individual Characteristics 
RQ1 How does personality affect the individual outcomes? 
RQ2 How does the social value orientation affect the individual outcomes? 
RQ3 How does figural intelligence affect the individual outcomes? 
 
Priority Awareness 
Results. For the analyses of all hypotheses, except the one concerning the impasse rate, 
we followed the advice of Tripp and Sondak (1992) and excluded all dyads which stated an 
impasse and therefore did not achieve any interpretable outcome. This approach left 60 
dyads in the sample (nEC = 28, nCC = 32). Substituting a non-agreement with a zero or mean 
point score distorts the results because such dyads did not agree on a zero or mean point 
score but did not agree at all. We used the aggregated data of the negotiation dyads for all 
analyses because the individuals were not independent of each other (Cress, 2008). 
Depending on whether the assumptions of different statistical methods such as, for 
example, a normal distribution of values or the homogeneity of variance were met, we 
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either calculated a t-Test, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, a pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
with a p-value adjustment by Holm (1979), or a Chi-squared test with their appropriate 
effect sizes to compare the performance of the conditions. 
There were no significant differences on the group level in terms of the control 
measures age, familiarity with the partner, computer abilities, effortlessness, and 
frequency of using tables or diagrams. We assessed the level of experience of the 
negotiators by looking at their individually stated frequency of previous negotiations. The 
participants were “rather unexperienced” (M = 2.39, SD = 0.86) in negotiating. 
H1 confirmed: The dyads with priority awareness agreed on a higher joint outcome 
(M = 9793, SD = 1960) than dyads without priority awareness (M = 8775, SD = 1890, 
t(58) = 2.05, p = .045, d = .53). This makes up for a difference in the mean of 12%. 
H2 partially confirmed: The dyads with priority awareness also achieved a 
marginally higher pareto efficiency in their negotiation (M = .959, SD = .13) than the dyads 
without priority awareness (M = .935, SD = .12, W = 568.5, p = .074, r = -.23). This makes up 
for a difference in the mean of 2.4%. 
H3 disconfirmed: The dyads with priority awareness arrived at a marginally higher 
impasse rate (n = 5) than dyads without priority awareness (n = 1, χ²(1, N = 66) = 2.93, 
p = .087, φ = .21). 
Although it seems that dyads with priority awareness achieved an objectively fairer 
agreement (M = 36.7%, SD = 34.0%) than dyads without priority awareness (M = 50.9%, 
SD = 49.7%, W = 361, p = .197) they did not differ significantly (RQ1a). They also did not 
differ in the subjective fairness of agreements (MEC = 3.23, SDEC = .49, MCC = 3.27, SDCC = .43, 
W = 440, p = .904) which both conditions stated as “rather fair” (RQ1b). 
We also did not find any difference in the satisfaction with the negotiation between 
dyads with priority awareness (M = 3.05, SD = .33) and dyads without priority awareness 
(M = 3.07, SD = .41, t(58) = -0.22, p = .828). Dyads of both conditions were “rather satisfied” 
with their negotiations (RQ2). 
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With regard to RQ3, we found no difference in the duration of the negotiation 
between dyads with priority awareness (M = 12:03 minutes, SD = 07:19 minutes) and dyads 
without priority awareness (M = 11:31 minutes, SD = 06:07 minutes, W = 548, p = .970). 
The transcription of the audio recordings of the negotiations resulted in 7911 lines 
of utterances which were independently coded by two raters on three variables, with 
either a 0 or a 1: (1) Reference to the bar chart, for example, “We can take financing and 
warranty; it seems as if we both have a large and a small bar.” (2) Reference to priorities, 
for example, “It's more important for me that the CO2 emission is alright. The color is not 
important to me at all.” (3) Reference to point scores, for example, “Yes, how many points 
do you get for multimedia equipment and car computer?” 
Cohen's Kappa for two raters showed moderate to substantial agreement (Landis 
& Koch, 1977) between the independent raters with κRefBarChart = .56, κRefPriorities = .64 and 
κRefPreferences = .61. In the following step, the raters agreed on one correct rating for each 
utterance by working through the whole transcription together. This unified rating was 
used for the next calculations. 
Dyads with priority awareness referred to the bar chart more often (SUM = 154) 
than dyads without priority awareness (SUM = 32, W = 7581658, p < .001, r = -.10). They also 
referred to priorities more often (SUM = 198) than dyads without priority awareness 
(SUM = 141, W = 7724479, p = .023, r = -.03). Both conditions did not differ in their reference 
to point scores (SUMEC = 600, SUMCC = 538, W = 7789097, p = .789). 
 
Discussion. The knowledge about the priorities of a negotiation partner could be 
assumed to have a high impact on the economic outcome of a negotiation because it 
creates the possibility of an integrative agreement in which the negotiators give in on less 
important issues and, in exchange, take on more important ones. Until now, no study has 
systematically tested the effect of making the negotiators only aware of the differences 
between their priorities on different measures of negotiation outcome. Our goal was to 
create this priority awareness with an intervention so trivial that it could be implemented 
with minimal effort. We therefore used ordinary bar charts as known from business 
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reports or school books. None of the negotiators was instructed on how or why to use the 
bar charts and none of them was kept from freely exchanging any information 
whatsoever. The negotiation dyads could perceive the bar charts as an awareness tool, 
they could understand its benefit and they could use it for making more trade-offs to 
achieve a better negotiation performance. 
The results of 66 computer-supported negotiations between the roles of a car 
buyer and seller have shown that negotiation dyads, which were made aware of the 
priorities of their negotiation partner, negotiated an averaged 12% higher joint outcome 
than dyads which were not made aware of the priorities of their negotiation partner. 
Dyads with priority awareness tended to arrive at averaged 2.4% more pareto efficient 
agreements, leaving less profit on the table. Surprisingly, dyads with priority awareness 
might have been slightly more likely to abort the negotiation than dyads without. There 
were no differences between dyads negotiating with or without priority awareness on the 
measures stated in the open research questions. Both conditions did not differ in the 
duration of the negotiation, the objective or subjective fairness of the agreement, or their 
satisfaction with the negotiation. 
It is possible to make negotiators aware of each other’s priorities in a tacit and 
unobtrusive way. The results of the study speak for the effectiveness of the priority 
awareness approach. It would be possible to integrate this approach – creating priority 
awareness through bar charts – in existing negotiation support systems, at least in an 
optional way. Furthermore, a specialized negotiation support system is not needed for 
real life negotiations in order to make use of priority awareness. Agreeing on using this 
approach and a spreadsheet program are already sufficient to improve the negotiation 
performance. It is even conceivable that both parties agree to draw bar charts 
representing their priorities of issues on a single sheet of paper. The usage of a single 
sheet of paper needs further research as it differs in a great way from computer-supported 
negotiations. 
Further, this approach is not about negotiations over the distribution of a product 
alone but about decision making in general. The use of a negotiation support system with 
an optional priority awareness function would be advisable and every improvement of the 
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agreement would benefit all parties. An example would be different departments of one 
organization, which clearly have the common goal of success for the organization 
although they have different priorities. Being aware of these differences and using them 
for integrative decision making would benefit the organization as a whole and, in return, 
all of the departments. The feasibility of this idea was shortly presented by Thiemann and 
Engelmann (2015). 
Regarding bar charts, it becomes obvious how omnipresent they are in everyday 
life. They are quick to make and seem easy to understand. But the ability to correctly read 
and interpret even ordinary bar charts is not necessarily intuitive and has to be learned by 
some people. This study gave us a hint that some people had at least initially difficulty 
understanding the bar chart and therefore they could have lacked the advantage of those 
with a higher aptitude for this type of visual literacy. Especially in business settings, it is 
crucial to be able to read bar charts, understand them, and to react to their information in 
order to make adequate decisions. Organizations also use bar charts to portray their 
performance in a better light (Beattie & Jones, 1992). Thus a critical examination of bar 
charts would not only be wise for the sake of fostering priority awareness to improve 
negotiations but also in many other business related situations. Such visual literacy is 
taken for granted for the most people because we are exposed to bar charts ever since 
entering school. There is no special emphasis in schools on teaching visualizations or 
graphical decision aids, but as we strongly rely on them to simplify and aggregate 
information for us to make decisions, it would be advisable to at least in some way 
address the task of reading, understand, and interpreting graphical decision aids.  
Somewhat limiting in this study was, that the participants were rather 
unexperienced in terms of negotiations. The effectiveness could be even higher in real life 
negotiations. People negotiating for a living could have taken more out of the awareness 
of the priorities of the others. They have the experience needed to understand this 
information better and to make better use of the integrative potential of the negotiation. 
On the other hand, it has been shown that even unexperienced negotiators without 
training could make beneficial use of priority information when made aware about them. 
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We would like to point out that the influence of priority awareness on the impasse 
rate has never been measured in this way before and that it is only meaningfully 
interpretable if enough impasses occur naturally. If it would not have been 
counterhypothetical, this result could have been ignored because the total number of 
impasses was so low that it can only be interpreted in a descriptive way. Nevertheless, a 
possible explanation could be that fostering awareness of the priorities of the other party 
works well in making the integrative potential of the negotiation visible, but the possible 
unwillingness of one negotiator to make concessions – even though his or her priorities 
are available to the other – would lead the other negotiator to abort the negotiation. 
Future studies will show whether this is a recurring phenomenon or just a coincidence in 
the sample of participants. 
This experiment has shown that the bar charts in our study had their own share of 
drawbacks in their simplicity. An informal questioning of the participants after the 
experiment showed that many expected an interactive instead of a non-interactive bar 
chart. They were surprised that the bars did not change in size in correspondence to the 
marked options in the negotiation because they were accustomed to more interactivity in 
a computer-supported environment. A non-interactive bar chart has now been proven to 
successfully foster priority awareness, but it may not deliver enough information in a 
computer-supported environment for the negotiators and also has its limitations as it 
does nothing to resolve the incompatibility error (Thompson, 1991). Forty-five percent of 
all dyads did agree at least in one of two compatible issues on an option that was 
suboptimal for both negotiators although both preferred the identical option. They 
agreed on a joint loss. In our next study, we use interactive bar charts to foster priority 
awareness and compare them to the non-interactive bar charts. This interactivity could 
create not only a better awareness about priorities but also another quality of awareness. 
The negotiators would not only be made aware of the different priorities of issues but also 
of the different priorities of options, as the bars would change in size according to the 
marked options in the negotiation. This could result not only in an even better negotiation 
performance but, while creating awareness for differences between issues, also create 
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awareness for the similarities between issues and help to resolve the incompatibility 
error. 
For the present study and the next study with interactive bar charts, we assume a 
state in which negotiation parties truthfully and openly share all the information about 
their priorities. Negotiations here take place in a manner of a full, open, truthful exchange 
(FOTE; Raiffa et al., 2002) which is also assumed in other studies (e.g. Herath, Bremser, & 
Birnberg, 2010). This can be considered a limitation of this study because although 
negotiations take place in such a manner, the case of a partial open, truthful exchange 
(POTE), in which not all information is shared, is prevalent in real life negotiations. After 
we have established that priority awareness improves negotiation outcomes at the level 
of the issues in this study, and we have evaluated whether it works better on the 
additional level of options in a second study, we will address the partial open, truthful 
exchange of priorities in a potential third study on priority awareness not part of this 
thesis. This will further validate the priority awareness approach and make way for its 
implementation in existing negotiation support systems and for its broad usage in a 
computer-supported environment to enhance integrative decision making in a multitude 
of natural settings. 
 
Conclusion. A trivial bar chart including the priorities of the other negotiator is enough to 
improve the negotiation performance, without negative consequences on satisfaction, 
fairness and duration. This kind of awareness is enough for the most, there are no further 
instructions needed. Such a simple and inexpensive way to improve – not only – 
computer-supported negotiations could easily be integrated as an optional feature in 
existing professional negotiation support systems and benefit its users. 
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Performance Awareness 
Results. For the analyses we used a Wilcoxon rank-sum test or, where the normality 
assumption was not violated, a t-Test. There were no meaningful differences between the 
conditions in the control measures age, familiarity with the partner, computer abilities, 
effortlessness, and frequency of using tables or diagrams (all Ws > 2077 with N = 132, all 
ps > .165). Both conditions can be seen as identical and all differences in the measures of 
negotiation performance can be ascribed to the condition. All analyses were conducted 
on the aggregated data on the level of dyads because the individuals were not 
independent of each other (Cress, 2008). There were no impasses and all dyads achieved a 
positive joint outcome. 
Table 4 holds an overview of the correlations between the used measures of 
negotiation performance. All measures forming one hypothesis are significantly 
correlated with each other. 
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Table 4 
Overall Correlations between the Used Measures of Negotiation Performance 
 Joint 
outcome 
Pareto 
efficiency 
Satisfaction Likeability Objective 
fairness 
Subjective 
fairness 
Personal 
deceitfulness 
Perceived 
deceitfulness 
Information 
disclosure 
Information 
memory 
Joint outcome 
 
 0.996***  0.060  0.019 -0.175  0.018  0.085  0.032  0.319** -0.009 
Pareto efficiency 0.996*** 
 
 0.069  0.030 -0.195  0.031  0.074  0.042  0.324** -0.029 
Satisfaction  0.060 0.069 
 
 0.493*** -0.212  0.660*** -0.480*** -0.473*** -0.137 -0.047 
Likeability  0.019  0.030 0.493*** 
 
-0.199  0.566*** -0.547*** -0.567*** -0.330** -0.112 
Objective fairness -0.175 -0.195 -0.212 -0.199 
 
-0.319**  0.265*  0.255*  0.027  0.350** 
Subjective fairness  0.018  0.031  0.660***  0.566*** -0.319** 
 
-0.604*** -0.602*** -0.282* -0.211 
Personal deceitfulness  0.085  0.074 -0.480*** -0.547***  0.265* -0.604*** 
 
 0.701***  0.482*** 0.216 
Perceived deceitfulness  0.032  0.042 -0.473*** -0.567***  0.255* -0.602*** 0.701*** 
 
 0.471***  0.076 
Information disclosure  0.319**  0.324** -0.137 -0.330**  0.027 -0.282*  0.482*** 0.471*** 
 
 0.298* 
Information memory -0.009 -0.029 -0.047 -0.112  0.350** -0.211  0.216  0.076 0.298* 
 Spearman’s correlation with pairwise-deletion. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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H1 disconfirmed: Both conditions did not differ in the agreed joint outcome 
(MPriA = 10055, SDPriA = 2428, MPerA = 9055, SDPerA = 2796, p = .262) and the achieved pareto 
efficiency (MPriA = 0.96, SDPriA = 0.10, MPerA = 0.89, SDPerA = 0.26, p = .228). 
H2 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 3.23, SD = 0.40) 
were more satisfied with the negotiation than the dyads with performance awareness (M = 
2.99, SD = 0.44, W = 690, p = .031, r = -.28) and they also found their negotiation partner 
more likeable (MPriA = 3.49, SDPriA = 0.40, MPerA = 3.18, SDPerA = 0.42, W = 749, p = .003, r = -.37) 
H3 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 3.43, SD = 0.41) 
found their agreement subjectively fairer than the dyads with performance awareness 
(M = 3.20, SD = 0.40, W = 702.5, p = .020, r = -.41). Objectively, there was no difference in the 
fairness of the agreement between the conditions (MPriA = 16.5%, SDPriA = 22.0%, 
MPerA = 22.6%, SDPerA = 30.4%, W = 453, p = .237) 
H4 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 1.51, SD = 0.41) 
not only said that they were less deceitful in the negotiation than the dyads with 
performance awareness (M = 1.88, SD = 0.43, W = 283, p = .001, r = -.41), and they also 
perceived their negotiation partner as less deceitful (MPriA = 1.59, SDPriA = 0.40, MProA = 1.80, 
SDProA = 0.36, t(63) = -2.15, p = .036, d = .53).  
H5 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 2.27, SD = 0.63) 
were more willing to also present their full payoff schedule to their partner in future 
negotiations than the dyads with performance awareness (M = 2.58, SD = 0.55, t(63) = -2.13, 
p = .037, d = .53). In replicating the priorities from the other party after the negotiation, the 
negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 25.76, SD = 5.38) remembered fewer 
correct priorities of the other party than the dyads with performance awareness 
(M = 20.18, SD = 7.49, t(64) = 3.48 , p < .001, d = .86). 
 
Discussion. A successful negotiation strongly relies on the negotiators’ awareness of 
each other’s priorities. Being aware of which issues could be traded off in a beneficial way 
leads to an integrative negotiation. We compared two different kinds of awareness and 
their influence on different measures of negotiation performance in an experimental 
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negotiation support system: (1) priority awareness, tacitly facilitated with non-interactive 
bar charts and (2) performance awareness, tacitly facilitated with interactive bar charts.  
Through its interactivity, the performance awareness approach could have 
possibly facilitated the steps needed to create awareness (see Table 2) and thus diminish 
the fixed-sum-error. Additionally, it could have possibly created another quality of priority 
awareness on the level of options as well as issues, which could have reduced the 
incompatibility error. Making a more extensive use of information and communications 
technologies, interactive possibilities did not, however, improve the negotiation 
performance; on the contrary, it even had detrimental effects: There was no difference in 
the joint outcome or in the pareto efficiency – being indicators for the fixed-sum-error – 
and ultimately no difference in the commitment of the incompatibility error between 
dyads negotiating with priority awareness or performance awareness. Dyads negotiating 
with performance awareness were less satisfied with their negotiation, found their partner 
less likable, found their agreement less fair – although there was no objective difference in 
fairness – were more deceitful in the negotiation, and also thought their partner was more 
deceitful. There were two results in which dyads negotiating with performance awareness 
had a higher score than those negotiating with priority awareness. On the one hand, they 
could remember the priorities of their partner better and, on the other hand, they were 
less willing to disclose even more information in form of their payoff schedule. 
Although the performance awareness approach was assumed to have a great 
potential for being superior to the priority awareness approach, it was mostly inferior to it. 
An explanation of why there was no difference in the joint outcome and the pareto 
efficiency between the conditions lies in the higher complexity of the interactive bar 
charts and their greater need for cognitive resources (Chandler & Sweller, 1991). Further, 
although performance awareness created awareness of the priorities of options inside 
issues, making the options discoverable – which both negotiators unanimously preferred 
– and thus potentially circumventing the incompatibility error, we believe that the 
negotiators were too busy handling the higher complexity that accompanied the 
introduced interactivity to have also noticed these kinds of options. The interactivity may 
have led to too much awareness and too much information to process at once. This is also 
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in line with Schmutz et al. (2009) where higher complexity led likewise to less satisfaction 
with a computer system. 
The regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) holds an answer to why 
performance awareness had these adverse effects on satisfaction with the negotiation, 
likeability of the partner, the subjective fairness of the agreement, as well as the personal 
and the perceived deceptiveness. These five concepts were significantly correlated with 
each other, indicating that these are interrelated concepts which might have been 
influenced at once. Performance awareness not only showed the current performance in 
the negotiation, but also made the transition from a previous state more salient: The 
negotiators were made aware of what they have lost in the transition of one offer to 
another and what the other negotiator had received in return, which may not have been a 
fair trade. Also, the goal of the negotiation was to maximize the individual points – to get 
the bars to an optimal size. Being made aware of a deviation from this goal could have 
also led to frustration. 
As for the higher deceptiveness and the perceived deceptiveness of the partner in 
the performance awareness condition, there seems to be a need for strategic 
misrepresentation (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004), which becomes more visible, the less 
information there is that the negotiators can hide. In a scenario in which each negotiator 
is made aware of the other’s priorities of issues and options, complete rational and fair 
negotiators would achieve a perfect integrative agreement with the highest possible joint 
outcome and perfect pareto efficiency. But humans are not completely rational and fair (f. 
e. Henrich et al., 2001). The highest individual outcome is only possible at the cost of the 
negotiation partner’s individual outcome. In a scenario in which more detailed 
information about one’s priorities is available, the only possible way to gain a higher 
individual outcome is to be deceptive. But because the priority information is available, 
this deception is easier to see through. 
The dyads with priority awareness were more willing to even share their individual 
payoff schedule. Dyads with performance awareness already had more awareness and 
they were less convinced of sharing even more information. The correlations with the joint 
outcome and pareto efficiency indicate that a higher willingness to share even more 
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information was connected to a better economical negotiation outcome. It seems as if 
awareness of negotiation relevant information has its benefits and people assume that 
more would be better, but when they have more awareness of negotiation-relevant 
information, they change their mind. This again is an indicator of the need for strategic 
misrepresentation of information because people who have less opportunity to deceive 
are also less willing to share even more information. 
The individual payoff schedule is the basis of every complex negotiation. It 
attaches measureable values to options and creates priorities for issues. Otherwise, 
negotiators would have to rely on fast assumptions of which issue or option is more or less 
important to them. Giving away the individual payoff schedule is a full disclosure of the 
key information in a negotiation. Our results show that negotiators would prefer a partial, 
open, truthful exchange over a full, open, truthful exchange (Raiffa et al., 2002).  
After the negotiation, the dyads with performance awareness knew more about the 
priorities of their negotiation partner than the dyads with priority awareness. 
Remembering the priorities of the partner after the negotiation is useful for recurring 
negotiations between the same parties as this would save time in coming to terms with 
the others’ priorities. Other studies on awareness centered on learning and problem 
solving. In these studies, the extent of the knowledge that one group member gained 
about the others was assessed (e. g. Engelmann, Dehler, Bodemer, & Buder, 2009). In such 
a context, added interactivity and more detailed awareness would be more useful since it 
has been clearly shown to lead to more engagement with the information of the other and 
better retention. 
A shortcoming of the present study is the mentioned full, open, truthful, exchange 
of information that we granted the negotiators. We did so to be able to compare the 
effectiveness of the two different awareness conditions, which could not have been 
properly done without giving away all priority information about issues (and options). 
Through a full, open, truthful exchange in a negotiation, the negotiators may “gain clarity, 
simplicity and crispness of definition” (Raiffa et al., 2002, p. 87, p. 87) about their 
negotiation which also is the case in reality (Herath et al., 2010; Raiffa et al., 2002). A 
partial, open, truthful exchange is also the case in reality: Not all information is exchanged 
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open and truthfully. Sometimes a full, open, truthful exchange is not possible with a 
partner who cannot be trusted and sometimes negotiations start out as partially open and 
truthful but then change to fully open and truthful, understanding its benefits (Raiffa et 
al., 2002). 
Interactive visualizations are broadly used in economical decision making (Dilla, 
Janvrin, & Raschke, 2010). Their goal is to interactively visualize different key performance 
indicators to help decision-makers or negotiators to come to a beneficial decision and in 
the context of a negotiation, a beneficial agreement. This study leads to the question how 
many interactive computer-supported environments could work as well as non-
interactive ones which are implemented in a faster, cheaper, and simpler way. It is not a 
question of adding more interactive features but removing some. Removing features, 
reducing the amount of information, and limiting the amount of possible interaction 
could lead to the same or even better outcomes. Future studies will have to focus on 
simpler ways of creating a limited amount of awareness and also on a partial, open, 
truthful exchange of information, answering the question: How much voluntarily given 
awareness about one’s own information is enough to improve negotiation performance? 
 
Conclusion. There seems to be the phenomenon of too much awareness. Performance 
awareness makes the current state of the negotiation salient to the negotiators and can 
clearly help facilitate decision making processes in a computer-supported environment. It 
unfortunately also leads to simply too much information to handle at once efficiently, to 
feelings of regret, and prevents the use of strategic misrepresentation. These effects have 
a negative influence on satisfaction, fairness, and honesty. Such an awareness approach 
comes with its share of disadvantages that does not justify the additional amount of time 
and resources needed to create and maintain it. Non-interactive awareness approaches 
are easier and cheaper to create and maintain and optimally do not take up much mental 
effort in using them, do not leave the negotiators with feelings of regret, and should still 
leave the negotiators some room for strategic misrepresentation of information. 
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Individual Characteristics 
Results. Table 4 holds an overview of all significant results of the actor-partner 
interdependence model analyses. There were no condition specific results found. 
 
Table 4 
Overview of Results of the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model Analyses 
Measure 
Actor Effect 
on Individual Outcome 
 
Partner Effect 
on Individual Outcome 
β  β  b  r 
HEXACO Emotionality .036  -.173  -337  -.173 
    Dependence -.039  -.188  -368  -.184 
    Sentimentality -.087  -.225  -438  -.221 
    Anxiety .112  -.044     
    Fearfulness .154  -.074     
HEXACO Honesty Humility -.079  .070     
    Sincerity -.159  .101     
    Fairness -.073  -.056     
    Greed Avoidance -.041  .070     
    Modesty .039  .121     
HEXACO Extraversion -.096  -.024     
    Social Self-Esteem -.160  .068     
    Social Boldness -.092  -.080     
    Sociability -.018  -.053     
    Liveliness -.030  -.047     
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HEXACO Agreeableness -.076  -.044     
    Forgiveness .030  .030     
    Gentleness -.082  -.088     
    Flexibility -.104  -.016     
    Patience -.113  -.068     
HEXACO Conscientiousness .073  -.060     
    Organization -.038  -.068     
    Diligence .038  .007     
    Perfectionism .119  -.054     
    Prudence .084  -.097     
HEXACO Openness to Experience -.085  .122     
    Aesthetic Appreciation -.051  .059     
    Inquisitiveness -.097  .121     
    Creativity -.043  .091     
    Unconventionality -.029  .076     
Social Value Orientation .020  .206  401  .195 
Figural Intelligence .004  .199  389  .191 
Besides Social Value Orientation with N = 130 individuals in N = 65 dyads (due to technical 
errors) all N = 132 individuals in N = 66 dyads. Effects marked bold are significant with  
p < .05. 
 
The individual characteristic of the HEXACO scale emotionality had a partner effect 
on the individual outcome. A negotiator’s own emotionality had no influence on his or her 
own individual outcome but the more emotional the opposing partner was, the lower the 
negotiator’s own individual outcome turned out to be. Two subscales of emotionality, 
namely, dependence and sentimentality had similar effects. 
 
IMPROVING NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH AWARENESS 44 
The individual characteristic of the subscale dependence also had a partner effect 
on the individual outcome. A negotiator’s own need for emotional support from others 
had no influence on his or her own individual outcome but the more the opposing partner 
needed emotional support, the lower the negotiator’s own individual outcome became. 
The individual characteristic of the subscale sentimentality had a partner effect on 
the individual outcome too. A negotiator’s own strength of feeling an emotional bond had 
no influence on his or her own individual outcome but the higher the strength of feeling an 
emotional bond of the opposing partner was, the lower the negotiator’s own individual 
outcome turned out to be. 
The individual characteristic of the social value orientation had a partner effect on 
the individual outcome. A negotiator’s own social orientation had no influence on his or 
her own individual outcome but the more social the orientation of the opposing partner 
was, the higher the negotiator’s own individual outcome was. 
The individual characteristic of the figural intelligence had a partner effect on the 
individual outcome. A negotiator’s own figural intelligence had no influence on his or her 
own individual outcome but the higher the figural intelligence of the opposing partner 
was, the higher the negotiator’s own individual outcome was. 
 
Discussion. In this experimental study, we sought to find answers on how the HEXACO 
personality scales and relevant measures such as figural intelligence and social value 
orientation affected the individual outcomes in a computer-supported negotiation. To 
accomplish this, we compared two conditions with negotiation support system, differing 
in their amount of information and interactive capabilities, which ultimately did not differ 
in their results. Interestingly, a negotiator’s own personality traits had no influence on his 
or her own individual outcome. A negotiator’s own individual outcome lies mostly in the 
hands of the opposing partner. Table 5 holds an overview of the partner’s characteristics 
which may improve a negotiator’s own individual outcome in a computer-supported 
negotiation. 
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Table 5 
Partner’s Characteristics that Improve a Negotiator’s own Individual Outcome Within 
a Negotiation Support System 
Measure Partner’s characteristic 
HEXACO Emotionality Lower emotionality 
    Dependence Lower need for emotional support 
    Sentimentality Lower strength of feeling and emotional bond 
Social Value Orientation Higher prosocial attitude 
Figural Intelligence Higher figural intelligence 
 
Higher emotionality, a higher need for emotional support, and a higher feeling of 
an emotional bond are personality traits of one negotiation partner which could elicit 
caring behavior in the other negotiator or a stronger emotional bond, resulting in more 
concessions from the other negotiator. The only other study using the direct individual 
outcome in connection with personality traits, as we did, showed that a higher 
emotionality – or neuroticism – improved the individual outcome (Foo et al., 2004). 
However, it seems to be true that the high emotionality of one negotiation partner does 
not improve his or her own individual outcome, but it instead worsens the individual 
outcome of the less emotional negotiation partner. Further studies are needed to fully 
understand the individual influence of emotionality on the individual outcomes as a 
higher score in this personality trait is common in the population and has a high economic 
cost for society (Cuijpers et al., 2010). 
The higher social value orientation of one negotiation partner, improving only the 
individual outcome of the other, fell in line with previous research: Prosocial individuals 
were less demanding but simultaneously more giving and considerate (Dreu & Lange, 
1995). This would explain the higher individual outcome of their negotiation partner. It is 
still interesting to see that social orientation of a negotiator had no influence on his or her 
own individual outcome. 
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The higher figural intelligence of the partner played an important role in the 
negotiation with a negotiation support system using a graphical decision aid: The 
understanding of the graphical decision aid is crucial for beneficial trade-offs, and lacking 
the general ability to understand figural representations might hinder this process. We 
believe that the negotiator with a better understanding of the graphical decision aid 
offered more profitable concessions to the other negotiator, but in return received less 
profitable concessions back due to the other’s lower general ability to understand the 
figures in form of bar charts.  
One shortcoming of this experimental study is that these findings for the HEXACO 
scales and the findings for the Big Five are not fully comparable: (1) Although the HEXACO 
is very similar to the Big Five, it is not identical. (2) Previous studies did not use the actor-
partner interdependence model but lesser methods to test the influence on individual 
outcomes. (3) Previous studies did not use the direct individual outcome measured in 
points but the individual deviation from a preset individual target. 
More studies researching the HEXACO scales in a computer-supported negotiation, 
using the actor-partner-interdependence model for analysis of the direct individual 
outcome are needed to create a more complete knowledge base on the influence of 
personality traits on individual outcomes in negotiations. Also, further research is needed 
to fully assess the reasons, why the negotiator’s own individual outcome lies mostly in the 
hand of the partner and stays uninfluenced by one’s own characteristics. 
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Conclusion. Negotiators seem to compensate the deficiencies of their partner with their 
own share of the gain in a negotiation. Furthermore, the individual outcome of one 
partner seems highly dependent upon the personality and prosocial behavior of the 
opposing partner. The worst negotiation partner using a negotiation support system with 
graphical decision aids would be the one who is emotionally unstable and competitive 
and who has problems interpreting figures. This negotiation partner will not feel the 
effects of his or her shortcomings, but the one negotiating with this partner will suffer a 
lower individual outcome. Asking for an experienced negotiator is therefore advisable, 
especially when using a computer-supported environment. 
 
General Discussion 
The articles in this thesis build upon each other and paint a comprehensive picture of 
improving different measures of negotiation performance through the awareness of 
priorities. It could not only be shown, that the tacit priority awareness approach works but 
also that there are limits to this kind of awareness in computer-supported negotiations. 
On top, not all negotiators profit equally in such negotiations. Their different 
characteristics influence their individual outcomes in which being the less talented and 
experienced negotiator actually translated into a better individual outcome. 
The findings in the first article came out quite as hypothesized. Tacitly fostering 
priority awareness with bar charts is possible in computer-supported negotiations and it 
leads to an improved joint outcome and a marginally better pareto efficiency. It did not 
have an influence on objective and subjective fairness, the satisfaction with the 
negotiations and the duration of the negotiation. The impasse rate was higher in the 
priority awareness condition but as discussed, this seems to be a coincidence in the 
sample of participants as the second study for the second article did not have a single 
impasse in the same number of negotiations.  
The performance awareness approach in the second article, which delivered more 
detailed priority information through the use of interactivity, was not economically 
superior in the means of joint outcome and pareto efficiency to the established priority 
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awareness approach. It was even detrimental to fairness, satisfaction and deception. The 
three different theories discussed hold an answer to why more awareness had these 
effects. 
The findings in the third article went into a slightly different direction as assumed. 
Analyzing the data from the second study on the individual level, all reported results did 
not show any awareness condition specific effects. In the general use of a negotiation 
support system the characteristics of the negotiation partner are of high importance; 
more emotional and prosocial partners with lower figural intelligence will achieve a better 
individual outcome. 
The logical next studies would focus on two areas, continuing the raised questions 
in the three main articles of this thesis. The first one would be the partial, open, truthful 
exchange of information, which was already discussed in the first two articles. Fully, open 
and truthfully exchanging priority information happens in real life negotiations but it is 
more often the case that not everything is shared and not everything is shared truthfully. 
How much (truthful) priority information has to be shared for this approach to work? What 
if only one negotiator (truthfully) shares priority information? Why do or do not 
negotiators share (truthful) priority information? How can the sharing of (truthful) priority 
information be improved? The robustness of the priority awareness approach under real 
life negotiation conditions still has to be proven although the pioneering articles in this 
thesis are already very promising. Integrating this economically beneficial approach as an 
optional feature in current real life negotiation support systems is already possible, but 
answering these open questions would be the next step in fully implementing such 
approach, transferring the theoretical groundwork into real practical use. 
The second area of future studies would further explore the individual 
characteristics in computer-supported negotiations. Minor results not reported in the 
article three showed effects which differed between the priority and performance 
awareness approach. There were interaction effects between the self-stated computer 
skills, effortlessness of using tables/charts, frequency of using tables/charts and the 
condition. The better the computer skills, the less effort with tables/charts and the more 
frequent use of tables/charts the opposing partner had, the higher was the negotiator’s 
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own individual outcome, but only in the performance awareness condition. These 
measures were assessed through single questions and were therefore not valid enough to 
justify a mentioning in the article three. There are reasons to believe that the complexity 
of a negotiation support system and the experience in using such systems or individual 
differences in the underlying mechanisms like effortlessness and frequency of using 
tables/charts as well as the general computer skills, are also responsible for the individual 
outcomes of both negotiators. Combined with area one for future studies, the question 
about the interindividual effects of specific characteristics which influence the individual 
outcomes could be further explored. 
All the present and future studies and analyses get us closer to not only 
understanding how to tacitly foster awareness in negotiations to improve negotiation 
performance – still without the need for experience, training or instructions – but also 
which underlying psychological effects and cognitive errors, as well as individual 
characteristics are at work behind this awareness approach. 
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a b s t r a c t
Negotiations seldom lead to optimal results for the negotiators. The missing knowledge about the pri-
orities of the negotiating parties is one known reason for this. This experimental study examines the
effects of priority awareness on different measures of negotiation outcomes. Priority awareness is the
awareness of one negotiator about the priorities of the other negotiator. One hundred thirty-two par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to negotiation pairs in an experimental condition with priority
awareness e created implicitly through the usage of an ordinary bar chart e or a control condition
without priority awareness. They took over the roles of a car seller or buyer and negotiated within an
experimental negotiation support system. They were neither explicitly instructed to use the bar chart in
the negotiation or about its beneﬁts, nor were they restricted in sharing any kind of information. The
experimental condition showed not only a signiﬁcantly higher negotiation performance in the form of
joint outcome and pareto efﬁciency than the control condition, but also a higher impasse rate. Creating
awareness about each other's priorities in a negotiation has a positive effect on the negotiation perfor-
mance without noticeable negative effects on satisfaction with, or fairness and duration of, the
negotiation.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Negotiations and priorities
Differences in priorities play a major role in successful negoti-
ations, whether we are aware of them or not. Whenever there is a
conﬂict based on different interests or different beliefs on what is
more important, negotiations may resolve it. Negotiations are not
only of concern for salespersons and professional life but also for
one's personal life and everyday human interaction e from trade
agreements between organizations to workers trying to agree on
how to proceed with a construction or students trying to agree on
the best approach to solve a task. Both parties have their prefer-
ences, both parties have their priorities, but most often, they cannot
have their own way without the consent of the other. They have to
negotiate because one party does not just give in to the other's
wishes and there is no chance to achieve at least a partial win
without giving in on some issues. If both parties give in on some
issues and if they concede, it would be best for them if these issues
were of lower importance to them, so they will then lose less by
giving in. Giving in on issues that are less important and instead
receiving concessions on issues that are more important is known
as integrative agreement or integrative negotiation (Barry &
Friedman, 1998; De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & van Kleef, 2007).
For suchmutually beneﬁcial trade-offs to take place, the negotiators
must somehow be aware of their different priorities. However, they
rarely are aware of their different priorities and how to integrate
them into an optimal solution (Hyder, Prietula, & Weingart, 2000;
Thompson & Hastie, 1990). In many cases they agree on an equal
split on each topic that is negotiated, meeting in the middle for
every negotiated issue. This seems fair but leads to a lower common
negotiation performance in the sense of joint outcome ethe sum of
the individual outcomes of both negotiators represented by point
scores given to their agreement e than the trade-off of less
important issues against more important ones (Van der Schalk,
Beersma, VanKleef, & De Dreu, 2009). The lack of integrative
negotiation also leads to less pareto efﬁcient agreements, in other
words, to agreements in which at least one party could have ach-
ieved a better individual outcome without the other party doing
worse (Hyder et al., 2000).
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Two reasons why negotiations often lead to worse outcomes are
the ﬁxed-sum error or ﬁxed-pie error and its subordinate, the in-
compatibility error (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). The ﬁxed sum error
is the tendency of a negotiator to assume the same priorities of
issues for the other negotiator, assuming similarities where there
are none. The incompatibility error is the belief of one negotiator
that his or her priorities of preferences differ from those of the
other negotiator, assuming differences where there are none. Due
to the lack of underlying knowledge about the priorities of the
other party, negotiators agree on a lower joint outcome (Thompson
& Hastie, 1990) and sometimes even arrive at loseelose agreements
inwhich both negotiation parties agree on an unnecessary common
loss (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Not even experienced negotiators
are safe from these fallacies (Thompson, 1990).
When the negotiators do know about each other's priorities in
some way, either by freely giving information about priorities
(Schei, Rognes, & Mykland, 2006), simply asking the other negoti-
ation party (Hyder et al., 2000; Schei et al., 2006; Thompson &
Hastie, 1990) or being guided by a computer program to estimate
the others priorities (Foroughi, Perkins, & Jelassi, 1995), they agree
on a higher joint outcome. The exchange of priority information in
computer-supported negotiations is a “major prerequisite for
reaching integrative negotiation outcomes” as discussed by
Gettinger and Koeszegi (2012, p. 26), emphasizing the need for
further research.
As seen in these studies, the exchange of priorities depends on
the negotiators personal experiences with previous negotiations,
on their knowledge about the beneﬁts of priorities, and coming up
with the idea of giving or asking for information about priorities.
Otherwise the exchange of priorities depends on a prestructured
computer program explicitly instructing the negotiators to think
about the others priorities.
Our approach is different: We want to make negotiators only
aware of each other's priorities in a tacit and unobtrusive way. A
way that does not explicitly prompt to do something in a speciﬁc
manner or that does not stand as an obstacle between the negoti-
ators. Regular bar charts as seen in business reports, TV commer-
cials, and so on, are one possible way. We do not depend on the
negotiators previous experience with negotiations and their
knowledge about the beneﬁts of priorities for the negotiation
outcomes, and we do not explicitly instruct them to think about
this. Our focus lies clearly on the human aspect, tacitly fostering
awareness of differences in priorities between negotiators in order
to achieve a better negotiation performance for both. It is not about
algorithms or software agents that negotiate in the absence of
human interaction by predeﬁned rules. We want to enhance real
human negotiations in which two parties attempt to reach an
agreement collaboratively with the support of computers.
In the following two sections, we will explain what we mean by
priority awareness and how the experiment was set up. Also wewill
explain what exactly the different measures of negotiation perfor-
mance are before we state our hypotheses and research questions.
2. Priority awareness
Being aware of the priorities of the other negotiator is what we
call priority awareness. In fact, the term “priority awareness” has
already been coined by De Jong, Tuyls, Verbeeck, and Roos (2008)
as a means to take human fairness into account in modelling
software agents for a multi-agent system. De Jong et al. (2008) have
shown that adding priority awareness to a software agent gave a
much better prediction of human behavior, as humans sometimes
take different priorities into account and make trade-offs based on
them. Our understanding of priority awareness is the same but
from a human perspective.
The adaptation of an awareness approach to negotiations seems
promising. Previous studies that made spatially separated in-
dividuals in computer-supported work groups aware of each
other's different knowledge enhanced the effectiveness and efﬁ-
ciency of their solution to a complex problem (Engelmann & Hesse,
2010; Engelmann, Tergan, & Hesse, 2010; Schreiber & Engelmann,
2010). This approach also reduced the undesirable effect of too
much trust between the group members in such tasks in which
they would not question the decisions of the others and achieve an
inferior result (Engelmann, Kolodziej,& Hesse, 2014). It also guided
their communication (Dehler, Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2011) and
increased the discussion and processing of unshared information
(Engelmann & Hesse, 2011).
However, just making humans aware is not a guarantee that
they will change their behavior. They will not necessarily act in a
perfectly rational way and try to maximize their utility (Henrich
et al., 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). But humans do
commonly use awareness as a tool: Potential employees for a job
resolve the asymmetric distribution of information about their
qualiﬁcation between them and the employer by using their ac-
quired education credentials as a signal about their ability level
(Spence, 1973).
Creating priority awareness is about tacitly making each party
aware of the other's priorities in a negotiation. The awareness tool
with which priority awareness is created must ﬁrst be perceived as
something that the negotiators canmake use of, and then they have
to understand that it is about different priorities, and ﬁnally they
have to use it to integrate their different priorities in a beneﬁcial
way. Priority awareness creates the possibility to bypass an other-
wise trial and error search for integrative issues.
3. Experimental study
The goal of our experimental study was to create awareness of
the differences in priorities between the negotiating parties, thus
promoting more integrative negotiations and, in the end, a better
negotiation performance. For this we refrained from explicit in-
structions or speciﬁc training for the negotiators to test if only the
awareness is sufﬁcient to change the behavior and improve the
performance.
We aimed to foster priority awareness in a computer-supported
bilateral (two parties) negotiation. The experimental negotiation
support system falls into the deﬁnition of an e-negotiation system
(Kersten & Lai, 2007) as it relies on internet technology for the
purpose of facilitating and supporting activities undertaken by
negotiators. This experimental negotiations support system was
made solely for the purpose of testing the effects of priority
awareness and is therefore far away from the functionality of a real
live negotiation support system such as “Smartsettle” (iCan
Systems Inc., 2015) or other experimental negotiation support
systems such as “Inspire” (Kersten & Noronha, 1999) or “Negoisst”
(Schoop, Jertila, & List, 2003).
Bar charts seem to be a good choice for fostering priority
awareness because they have already been used to visualize pri-
orities of issues (Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997). Rangaswamy and
Shell (1997) did not examine its effects because their negotiation
support system as a whole was their main research topic. Further,
Weber, Kersten, and Hine (2006) discussed the potential use of bar
charts to visualize priorities as a means to achieve more integrative
agreements. Bar charts lead to better comparisons of values than
tables (Jacobs, 1994, 1999) and to more accurate judgments of
proportions (Simkin & Hastie, 1987) as well as shorter response
times in an information retrieval task (Quispel & Maes, 2014) than
other forms of visualization. They are also the advised visualization
format for larger numerators (McCaffery et al., 2012). Additionally,
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they are commonly used worldwide from regular newspapers to
scientiﬁc articles for their ease of accessibility.
We used a graphical decision aid to test the effect of the under-
lying concept of priority awareness on different measures of
negotiation performance. There are other graphical decision aids
conceivable to foster priority awareness than through bar charts,
but our intentionwas to create awareness in a tacit and unobtrusive
way. Although visualized two-dimensionally, bar charts represent
one-dimensional data e.g. number of sold items or degree of
customer satisfaction. Line graphs in comparison, represent two-
dimensional data and may be more difﬁcult to understand than
other graphs (for an overview see Friel, Curcio, & Bright, 2001). A
one-dimensional, well known visualization format like a bar chart
could minimize the cognitive load needed to process the visually
encoded information (Mayer & Moreno, 2003).
3.1. Measures of negotiation performance
The outcome measures of negotiation that we used are either
directly quantiﬁable measures of economic success or have an
implicit effect on negotiations. Our focus lay on the directly quan-
tiﬁable measures of economic success such as the joint outcome,
the pareto efﬁciency, and the impasse rate because they are
generally the primary relevant aspect of real life negotiations. We
treated measures with implicit effects such as fairness, satisfaction,
and duration as open research questions because we have no
informed way to tell how priority awareness will affect them.
The joint outcome, the pareto efﬁciency, and the impasse rate
are widely used to capture the economic success of negotiations
(Gettinger, Koeszegi, & Schoop, 2012; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004;
Hindriks, Jonker, & Tykhonov, 2011; Hyder et al., 2000;
Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) and were
thoroughly explained by Tripp and Sondak (1992). The ﬁrst two are
based on preferences, or more precisely, the point scores attached
to the different options of all issues that differ between the nego-
tiators. Table 2 helps to understand their calculations as it holds all
underlying issues, their options, and the attached point scores for
the role of the buyer and the seller.
Taking the ﬁctional car buying/selling scenario from this
experimental study as an example, the negotiators have to agree on
one option for each of the issues to be negotiated. On the issue
“Color” they might agree on the option “White”, on the issue “De-
livery date” they might agree on the option “5 months”, and so on
with the remaining 6 six issues. Since both negotiators have
different priorities through different point scores attached to the
options, they achieve a different individual outcome. The sum of
the individual outcomes creates the joint outcome. Seen from a
macroeconomic perspective, the joint outcome is a simple measure
of the created value of a negotiation and increasing, it leads to
ﬁnancial growth of the economy. One negotiator could achieve
6000 points and the other 1200; taken together, both have ach-
ieved 7200 points. They could also achieved 4000 and 4200 points,
and this taken together amounts to 8200 points. The second
example would thus create more value for the economy than the
ﬁrst example.
The pareto efﬁciency is a numerical value between 0 and 1 and
showswhether there are any better individual outcomes for at least
one party without them being worse for the other party. Tripp and
Sondak (1992) explain the formula for calculating the pareto efﬁ-
ciency. A perfect score of 1 means that there is no other agreement
possible which would result in a better individual outcome for at
least one party without worsening the individual outcome of the
other party. Or put differently: Has there been proﬁt left on the
table? To ﬁnd this out, all possible agreements of a negotiation have
to be known. A negotiation with eight issues and ﬁve options each
results in 390,625 (85) different possibilities of agreement which
have to be taken into account.
The impasse rate represents the number of aborted negotiations
without agreement. Measuring the effects on the impasse rate in
negotiations has the caveat that many negotiations have to come to
a halt without an external interference. Manipulating impasses
would impair natural negotiations and distort the implications on
negotiation outcomes. It is up to chance or an enormous number of
negotiations to obtain a meaningful amount of impasses to make
any valid statements about it.
3.2. Hypotheses and research questions
We hypothesize that priority awareness shows effects consis-
tent with the ﬁndings that knowledge about priorities leads to a
higher joint outcome (H1, see Table 1 for an overview of all hy-
potheses; Foroughi et al.,1995; Hyder et al., 2000; Schei et al., 2006;
Thompson& Hastie, 1990). We assume that only being aware of the
differences in priorities between oneself and the other negotiatore
completely uninstructed on how and why to use this informatione
leads to a better recognition of integrative potential, to more and
better trade-offs between integrative issues, and thus to a higher
pareto efﬁciency (H2). As self-disclosure has been shown to result
in a lower impasse-rate (Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris,
1999) and priority awareness is accompanied by a kind of self-
disclosure about ones priorities, we assume that priority aware-
ness e having a better recognition of integrative potential and the
prospect of a higher joint outcome e should also beneﬁt a lower
impasse rate (H3).
For the objective and subjective fairness of the agreement, the
satisfaction with the negotiation, and the duration of the negotia-
tion, we state the following research questions.
How does priority awareness affect the objective (RQ1a) and
subjective fairness (RQ1b) of the agreement? It is possible that
being aware of the priorities of the other negotiation party leads to
an objectively and subjectively fairer agreement because both ne-
gotiators are also aware of the potential losses and gains of the
other. With the objective fairness of the agreement, we mean a
measurably fair distribution of points. This is sometimes called
contract balance (Foroughi, 1998; Gettinger et al., 2012). Goh, Teo,
Wu and Wei conclude “that contract balance is not a standardized
measure of negotiation fairness” (2000, p.106); we therefore do not
calculate the point difference between the individual outcomes in a
Table 1
Summary of hypotheses and research questions.
No. Hypotheses/Research question
H1 Negotiation pairs with priority awareness agree on a higher joint outcome than those without priority awareness.
H2 Negotiation pairs with priority awareness achieve a higher pareto efﬁciency than those without priority awareness.
H3 Negotiation pairs with priority awareness arrive at a lower impasse rate than those without priority awareness.
RQ1a/b Do negotiation pairs with or without priority awareness differ in the objective and subjective fairness of their agreement?
RQ2 Do negotiation pairs with or without priority awareness differ in the satisfaction with their negotiation?
RQ3 Do negotiation pairs with or without priority awareness differ in the duration of their negotiation?
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negotiation pair but the percentual difference between the indi-
vidual outcomes in a negotiation pair. Dividing the contract balance
by the joint outcome gives a percentual difference between the
negotiators in a pair independent of the amount of their achieved
joint outcome and thus makes all the pairs comparable. With the
subjective fairness of the agreement, we mean the perceived fair-
ness of the parties after the negotiation. This could hypothetically
be different from the objective fairness, but we have no reason to
believe so.
How does priority awareness affect the satisfaction with the
negotiation (RQ2)? The satisfaction with the negotiation is a strong
predictor of the willingness for future negotiations with the same
partner (Oliver, (Sundar) Balakrishnan, & Barry, 1994). It is possible
that the parties are more satisﬁed with the negotiation when they
are made aware of the priorities of their negotiation partner
because this avoids the intrusion of asking the other about his or
her priorities and gives a hint on his or her honesty. There is also the
chance that the negotiators are not happy about the fact that the
other is aware of their true priorities and that they cannot engage in
strategic misrepresentation of information to gain an advantage
over the other negotiation party (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004).
How does priority awareness affect the duration of the negoti-
ation (RQ3)? Jarvenpaa (1989) showed that graphical decision aids
speed up the decision making time when they are congruent with
the task. The bar charts in both conditions, with and without pri-
ority awareness, have a different amount of information but are
both task congruent in visualizing the priorities that play a sub-
stantial role in negotiations. The pairs with priority awareness have
the advantage of also seeing each other's priorities; they do not
have to ask for the priorities and can directly concentrate on the
most important issues. Therefore, they can potentially arrive faster
at an agreement. The additional processing of the priorities of the
other negotiation party does take more time, on the other hand,
and hence, this could eliminate the potential time advantage of
priority awareness.
This experiment was carried out in Germany; therefore, we have
translated all presented screenshots of the experimental negotia-
tion interface into English.
4. Method
4.1. Participants and design
A sum of 132 university students from different ﬁelds of study
(69 female, 63 male, Mage ¼ 24.96, SDage ¼ 7.31, age range: 18e62)
successfully and voluntarily participated in this experimental study
andwere paid an hourly rate of 8V. All participants were randomly
assigned to either the role of a car seller or the role of a potential
buyer. This resulted in 66 pairs. These pairs then were randomly
assigned to either the experimental condition with priority
awareness or the control condition without priority awareness,
resulting in 33 pairs per condition. The distribution of gender in the
pairs was controlled for. These numbers are after the exclusion of
two pairs who had serious problems understanding the negotiation
task and did not generate valid data that could be included in the
calculations.
4.2. Material
The material used in this experiment was a modernized version
of the payoff schedule for a car buying/selling scenario of
Thompson and Hastie (1990). Using a payoff schedule is common
practice in most experimental negotiation studies in which the
participants have to take over a role in a scenario and negotiate
predeﬁned issues (e.g. Hyder et al., 2000; Thompson & Hastie,
1990; Van der Schalk et al., 2009). This ensures identical pre-
conditions for all negotiators and makes different hypotheses
examinable. All participants receive a table with the issues to be
negotiated as well as the different options for the issues, depending
on their role in the negotiation. Every option has an attached point
score and the goal for every negotiator is to maximize the sum of
their individual point scores. A full overview of the used payoff
schedule can be seen in Table 2.
With respect to the differences between the original and our
payoff schedule, we did not change the distribution of point scores
between the issues and the amount and order of point scores of the
options by themselves. We had to modernize the descriptions of
some of the eight issues and ﬁve respective options; for example,
we changed the original issue “Radio” with its options “None”,
“AM”, “AM/FM”, “AM/FM/Tape” and “AM/FM/Tapeþ” to the issue
“Technology/Audio” with the options “None”, “Audio base equip-
ment”, “Multimedia equipment” “Multimedia equipment þ car
computer” and “Multimedia equipment þ car
computer þ navigation” (a comprehensive list of changes is avail-
able upon request).
Four issues were integrative and could be proﬁtably traded
between the negotiators: Financing, Warranty, Extras, and Tech-
nology/Audio. Two issues were distributive, meaning that both
negotiators wanted exactly the opposite option to gain the same
amount of points: Delivery date and Price. For example, the seller
Table 2
Overview Payoff Schedule with all Issues and their Options with Attached Individual Point Scores.
Financing Points
buyer
Points
seller
CO2 emission Points
buyer
Points
seller
Warranty Points
buyer
Points
seller
Delivery
date
Points
buyer
Points
seller
8% 1600 4000 88 g/km 0 0 6 months 0 1600 5 months 0 2400
6% 1200 3000 126 g/km 600 600 12 months 1000 1200 4 months 600 1800
4% 800 2000 164 g/km 1200 1200 18 months 2000 800 3 months 1200 1200
2% 400 1000 202 g/km 1800 1800 24 months 3000 400 2 months 1800 600
0% 0 0 240 g/km 2400 2400 30 months 4000 0 1 month 2400 0
Extras Points
Buyer
Points
Seller
Technology/Audio Points
Buyer
Points
Seller
Price Points
Buyer
Points
Seller
Color Points
Buyer
Points
Seller
1 0 3200 None 0 800 24.500 V 6000 0 Grey 1200 1200
2 200 2400 Audio base equipment 800 600 23.520 V 4500 1500 White 900 900
3 400 1600 Multimedia equipment 1600 400 22.540 V 3000 3000 Red 600 600
4 600 800 Multimedia equipment þ car
computer
2400 200 21.560 V 1500 4500 Black 300 300
5 800 0 Multimedia equipment þ car
computer þ navigation
3200 0 20.580 V 0 6000 Silver 0 0
The buyer and the seller could only see their own point scores during the negotiation, independent of the condition. There were no restrictions made on the communication of
the negotiators, including the sharing of any of this information.
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would get 0 points for the option “1 month” in the issue “Delivery
date” and the buyer 2400 points. For the option “5 months” it was
the other way around. The two remaining issues “CO2 Emission”
and “Color” were compatible: Both negotiators had the highest
point score on the same option of an issue; in other words, they
wanted the exactly same thing. The sum of the individual point
scores could possibly range from 3600 to 13200 points of joint
outcome.
The priorities and their visual representation in form of bar
charts were created by ranking the issues by the option with the
highest point score for the respective negotiator. At this point, we
should mention that there is one special case: Only the modulus of
the highest scoring option is important for the creation of priorities.
The seller's loss of the highest scoring option “20,580 V, -6000
points” of the issue “Price” is higher than the gain of the highest
scoring option “5 months, 2400 points” of the issue “Delivery date”
and therefore “Price” would be of higher priority than “Delivery
date”. Such negative point scores are omitted inmany experimental
negotiation studies but have a valid reason to exist. Sometimes
negotiators do not only have to agree on who gains more but also
on who loses less.
This approach of creating priorities by ranking the issues by the
modulus of their highest scoring option is also followed by Raiffa,
Richardson, and Metcalfe (2002 p. 214) in the evaluation of two-
party integrative negotiations.
4.3. Procedure and operationalization
The duration of the entire experiment was approximately 1 h;
timestamps were logged. It took place completely in an experi-
mental negotiation support system created speciﬁcally to test the
impact of priority awareness. Fig. 1 holds an overview of the pro-
cedure of the experiment.
4.3.1. Introduction and questionnaires
At ﬁrst, when the participants arrived in the waiting room, they
were greeted by the experimenter and briefed shortly about the
procedure of the experiment as follows: They would work alone in
separate rooms. Everything would take place on the computer in
front of them and they would also see all instructions on the
monitor. They would work alone until the negotiation phase when
they would have to put on a headset for communication. After the
negotiation phase, both negotiators would once again work
separately.
Before the experiment started, the participants were asked ﬁrst
to ﬁll out a declaration of consent informing them about which data
will be gathered about them, how it will be used, and that they can
e without any drawbacks e always abort the experiment and
retract their data.
The experiment began with questions on control measures.
First, the participants ﬁlled out a questionnaire about personal data
such as the ﬁeld of study, gender, age, prior knowledge of bar
charts/tables/computers and its frequency of usage, and acquain-
tance with the other negotiator. This was followed by other ques-
tionnaires which were not relevant for testing the hypotheses of
this study. All questions in this study were assessed by four-point
rating scales ranging from 1 point for no agreement and 4 points
for complete agreement except of ﬁeld of study, gender and age,
which were open questions.
4.3.2. Preview of negotiation
Next, the negotiation scenario and the individual role were
described for the ﬁrst time (here exemplary of the seller):
You want to sell a car and are negotiating with the buyer. You
have to agree on 8 issues: Financing, CO2 Emission, Warranty,
Delivery date, Extras, Technology/Audio, Price and Color. Every
issue has 5 options with different point scores. You are negoti-
ating for points: Your goal is to maximize your own points!
The instruction to maximize their individual points should
create a more realistic negotiation scenario and reinforce their
intrinsic motivation to win (Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, & Porac,
1981).
After this initial brieﬁng, a preview of the experimental nego-
tiation support system was presented (nearly identical to Fig. 3). It
allowed the participants to become familiar with the upcoming
negotiation interface as well as their priorities and point scores. To
engage the participants with their payoff schedule, we asked them
to assign priority numbers to each issue. In the top half of the
screen, every participant saw a bar chart with his or her priorities
and in the bottom half of the screen, a table with the eight issues
and their respective options depending on their role as either car
buyer or seller. The participants were asked to choose the correct
priority for each issue from a drop-down menu under every issue/
bar of the bar chart. The speciﬁc instructions shown during the
preview were:
The more points you can win/lose on an issue, the more
important the issue is and the taller the bar is. Assign correct
ranking numbers to the issues according to their importance. Begin
with the most important issue with rank 1. You have to assign the
rank 4 twice so that the least important issue can be given the rank
7. Only then can you click on “Forward” (or you will be automati-
cally forwarded after 5 min)!
No further information was given on behalf of the bar chart
except enough to make sure that the participants knew what the
bar chart represented. However, they were not informed about its
potential beneﬁts so as to not impair the potential effects of
awareness, which was precisely what we wanted to test.
4.3.3. Negotiation
After the preview, the negotiation scenario and each individual
role were described for a second time but with further instructions
on the negotiation interface: Every negotiator could independently
click on the options which would be seen as marked by both. They
could also freely change this marking, independent of who set it.
Marking options would be there to help them during negotiation
but also to save their ﬁnal agreement. The order of options each
negotiator would see differed from the other. The negotiation could
be aborted at any time by clicking on “Forward”. The negotiation
would end automatically after 35 min. After the negotiation they
Negotiation (max 35 minutes) 
Working 
individually
Introduction and Questionnaires 
Preview of Negotiation (max 5 minutes) 
        Control Condition               Experimental Condition 
Working 
individually
Working 
together No priority 
awareness 
Priority 
awareness VS 
Test of the Knowledge About the Other’s Priorities 
Questionnaires and Debriefing 
Fig. 1. Overview of the experimental procedure.
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would be asked, if they had come to an agreement.
The Figs. 2 and 3 show a screenshot of the experimental nego-
tiation support system exemplary for the car seller. The negotiators
could use their headset to communicate through a Skype connec-
tion, which was recorded and only lasted for the duration of the
negotiation phase (audio-only communication; Bazerman, Curhan,
Moore, & Valley, 2000). There were no constraints on the topics
that the negotiators could talk about. They were free to carry out
the negotiation and communicate as they wished, including the
sharing of priority information. Both conditions should potentially
have access to the same information so any found differences be-
tween the negotiation pairs would be due to priority awareness.
To test the impact of priority awareness, the negotiators in the
control condition saw a bar chart in the upper half of the screen,
which only visualized their own priorities (Fig. 2). The maximal
gain or loss that the negotiators could achieve with an issue
determined its importance and priority: The taller the bar, themore
points they could gain or lose with an issue and, consequently, the
higher the priority of an issue. The negotiators in the experimental
condition saw a bar chart in the upper half of the screen which
visualized their own priorities as well as those of the other nego-
tiator (Fig. 3). Besides this difference in the upper half of the screen,
there were no differences between the control and the experi-
mental condition.
Depending on their role as car buyer or seller, both parties only
saw a table with their own preference scores for the ﬁve options of
each one of the eight issues in the lower half of the screen. The
options were accompanied by radio buttons which either
negotiator could mark by clicking on it. For example: Did the seller
not agree with a marked option of the buyer e for instance, a very
low price which has a low point score for the seller e he or she
could click freely on another option, preferably a higher price,
which had a higher point score for the seller. This could go back and
forth until they ﬁnally agreed on one marked option of this issue.
Every marked optionwas logged by the negotiation support system
and afterwards, the joint outcome, the pareto efﬁciency, as well as
objective fairness could be calculated.
To evaluate whether the negotiation ended in an agreement or
an impasse, a single yes/no question on whether the negotiators
reached an agreement on all issues was presented to each negoti-
ator individually after the negotiation.
4.3.4. Test of the knowledge about the Other's priorities
A test of the knowledge about the other's priorities was applied
afterward to assess whether a negotiator remembered the prior-
ities of his or her partner. This procedure stems from the studies by
Engelmann et al. (Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann et al.,
2010; Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010). centering around learning
and problem solving and in which participants had to assess the
extent of the knowledge that one group member gained about the
others. The negotiators had to select the priorities of the issues of
their partner. Every one of the eight issues was listed and accom-
panied by a drop-down menu with again a choice of ranking
numbers ranging from 1 to 7.
Fig. 2. Negotiation phase in the control condition without priority awareness (as seen by the car seller).
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4.3.5. Questionnaires and debrieﬁng
Finally, the participants were asked to answer four questions on
their satisfaction with the negotiation and two questions on their
perceived fairness of the agreement. Formeasuring satisfaction, the
questions were “I am satisﬁedwith the outcome of our negotiation”
and “I am not satisﬁed with our agreement” as well as “I am
satisﬁed with the process of our negotiation” and “Our negotiation
could have run better”. These were intended to measure the
satisfaction with the agreement and the satisfaction with the pro-
cess of the negotiation but the participants did not distinguish
between the result and the process and therefore these four
questions constitute the general satisfaction with the negotiation.
For measuring subjective fairness, the questions were “I think the
outcome of our negotiation is fair” and “I think the agreements
made in our negotiation are unfair”. Although considered to be
control measures, we asked two questions each about the fre-
quency of previous negotiations after the negotiation as to not in-
ﬂuence the negotiation performance: “Before participating in the
study I have often negotiated” and “Before participating in the
study I rarely negotiated”. Further questions on supplementary
measures were asked, which do not fall in the scope of the stated
hypotheses here.
At the end, the participants were paid and shortly debriefed.
5. Results
For the analyses of all hypotheses, except the one concerning the
impasse rate, we followed the advice of Tripp and Sondak (1992)
and excluded all pairs which stated an impasse and therefore did
not achieve any interpretable outcome. This approach left 60 pairs
in the sample (nEC ¼ 28, nCC ¼ 32). Substituting a non-agreement
with a zero or mean point score distorts the results because such
pairs did not agree on a zero or mean point score but did not agree
at all. We used the aggregated data of the negotiation pairs for all
analyses because the individuals were not independent of each
other (Cress, 2008). Depending on whether the assumptions of
different statistical methods such as, for example, a normal distri-
bution of values or the homogeneity of variance were met, we
either calculated a t-Test, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, a pairwise
Wilcoxon rank-sum test with a p-value adjustment by Holm (1979),
or a Chi-squared test with their appropriate effect sizes to compare
the performance of the conditions.
Therewere no signiﬁcant differences on the group level in terms
of the control measures. We assessed the level of experience of the
negotiators by looking at their individually stated frequency of
previous negotiations. The participants were “rather unexper-
ienced” (M ¼ 2.39, SD ¼ 0.86) in negotiating.
The results conﬁrm Hypothesis 1: Pairs with priority awareness
agreed on a higher joint outcome (M ¼ 9793, SD ¼ 1960) than pairs
without priority awareness (M ¼ 8775, SD ¼ 1890, t(58) ¼ 2.05,
p¼ .045, d¼ .53). This makes up for a difference in themean of 12%.
The pairs with priority awareness also achieved a marginally
higher pareto efﬁciency in their negotiation (M ¼ .959, SD ¼ .13)
than the pairs without priority awareness (M ¼ .935, SD ¼ .12,
W ¼ 568.5, p ¼ .074, r ¼ .23). This makes up for a difference in the
mean of 2.4%.
Fig. 3. Negotiation phase in the experimental condition with priority awareness (as seen by the car seller).
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Contrary to Hypothesis 3, pairs with priority awareness arrived
at a marginally higher impasse rate (n ¼ 5) than pairs without
priority awareness (n ¼ 1, c2(1, N ¼ 66) ¼ 2.93, p ¼ .087, 4 ¼ .21).
This result will be discussed thoroughly below.
We found the following results with respect to the research
questions about the effects of priority awareness on the outcome
measures of negotiations, objective and subjective fairness of
agreement, satisfaction with the agreement, and duration of
negotiation:With regard to the ﬁrst research question, we found no
difference in the duration of the negotiation between pairs with
priority awareness (M ¼ 12:03 min, SD ¼ 07:19 min) and pairs
without priority awareness (M ¼ 11:31 min, SD ¼ 06:07 min,
W ¼ 548, p ¼ .970).
We also did not ﬁnd any difference in the satisfaction with the
negotiation between pairs with priority awareness (M ¼ 3.05,
SD ¼ .33) and pairs without priority awareness (M ¼ 3.07, SD ¼ .41,
t(58) ¼ 0.22, p ¼ .828). Pairs of both conditions were “rather
satisﬁed” with their negotiations.
Although it seems that pairs with priority awareness achieved
an objectively fairer agreement (M ¼ 36.7%, SD ¼ 34.0%) than pairs
without priority awareness (M ¼ 50.9%, SD ¼ 49.7%, W ¼ 361,
p ¼ .197) they did not differ signiﬁcantly. They also did not differ in
the subjective fairness of agreements (MEC ¼ 3.23, SDEC ¼ .49,
MCC ¼ 3.27, SDCC ¼ .43, W ¼ 440, p ¼ .904) which both conditions
stated as “rather fair”.
The transcription of the audio recordings of the negotiations
resulted in 7911 lines of utterances which were independently
coded by two raters on three variables, with either a 0 or a 1: (1)
Reference to the bar chart, for example, “We can take ﬁnancing and
warranty; it seems as if we both have a large and a small bar.” (2)
Reference to priorities, for example, “It's more important for me
that the CO2 emission is alright. The color is not important to me at
all.” (3) Reference to point scores, for example, “Yes, how many
points do you get for multimedia equipment and car computer?”
Cohen's Kappa for two raters showed moderate to substantial
agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977) between the independent raters
with kRefBarChart¼ .56, kRefPriorities¼ .64 and kRefPreferences¼ .61. In the
following step, the raters agreed on one correct rating for each
utterance by working through the whole transcription together.
This uniﬁed rating was used for the next calculations.
Pairs with priority awareness referred to the bar chart more
often (SUM ¼ 154) than pairs without priority awareness
(SUM ¼ 32, W ¼ 7581658, p < .001, r ¼ .10). They also referred to
priorities more often (SUM ¼ 198) than pairs without priority
awareness (SUM ¼ 141, W ¼ 7724479, p ¼ .023, r ¼ .03). Both
conditions did not differ in their reference to point scores
(SUMEC ¼ 600, SUMCC ¼ 538, W ¼ 7789097, p ¼ .789).
No signiﬁcant differences on the group level were found in the
test of the knowledge about the other's priorities and in any of the
supplementary measures.
6. Discussion
The knowledge about the priorities of a negotiation partner is
assumed to have a high impact on the economic outcome of a
negotiation because it creates the possibility of an integrative
agreement inwhich the negotiators give in on less important issues
and, in exchange, take onmore important ones. Until now, no study
has systematically tested the effect of making the negotiators only
aware of the differences between their priorities on different
measures of negotiation outcome. Our goal was to create this pri-
ority awareness with an intervention so trivial that it could be
implemented with minimal effort. We therefore used ordinary bar
charts as known from business reports or school books. None of the
negotiators was instructed on how or why to use the bar charts and
none of them was kept from freely exchanging any information
whatsoever. Would the negotiation pairs perceive the bar charts as
an awareness tool, would they understand its beneﬁt and would
they use it for making more trade-offs to achieve a better negoti-
ation performance?
The results of 66 computer-supported negotiations between the
roles of a car buyer and seller have shown that negotiation pairs,
which were made aware of the priorities of their negotiation
partner, negotiated an averaged 12% higher joint outcome than
pairs which were not made aware of the priorities of their nego-
tiation partner. Pairs with priority awareness tended to arrive at
averaged 2.4% more pareto efﬁcient agreements, leaving less proﬁt
on the table. Surprisingly, pairs with priority awareness might have
been slightly more likely to abort the negotiation than pairs
without. Priority awareness does not seem to have any negative
effect on the measures stated in the open research questions. Both
conditions did not differ in the duration of the negotiation, the
objective or subjective fairness of the agreement, or their satis-
faction with the negotiation.
It is possible to make negotiators aware of each other's priorities
in a tacit and unobtrusiveway. The results of the study speak for the
effectiveness of the priority awareness approach: A minimal
intervention improves joint outcome and the pareto efﬁciency and
has no drawbacks on satisfaction, fairness or duration. It would be
possible to integrate this approach e creating priority awareness
through bar charts e in existing negotiation support systems, at
least in an optional way. Furthermore, a specialized negotiation
support system is not needed for real life negotiations in order to
make use of priority awareness. Agreeing on using this approach
and a spreadsheet program are already sufﬁcient to improve the
negotiation performance. It is even conceivable that both parties
agree to draw bar charts representing their priorities of issues on a
single sheet of paper. The usage of a spreadsheet program or a
single sheet of paper needs at least one negotiator who in fact
knows about the beneﬁts of priority awareness. Hence, these low-
tech approaches are only applicable for more experienced
negotiators.
Further, this approach is not about negotiations over the dis-
tribution of a product alone but about decision making in general.
The use of a negotiation support system with an optional priority
awareness function would be advisable and every improvement of
the agreement would beneﬁt all parties. An example would be
different departments of one organization, which clearly have the
common goal of success for the organization although they have
different priorities. Being aware of these differences and using
them for integrative decision making would beneﬁt the organiza-
tion as awhole and, in return, all of the departments. The feasibility
of this idea was shortly presented by Thiemann and Engelmann
(2015).
Regarding bar charts, it becomes obvious how omnipresent they
are in everyday life. They are quick to make and seem easy to un-
derstand. But the ability to correctly read and interpret even ordi-
nary bar charts is not necessarily intuitive and has to be learned.
This study gave us a hint that some people had at least initially
difﬁculty understanding the bar chart and therefore they could
have lacked the advantage of those with a higher aptitude for this
type of visual literacy. Especially in business settings, it is crucial to
be able to read bar charts, understand them, and to react to their
information in order to make adequate decisions. Organizations
also use bar charts to portray their performance in a better light
(Beattie & Jones, 1992). Thus a critical examination of bar charts
would not only be wise for the sake of fostering priority awareness
to improve negotiations but also in many other business related
situations. Such visual literacy is taken for granted because we are
exposed to bar charts ever since entering school. There is no special
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emphasis in schools on teaching visualizations or graphical deci-
sion aids, but as we strongly rely on them to simplify and aggregate
information for us to make decisions, it would be advisable to at
least in some way address the task of reading, understand, and
interpreting graphical decision aids.
Somewhat imitating in this study was, that the participants
were rather unexperienced in terms of negotiations. The effec-
tiveness could be even higher in real life negotiations. People
negotiating for a living could have taken more out of the awareness
of the priorities of the others. They have the experience needed to
understand this information better and to make better use of the
integrative potential of the negotiation. On the other hand, it has
been shown that even unexperienced negotiators without training
could make beneﬁcial use of priority information when made
aware about them.
We would like to point out that the inﬂuence of priority
awareness on the impasse rate has never been measured in this
way before and that it is only meaningfully interpretable if enough
impasses occur naturally. If it would not have been counter hypo-
thetical, this result could have been ignored because the total
number of impasses was so low that it can only be interpreted in a
descriptive way. Nevertheless, a possible explanation could be that
fostering awareness of the priorities of the other party works well
in making the integrative potential of the negotiation visible, but
the possible unwillingness of one negotiator to make concessionse
even though his or her priorities are available to the other ewould
lead the other negotiator to abort the negotiation. Future studies
will show whether this is a recurring phenomenon or just a coin-
cidence in the sample of participants.
This experiment has shown that the bar charts in our study had
their own share of drawbacks in their simplicity. An informal
questioning of the participants after the experiment showed that
many expected an interactive instead of a non-interactive bar chart.
They were surprised that the bars did not change in size in corre-
spondence to the marked options in the negotiation because they
were accustomed to more interactivity in a computer-supported
environment. A non-interactive bar chart has now been proven to
successfully foster priority awareness, but it may not deliver
enough information in a computer-supported environment for the
negotiators and also has its limitations as it does nothing to resolve
the incompatibility error (Thompson, 1991). Forty-ﬁve percent of
all pairs did agree at least in one of two compatible issues on an
option that was suboptimal for both negotiators although both
preferred the identical option. They agreed on a joint loss. In our
next study, we plan to use interactive bar charts to foster priority
awareness and compare them to the non-interactive bar charts.
This interactivity could create not only a better awareness about
priorities but also another quality of awareness. The negotiators
would not only be made aware of the different priorities of issues
but also of the different priorities of options, as the bars would
change in size according to the marked options in the negotiation.
This could result not only in an even better negotiation perfor-
mance but, while creating awareness for differences between is-
sues, also create awareness for the similarities between issues and
help to resolve the incompatibility error.
For the present study and the planned studywith interactive bar
charts, we assume a state in which negotiation parties truthfully
and openly share all the information about their priorities. Nego-
tiations here take place in a manner of a full, open, truthful ex-
change (FOTE; Raiffa et al., 2002) which is also assumed in other
studies (e.g. Herath, Bremser, & Birnberg, 2010). This can be
considered a limitation of this study because although negotiations
take place in such a manner, the case of a partial open, truthful
exchange (POTE), in which not all information is shared, is preva-
lent in real life negotiations. After we have established that priority
awareness improves negotiation outcomes at the level of the issues
in this study, and we have evaluated whether it works better on the
additional level of options in a second study, we will address the
partial open, truthful exchange of priorities in a third study on
priority awareness. This will further validate the priority awareness
approach and make way for its implementation in existing nego-
tiation support systems and for its broad usage in a computer-
supported environment to enhance integrative decision making
in a multitude of natural settings.
6.1. Conclusion
A trivial bar chart including the priorities of the other negotiator
is enough to improve the negotiation performance, without nega-
tive consequences on satisfaction, fairness and duration. This kind
of awareness is enough, there are no further instructions needed.
Such a simple and inexpensive way to improve e not only e
computer-supported negotiations could easily be integrated as an
optional feature in existing professional negotiation support sys-
tems and beneﬁt its users.
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informs group members about both their collaborators’ knowledge structures and their collab-
orators’ information. In the current study, we investigated whether this implicit approach
reduces undesirable effects of mutual trust and mutual skepticism. Trust is an important
influencing factor with regard to behavior and performance of groups. High mutual trust can
have a negative impact on group effectiveness because it reduces mutual control and, as a
result, the detection of the others’ mistakes. In an empirical study, 20 triads collaborating with
the knowledge and information awareness approach were compared with 20 triads collaborat-
ing without this approach. The members of a triad were spatially distributed and participated in
a computer-supported collaboration. The results demonstrated that the availability of the
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further clarifying the impact of trust on effectiveness and efficiency of virtual groups depend-
ing upon different situational contexts.
Keywords Computer-supported collaborativeproblemsolving .Groupawareness .Knowledge
and information awareness .Mutual skepticism .Mutual trust
Intern. J. Comput.-Support. Collab. Learn. (2014) 9:211–235
DOI 10.1007/s11412-013-9187-y
T. Engelmann (*) : R. Kolodziej : F. W. Hesse
Knowledge Media Research Center, Schleichstraße 6, 72076 Tuebingen, Germany
e-mail: t.engelmann@iwm-kmrc.de
R. Kolodziej
e-mail: r.kolodziej@iwm-kmrc.de
F. W. Hesse
e-mail: f.hesse@iwm-kmrc.de
Introduction
Different lines of research (e.g., Nickerson 1999; Wegner 1986) highlight the importance of
knowing what collaborators know in order to communicate and collaborate effectively.
However, the process of acquiring such knowledge is prone to errors (e.g., Nickerson 1999)
and the acquisition of such knowledge needs time (Wegner 1986). Engelmann and colleagues
have developed a solution for this problem: Their knowledge and information awareness
approach (KIA approach) assists spatially distributed group members in acquiring knowledge
about their collaborators’ knowledge structures and the information underlying these structures
in an effective and efficient way (e.g., Engelmann and Hesse 2010; Engelmann et al. 2010).
Therefore, they define knowledge and information awareness (KIA) as being informed about
the collaboration partners’ knowledge structures and about the partners’ information underly-
ing these structures (e.g., Engelmann et al. 2010). The acquisition of KIA is enhanced by
digital concept maps that visualize both the collaborators’ knowledge structures and the
information underlying these structures (see Fig. 1). These concept maps are provided to the
group members while they are participating in a computer-supported collaboration.
Concept maps are a well-proven kind of knowledge visualization consisting of hierarchi-
cally ordered labeled nodes and labeled links between these nodes (Novak and Gowin 1984).
Digital concept maps moreover allow for adding hyperlinks for accessing further information
(e.g., Alpert 2005).
The studies by Engelmann and colleagues demonstrated that this KIA approach not only
improves collaborative problem solving of virtual groups – that is, groups with spatially
distributed group members – but also can help to overcome several collaboration barriers
(e.g., Engelmann and Hesse 2011; Engelmann and Kolodziej 2012; Schreiber and Engelmann
2010).
Another collaboration barrier refers to the concept of mutual trust. Trust is an important
influencing factor with regard to behavior and performance of groups (Salas et al. 2005).
According to Mayer et al. (1995) trust refers to “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”
(p. 712); that is, one group member has to believe that another group member will perform the
needed activity in order to accomplish a common task.
Fig. 1 Computer screen of the experimental condition with a KIA approach
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Imagine a situation in which several people, having different domain expertises, were
ordered to solve an acute environmental pollution problem: They are highly busy and work
at different institutions. Therefore, they have to collaborate via computers. In addition, they do
not know each other and thus do not know what the others know – a problem that could be
solved with the KIA approach. Moreover, all experts differ in the amount of general trust they
have in others, also called trust propensity (trust as a trait) (e.g., Colquitt et al. 2007). Thus trust
is likely to affect the collaboration. In addition, mutual trust can be developed through
collaboration (trust as a state) (cf. Aubert and Kelsey 2003).
Our current study addressed group situations like the one described and investigated the
impact of mutual trust in virtual groups on group performance depending on whether the KIA
approach is available or not (trust as a predictor). In addition, it investigated whether –
depending on the availability of the KIA approach – differences in the amount of collaboration
quality have an impact on the developed trust after the collaboration phase (trust as criterion).
In this paper, we will start by highlighting the challenges of computer-supported collabo-
ration, especially the need for fostering the acquisition of knowing what collaborators know.
We will then explain how the KIA approach solves this problem and why it is able to help to
overcome several collaboration barriers, especially the barrier with regard to mutual trust.
Subsequently, we will present our experimental study. The paper ends with a discussion as
well as with explicating implications.
Challenges of computer-supported collaboration
The need for collaboration, especially between persons in different fields, is ever rising in our
information age, and certainly the geographical dispersion of different experts can be over-
come by using, for example, specialized groupware. Groupware can also address the social
element of computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL) such as explicating thoughts,
actively discussing views, and coordinating actions (Kirschner and Erkens 2013). To bridge
the research gap between computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) and CSCL, Fransen
et al. (2013) summarized variables mediating group effectiveness and applied these findings
from CSCW research to the field of CSCL. While there are differences between working- and
learning-teams, many similarities make knowledge gained in a CSCW setting applicable to a
CSCL setting and vice versa.
There are several advantages of computer-supported collaboration (cf. Engelmann et al.
2009; Janssen and Bodemer 2013; Kirschner and Erkens 2013), but it is not easily achieved in
an effective way. Interaction problems, especially regarding communication and coordination
may occur (Janssen et al. 2007): For example, a reduced amount of communication channels
may hinder coordination (e.g., Smith et al. 2011), provided communication capabilities may be
rarely used (Lambropoulos et al. 2012) or misused (Baker et al. 2012). According to Kirschner
et al. (2008) learning often does not take place in CSCL settings, because the tasks are not
suited for collaboration, the computer-supported environment is not suited to support learning,
or the social conditions that are necessary for good collaboration do not exist. In this current
paper, we refer to the last reason: A difficulty for virtual groups is that often the members do
not know each other before they have to collaborate on a common task, and therefore, they do
not know what their collaborators know. However, different lines of research have demon-
strated the importance of knowing what collaborators know (cf. Engelmann and Hesse 2010):
Research on Audience Design (e.g., Dehler-Zufferey et al. 2011) gives evidence that individ-
uals adapt their texts depending upon the addressee. According to the Knowledge Imputing
approach (Nickerson 1999), effective communication requires a sufficient amount of correct
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knowledge about the communication partner’s knowledge. If one overestimates the partner’s
knowledge, the partner might not be able to understand the statements anymore (Nickerson
1999). This is also highlighted by Beers et al. (2005) who pointed out that members of a
multidisciplinary group “need to find some kind of commonality between their different
perspectives in order to benefit from each other” (p. 624). Studies on the Theory of
Transactive Memory System (Wegner 1986) confirm that the groups whose members know
who is an expert on which topics achieve more in-group tasks (e.g., Liang et al. 1995).
Prior research has shown that it is not easy to acquire correct knowledge about the
collaboration partner’s knowledge: During this process, a lot of perception or evaluation
mistakes can slip in (Nickerson 1999). In addition, according to the theory of transactive
memory system (Wegner 1986) sufficient common time is required to acquire this knowledge.
Furthermore, there are situations in which the possibilities of acquiring knowledge about the
partners’ knowledge are strongly restricted (Engelmann and Hesse 2010), for example a CSCL
setting with a reduced amount of communication channels (cf. Baker et al. 2012;
Lambropoulos et al. 2012).
The approach for fostering knowledge and information awareness
In order to find a solution to the need for and the problem of acquiring knowledge about the
collaboration partners‘knowledge in computer-supported collaborative settings, Engelmann
(née Keller) and colleagues developed their KIA approach (Keller et al. 2006). It provides, as
mentioned above, the spatially distributed group members with their collaborators’ knowledge
structures and their collaborators’ information underlying these structures, both visualized by
means of digital concept maps (e.g., Engelmann and Hesse 2010).
Empirical studies confirmed that this approach not only leads to an easy and quick acquisition of
KIA, but also to an improvement of collaborative problem solving (e.g., Engelmann and Hesse
2010). Because it has been proven that collaborative problem solving fosters learning (e.g.,
Hausmann et al. 2004), one can expect that this approach also increases learning. This was tested
in a recent study by Lechner and Engelmann in which the KIA approach was applied in a school
setting to improve learning in biology. This data is being analyzed at the moment.
That knowledge awareness increases has also been confirmed by studies using other
approaches: For example, Bodemer’s (2011) knowledge awareness approach marginally
improved individual learning gains as well as collaborative learning performance. In his
experimental condition a learner was provided with his own solution together with the learning
partner’s solutions in the context of a multiple external representation task, while in his control
condition the dyad members only saw their own solutions. In the study by Nückles and Stürz
(2006) self-ratings regarding the expertise of laypersons were provided to the experts. As a
result, the communication between the expert and the layperson was more efficient, compared
to a condition without this knowledge awareness tool. This improved communication led to
laypersons acquiring more procedural and declarative knowledge.
Empirical results demonstrated that the KIA approach may also assist in overcoming
collaboration barriers: With the study by Engelmann and Hesse (2011) evidence was provided
showing that the KIA approach fostered sharing and cognitively processing of unshared
information. In the study by Schreiber and Engelmann (2010), it was shown that this approach
fostered the development of a transactive memory system. Further effects of knowledge
awareness approaches in CSCL are summarized by Janssen and Bodemer (2013). In the
current paper, we focus on investigating a collaboration barrier having to do with the concept
of mutual trust.
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The impact of mutual trust on behavior and performance of groups
Trust is an important influencing factor regarding behavior and performance of groups (Salas
et al. 2005). It can lead to more helping behaviors in CSCL groups (Hsu et al. 2011) and is
seen as a crucial part of CSCL by Kirschner and Erkens (2013). Changes in the situation can
have an impact on the role of trust in groups (e.g., Kramer 1999). For example, the role of trust
is dependent on the degree of structure in the situation (Dirks and Ferrin 2001; Jarvenpaa et al.
2004), that is, the degree of freedom regarding the group members’ activities: In situations
with a low degree of structure, trust has a direct effect on group variables. In such situations, it
is difficult to interpret others’ behaviors. Therefore, their behavior is interpreted depending on
the amount of trust the group members have with each other. In situations with a moderate
degree of structure, trust is a moderating factor. Factors for interpreting others’ behaviors are
given; however, trust influences how these factors are interpreted. In situations with high
structure, others’ behaviors can be directly evaluated. Trust is not used to interpret others’
behaviors and, therefore, does not have any impact on group measurements.
In situations, in which trust has an effect on group variables, the following relations are to be
expected: In numerous publications (e.g., Jarvenpaa et al. 1998), it is argued that mutual trust is an
important influencing factor for group effectiveness. This was also confirmed by several empir-
ical studies (e.g., Colquitt et al. 2007; Kanawattanachai and Yoo 2002; Paul andMcDaniel 2004).
Further empirical studies, for instance by Aubert and Kelsey (2003) as well as Jarvenpaa et al.
(2004), have shown that trust has an effect on group efficiency, but not on group effectiveness.
These contradictory results could possibly be explained by another influencing factor,
namely, correctness of individual performances: If group members with high mutual trust
work without mistakes, this should result – according to Aubert and Kelsey (2003) as well as
Jarvenpaa et al. (2004) – in a faster and, therefore, more efficient collaboration, since it is to be
expected that high mutual trust reduces mutual control. When free from errors, high mutual
trust should not have an impact on group effectiveness. If group members with high mutual
trust make mistakes, these mistakes might not be discovered due to the reduced mutual control
caused by having high mutual trust. This should lead to reduced group effectiveness (cf.,
Jarvenpaa et al. 2004; Dirks and Ferrin 2001). Due to the fact that efficiency is defined as
effectiveness per time, the time saved while performing the task has to be very high in order to
obtain good efficiency with low effectiveness. Therefore, it is expected that low effectiveness
will lead to poor efficiency (see Fig. 2, left side).
Contrarily, low mutual trust should increase mutual control and, therefore, the needed time;
that is, it should reduce group efficiency. Low mutual trust has already been shown to lead to
more relationship conflicts and task conflicts as well as to reduce the time of constructive
collaboration (Peterson and Behfar 2003). However, there is a good chance that the mistakes of
the collaboration partners will be discovered. As a consequence, higher group effectiveness
can be expected (see Fig. 2, right side).
Due to the fact that, compared to face-to-face collaboration, computer-supported collabo-
ration is often accompanied by various difficulties (e.g., Janssen and Bodemer 2013), it is most
likely that the group members will make mistakes. Therefore, the following argumentation
refers only to collaborations in which mistakes appeared.
In computer-supported environments, the ability for mutual control is often more limited
compared to face-to-face settings. Therefore, it is to assume that in computer-supported
environments mutual control is very effortful.
One research goal of this study was to investigate the impact of mutual trust in virtual
groups on group performance depending on whether the KIA approach was available or not.
(Mutual trust is a predictor here.)
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The amount of mutual trust also varies depending on prior group experience in a concrete
group (Aubert and Kelsey 2003). As a consequence, depending on the amount of collaboration
quality in the group, a different amount of trust should develop.
Another research goal of this study was to clarify the question of whether – depending on
the availability of the KIA approach – differences in the amount of collaboration quality have
an impact on the development of trust after the collaboration. (Mutual trust is the criterion
here.)
Experimental study
With regard to these two research goals the following expectations were postulated.
Expectations
Postulated effects of the interaction between initial trust and condition on group performance
(trust as predictor) Without being provided with the KIA approach (control condition), it was
to be expected that trust will affect group effectiveness: As explained above, if mutual trust is
high, it was to be expected that there was low mutual control and, therefore, mistakes would
not be detected. This should decrease group effectiveness (cf., Jarvenpaa et al. 2004; Dirks and
Ferrin 2001) and – because of its relation to effectiveness – efficiency. However, low trust
should lead to mutual control, even if mutual control was effortful in computer-supported
settings. This should reduce efficiency, while effectiveness should be increased. (However, due
to the mutual control difficulties in virtual groups, it was to be expected that not all mistakes
would be detected.).
In addition, it was expected that by direct access to the collaborators’ knowledge and
information, the availability of the KIA approach (experimental condition) would facilitate
mutual control. The ability for easy mutual control can therefore be given also in virtual
groups. In prior studies (e.g., Engelmann and Hesse 2010), it was confirmed that the KIA
approach is used if it is available. This means that even though the group members were not
explicitly instructed to cognitively process the maps depicting their collaborators’ knowledge
structures and information, when these maps were provided, cognitive processing of the maps
did take place. Therefore, there should not be an impact of mutual trust on mutual control; that
is, there should be mutual control independent of the amount of mutual trust. Consequently, it
was to be expected that the amount of mutual trust would not have an impact on group
effectiveness and group efficiency.
Fig. 2 The impact of high trust (left side) and high trust (right side) on group effectiveness and group efficiency
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Due to the fact that first, the collaborators’work would be checked over and, therefore, their
mistakes would be detected, and second, because the process costs of mutual control are low,
an effective and efficient group performance was to be expected, compared to groups that
collaborate without the KIA approach.
To sum up, we hypothesized – under the assumption of the existence of individual mistakes
in virtual groups – the following effects:
Hypothesis 1: Regarding group effectiveness as criterion, we expected a significant interaction
between initial mutual trust and condition. In more detail, we expected that (1.1) in the
experimental condition, initial trust would not have an impact on group effectiveness, while
(1.2) in the control condition, high initial trust would reduce effectiveness because of less
mutual control and, therefore, less mutual corrections of mistakes.
Hypothesis 2: Regarding group efficiency as the criterion, we only expected a main effect for
condition in favor of the experimental condition; that is, (2.1) the experimental condition
would be more efficient compared to the control condition. We expected (2.2) neither a main
effect for trust nor an interaction of trust and condition on group efficiency.
Postulated effects of the interaction between the quality of performance within the group and
condition on the development of mutual trust (trust as criterion) The amount of mutual trust
varies also, for example, depending on the experiences in a concrete group (Aubert and Kelsey
2003). Therefore, depending on the amount of collaboration quality of the groups, a different
amount of trust should be developed.
It was assumed that in the control condition, poor collaboration quality of the group
will lead to low mutual trust and high mutual skepticism, respectively. The difficult
mutual control in virtual groups should lead to the following: The group members should
attribute poor collaboration quality to their collaborators, because they were not able to
check the others’ work completely. In the experimental condition, however, it was to be
expected that the group members check each other’s work due to the easy opportunities
provided by the KIA approach. Poor collaboration quality of the group should, therefore,
not be attributed to the collaborators whose work has been checked, but to external
factors such as task difficulties.
Hypothesis 3: We expected a significant interaction between condition and the amount of
collaboration quality of the group, having an effect on developed trust and developed mutual
skepticism respectively. In more detail, we expected that (3.1) in the experimental condition,
the amount of collaboration quality of the group would not have an impact on developing
mutual skepticism, while (3.2) in the control condition poor collaboration quality of the group
would lead to the development of mutual skepticism regarding the others’ abilities.
A summary of all postulated hypotheses can be found in Table 1.
Method
An experimental condition consisting of 20 triads being provided with the KIA approach was
compared to a control condition consisting of 20 triads collaborating without this approach.
Participants Participants of the study were 120 students (84 female, 36 male) of a German
university from different fields of study with an average age of 23.74 years (SD=3.47). They
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volunteered to participate for payment. The participants collaborating in groups of three were
randomly assigned to a control condition (20 triads) or an experimental condition (20 triads).
The compositions of the groups regarding gender were equal between the conditions; that
is, both conditions had the same number of groups with no, one, two, or three women.
The members of a group either did not know each other or hardly knew each other: There
was no significant difference between the conditions regarding the degree of acquaintance
among the members in a group (F<1).
The participants were not balanced with respect to the field of study because the domain
material was artificial and, therefore, no advantage could exist for a particular field of study.
Setting and materials The members of a triad were spatially distributed and collaborated
through a computer-supported environment. They communicated by using Skype (only audio).
The experimental environment consisted of several shared and unshared working windows of
CmapTools, a digital concept mapping software developed by the Florida Institute for Human
and Machine Cognition (USA).
The study was held in German. Therefore, for this paper, all contents have been translated
into English.
The domain refers to rescuing a fictitious type of spruce forest and consisted of 13 concepts,
30 relations between the concepts and 13 pieces of background information (in parts divisible
into sub-elements), each linked to a concept. These elements were evenly distributed among
the three group members in a way that each member had the same amount of shared and
unshared concepts, relations, and background information aspects. The shared elements were
shared with either one collaborator or both collaborators.
The following online questionnaires and instructions were used in the study:
An online questionnaire for assessing several control measure items (e.g., experience in
working with computers and in groups) and for measuring the amount of initial mutual trust
was included. For measuring mutual trust several items taken from Amelang et al. (1984),
from Jarvenpaa et al. (1998), as well as from Jarvenpaa et al. (2004) were used that were
translated into German and partly adapted to our experimental setting. The 15 control measure
items and the 13 items for assessing mutual trust were designed as multiple-choice items with
five-point rating scales, ranging from complete agreement to no agreement. Examples of items
are: “I can create visualizations by means of a computer” (control measure item) and “In
contact with strangers, it is better to be careful until they have provided evidence that one can
trust them.”
Table 1 Summary of hypotheses
Effects on group effectiveness
1.1 In the experimental condition, initial mutual trust has no impact on group effectiveness.
1.2 In the control condition with increasing initial mutual trust, group effectiveness decreases.
Effects on group efficiency
2.1 The experimental condition solves the problems more efficiently than the control condition.
2.2. Trust has no impact on group efficiency.
Effects on mutual skepticism
3.1 In the experimental condition, the amount of collaboration quality has no impact on the
development of mutual skepticism.
3.2 In the control condition with a decreasing amount of collaboration quality, more mutual
skepticism develops.
Notes: Experimental condition: with knowledge and information awareness approach; control condition: without it
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An online knowledge test was used to measure the knowledge of group members regarding
their own and their collaborators’ knowledge on particular relations and concepts. It consisted
of 24 multiple-choice test items. These items were classified with regard to who possessed the
requested knowledge, resulting in four types of items: (1) items asking for one’s own unshared
elements, that is, items measuring knowledge that one alone had in his/her individual map
(Item example for Expert A: “Please mark which expert(s) had knowledge about the relation
between Topisol and nitrate – Expert A, B, or C?” Only Expert A had this knowledge.), (2)
items asking for the collaborators’ unshared elements, that is, items measuring knowledge that
only one of the collaborators had (Item example for Expert A: “Please mark which expert(s)
had knowledge about the relation between Oxatrol and potassium – Expert A, B, or C?” Only
Expert B had this knowledge.), (3) items asking for shared elements that one shared with one
of the collaborators, that is, items measuring knowledge that one had together with one of the
collaborators (Item example for Expert A: “Please mark which expert(s) had knowledge about
the relation between spruce and potassium – Expert A, B, or C?” Only Experts A and B had
this knowledge.), and (4) items asking for shared elements of the collaborators, that is, items
measuring knowledge that only the two collaborators had (Item example for Expert A: “Please
mark which expert(s) had knowledge about the relation between spruce and fidget-grub –
Expert A, B, or C?” Only experts B and C had this knowledge.). For each item the participants
stated whether they were certain that they had answered it correctly (rating scale with three
answers possibilities from low, middle, and high certainty).
A second online questionnaire was used to evaluate the study as a whole to assess aspects
of collaboration and mutual control, to subjectively rate the quality of the group performance
as well as to measure the amount of mutual trust and skepticism after collaboration. For
measuring mutual trust and skepticism several items taken from Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) that
were translated into German and adapted to our experimental setting as well as our own
created items were used. In addition, only in the experimental condition was the usefulness of
the KIA approach assessed. Again the items were designed as rating scales with answer
categories ranging from one point for no agreement and five points for complete agreement.
The questionnaire contained 50 items in the control condition and – due to the
additional items – 56 items in the experimental condition.
The group members were provided with a paper-based instruction on how to use
CmapTools and with a paper-based instruction to explain all the phases of the study and the
tasks to be completed by the group members.
Procedure After informing the participants about the framework of the study and obtaining
their signed letter of agreement to take part in the study, the three members of a group were
sent to separate rooms each equipped with a desk and a computer. They began the study by
individually filling out the online questionnaire for assessing several control measure items and
their initial mutual trust. After that, each group member practiced using CmapTools until she or
he was familiar with the core functions of creating digital concepts maps. This practicing phase
took about 10 to 20 min. In the subsequent phase, the group members were informed that they
should imagine that they were three experts who would have to mutually rescue a spruce
forest. They were told that in order to rescue this forest they would have to solve two problems,
namely, first which pesticide and second which fertilizer they would use. The fertilizer
problem could only be solved correctly if the pesticide problem was solved correctly. The
groups were told that there was only one solution for each problem. Thus, the problems were
well-defined. They were further told they should imagine that in the past they had taken some
notes regarding these problem domains and that – based on these notes – they had to create
their own concept map visualizing their own knowledge and information. They were given the
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notes containing one of three partly different pieces of expert information and had 20 min to
create their individual concept map. This was enough time for each group members to finish
the individual map. Log files of creating the individual maps were generated (by CmapTools).
After that the groups of the experimental condition were additionally provided with their
collaborators’ individual concept maps for 5 min. This individual phase was included to assure
that the members of the experimental condition looked at their partners’ map. In order to
control the time in the individual phase, the group members of the control condition had 5
more minutes for viewing their own individual map.
Then the collaborative problem solving phase started, lasting 35 min. In this phase, the
groups had to solve the two problems for rescuing the forest. In order to accomplish this, they
had to merge their individual conceptual knowledge by jointly creating a single group concept
map in a shared working window. The background information aspects were irrelevant to the
problem, but this was not known to the group members. The group members could speak with
each other by using Skype (only audio). Besides the shared working window, each member of
the control condition had access to their own individual concept map that they had created in
the individual phase (see Fig. 3 left side).
The members of the experimental condition were – throughout the whole collaboration
phase – additionally provided with their collaborators’ individual concept maps visualizing
their collaborators’ conceptual knowledge and background information (see Fig. 3, right side).
Due to the fact that the knowledge and information elements were evenly distributed among
the three members of a group, there was no information difference between the conditions. The
only difference was the visibility of the partners’ knowledge and information.
In this collaborative phase, log files of creating the group maps were generated (by
CmapTools), and computer screen contents as well as audio conversations were captured
(by Camtasia).
Thereafter, a second individual phase with no time limits and no access to the experimental
environment started in which the group members first had to fill out an online knowledge test
for measuring KIA and second had to complete a questionnaire for evaluating the study and
aspects of collaboration and problem-solving as well as for measuring the amount of devel-
oped mutual trust and skepticism.
At the end of the study, the participants were thanked, rewarded, and debriefed.
Predictor measures
To answer the hypotheses, besides differing between control condition and experimental
condition, the following measures were used as predictor measures:
The factor “trust in others due to experience” (in the following this will be called initial trust)
was used to answer Hypotheses 1 and 2.1 There was no significant difference between the
conditions regarding this factor (MC=0.16; ME=−0.16; F(1, 38)=1.06; MSE=1.00; p=0.31).
To answer Hypotheses 3, the following predictors were used:
The predictor solution potential of the individual maps means the amount of domain
content in the three individual maps of a triad needed to solve the problems. The more
1 A factor analysis with Varimax rotation with the 13 trust items included in the questionnaire on control
measurements was applied and resulted in these two interpretable factors (cf. Bortz and Schuster 2010): initial
skepticism, Cronbach’s α=0.59; initial trust, Cronbach’s α=0.78. Since the internal consistency is only
acceptable if Cronbach’s α is higher than 0.70 (e.g., Nunnally and Bernstein 1994), the factor “initial scepticism”
was not included in further analyses.
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problem-relevant aspects were in the three maps, the higher their solution potential was. If the
three individual maps of a triad contained all correct domain content aspects that were needed
to solve both problems, two points were given. If information was missing or wrong, and
therefore only one of both problems could be solved, one point was given. If no problem could
be solved by means of the three maps, no points were given. The interrater agreement was
ICC=0.85 (two-way mixed single measures (cf. Shrout and Fleiss 1979). As assumed, there
was no significant difference between the conditions regarding this variable (F<1).
For analyzing the completeness of the group maps that the triads created in the collaborative
phase, two dependent measures were assessed: the number of correctly drawn nodes in the
group map (called correct nodes in the group map), that is, nodes with correct labels (max. 13
attainable points) and the number of correctly drawn relations contained in the group map
(called correct relations in the group map), which means that the start and end node of the
relation as well as the label were correct (max. 30 attainable points). In order to determine these
measures, the group maps were compared to an original map representing all correct nodes and
relations of the artificial domain material. The groups received one point for each entry of each
category (e.g., if the group map of Group 3 contained 12 correctly drawn relations, this group
received 12 points for the category “correct relations in the group map”). The interrater
agreements were ICC=1 for correct nodes and ICC=0.99 for correct relations (two-way mixed
single measures (cf. Shrout and Fleiss 1979).
Criterion measures
Criterion measures regarding group performance: Regarding group effectiveness the follow-
ing measures were differentiated:
Group maps’ suitability for problem-solving refers to the amount of domain content in the
group map that is needed to solve the problems. The more problem-relevant aspects are in the
map, the more it is suited to solve the two problems. In this regard, two dependent measures were
differentiated, namely group maps’suitability for solving the pesticide problem and group maps’
suitability for solving the fertilizer problem. If in a group map all correct domain content aspects
were available that were needed to solve the pesticide problem, one point was given. If
information was missing or wrong, and therefore, the pesticide problem was not solvable by
viewing the group map, no points were given. Analogous to this, if the information was provided
in the group map for solving the fertilizer problem, one point was given, if information was
missing or wrong and as a consequence the fertilizer problem was not solvable by viewing the
group map no points were assigned. The interrater agreement wasCohen’s κ=1 for “groupmaps’
suitability for solving the pesticide problem” andCohen’s κ=0.87 for “groupmaps’ suitability for
solving the fertilizer problem” both indicating high rater agreement (Cohen 1960).
Regarding the quality of the problem solutions of the groups, we differentiated between two
dependent measures, namely solving the pesticide problem correctly and solving the fertilizer
Fig. 3 Computer screen of the control condition (left side) and the experimental condition (right side)
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problem correctly. If a group solved the pesticide problem correctly, one point was given, if the
wrong pesticide was chosen, no points were given. Analogous to this, if a group solved the
fertilizer problem correctly, one point was assigned, if the wrong fertilizer was chosen, no
points could be attained. The interrater agreements were for both measures Cohen’s κ=1
indicating perfect interrater agreement (Cohen 1960).
Regarding group efficiency the following measures were differentiated:
Because effectiveness was determined as a dichotomy variable in this study (solved vs. not
solved), to determined efficiency measures, only those triads were included that solved the
pesticide problem and/or the fertilizer problem correctly. Two measures were differentiated:
The variable efficiency of deciding for the correct pesticide solution refers to the collaboration
time needed to decide on the correct pesticide solution. The variable efficiency of deciding for
the correct fertilizer solution refers to the collaboration time needed to decide on the correct
fertilizer solution. The interrater agreement was ICC=0.96 for efficiency of deciding on the
correct pesticide solution and ICC=0.96 for efficiency of deciding on the correct fertilizer
solution (two-way mixed single measures, cf. Shrout and Fleiss 1979).
Criterion measures regarding developed mutual trust and developed mutual skepticism after
collaboration The factors “trust in the others’ ability and motivation” (called developed trust)
and “skepticism regarding the others” (called developed skepticism) were used as dependent
measures2.
For validating purposes, we correlated the predictor factor “initial trust” with the criterion
factors “developed trust” and “developed skepticism: Initial trust did neither significantly
correlate with developed trust (r=−0.01, p=0.96), as one might have expected, nor with the
other criterion factor (r=−0.17, p=0.29). The reason for this may be ascribed to the type of
items that the particular factor was based on: Initial trust refers to items such as “In most of the
groups that I have worked with in the past, the group members trusted each other” or “In the
past, I have worked mostly together with trustworthy people” and, therefore, it refers to the
amount of general trust in others developed by prior experience, in the sense of a trait. In
contrast, the factor, developed trust, was mainly based on items such as “The others [in the
sense of the collaboration partners in this current study] aimed to successfully contribute to the
problem solving” and “The others had knowledge that contributed to solving the problems”
and, therefore, refers to mutual trust in the collaborators’ performance in the sense of their
motivation and their ability. Trust is here a state.
Results
The experimental condition in which the group members were provided with a KIA approach
was compared with the control condition in which the group members collaborated without
2 The questionnaire after the collaboration phase contained 50 items (that were identical between the conditions),
that is, three factor analyses were necessary to comply with the rules for conducting factor analyses (cf. Bortz and
Schuster 2010). Factor Analysis 1, including 17 items on trust, resulted in two interpretable factors: Developed
trust, Cronbach’s α=0.73; developed skepticism, Cronbach’s α=0.78. Factor Analysis 2, including 19 items on
mutual control, coordination, communication, and subjective evaluation of the group outcomes, resulted in one
interpretable factor: Developed suspiciousness, Cronbach’s α=0.46. Factor Analysis 3, including 14 items on
study evaluation, group map creation, and collaboration, resulted in one interpretable factor: Cognitive effort,
Cronbach’s α=0.50. Because of their low Cronbach’s α values, the factors “developed suspiciousness” and
“cognitive effort” were not included in further analyses.
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this approach. All analyses presented here were based on the group level because most of the
dependent variables were variables on group level (e.g., the group answers, the group maps)
and individuals in a group are not independent of each other. Following Cress (2008), the
analyses have to be based on aggregated data of individuals, for example, in form of means, if
groups are the units of the analyses. Therefore, variables measured on the individual level were
aggregated; that is, group means were calculated. This also assures having the same analysis
level as the group variables.
The inclusion of a covariate was not necessary.3
The reasons for using moderator analyses and the explanation of the procedure can be
found in the Appendix “Analytical Procedures”.
Manipulation check
It was analyzed whether our KIA approach fostered the acquisition of knowledge and
information awareness.
The analysis of the answers to the knowledge test resulted in a significant higher KIAvalue
for the experimental condition compared to the control condition (MC=18.77, ME=22.87;
F(1, 38)=7.41;MSE=22.66; p=0.01; ηp
2=0.16). This value was calculated as the sum of item
Categories 2 and 4 each weighted by the correctness certainty (see section “Setting and
materials”) because only these categories merely referred to the collaborators’ knowledge.
This is accordant with the results of prior studies (e.g., Engelmann et al. 2010; Engelmann
and Hesse 2010).
In the questionnaire after the collaboration, the members of the experimental condition
mostly stated that they used or viewed the windows with the collaborators’ maps only
sometimes (M=3.29, SD=0.52). However, they also maintained that the windows with the
collaborators’ maps were helpful (M=3.92, SD=0.59), indispensable (M=3.14, SD=0.77),
helped to recognize differences and similarities between their own and the collaborators’ maps
(M=3.88, SD=0.81), helped to acquire a clear mental model of the collaborators’ knowledge
(M=3.63, SD=0.80), and to avoid misunderstandings (M=3.47, SD=0.67).
It is interesting to note that these descriptive values are lower compared to prior studies that
used the same domain and tasks (e.g., Engelmann and Hesse 2010). However, less use and
lower evaluated helpfulness did not affect the acquisition of knowledge and information
awareness.
Results on postulated effects of the interaction between initial trust and condition on group
performance
An overview of the results of all corresponding moderator analyses can be found in Table 2.
Group effectiveness as criterion variable The regression analyses with effectiveness measures
as criterion variable as well as condition, initial trust, and their interaction as predictor variables
led to the following results:
3 A factor analysis with Varimax rotation with the 15 control measure items resulted in six factors with
eigenvalues higher than 1. According to Bortz and Schuster (2010), in a Varimax-rotated factor structure, only
those factors can be interpreted that have at least four items with a loading>0.60 or at least ten items with a
loading>0.40. This criterion was met only by the factor “computer experience”. However, an univariate ANOVA
did not result in a significant difference between the two conditions (F<1).
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The regression analysis with solution potential of the pesticide problem in the group map as
the criterion variable revealed no significant conditional effect for initial trust or for the
belongingness to a particular condition. Though, a significant interaction between condition
and initial trust appeared: Simple slope analyses indicated as hypothesized that higher initial
trust significantly reduced the solution potential of the pesticide problem in the group maps of
the control condition but did not significantly affect the solution potential of the pesticide
problem in the group maps of the experimental condition.
In line with these results, the regression analysis with the solution of the pesticide problem
as the criterion variable also did not reveal significant conditional effects, however, a signif-
icant interaction between condition and initial trust. Simple slope analyses indicated, as
expected, that higher initial trust significantly impaired the solution of the pesticide problem
of the control condition but did not significantly affect the solution of the pesticide problem of
the experimental condition.
Please note that regarding the measures group maps’ suitability for solving the fertilizer
problem as well as solution of the fertilizer problem as criterion variables, no significant effects
resulted. Therefore, these results are not reported.
Group efficiency as criterion variable The regression analyses with efficiency measures as the
criterion variable as well as condition, initial trust, and their interaction as predictor variables
led to the following results:
According to our hypothesis, the regression analysis with efficiency of deciding for the
correct pesticide solution as the criterion variable revealed a significant conditional effect for the
belongingness to a particular condition. The experimental groups needed less time for finding
the correct pesticide solution compared to the control groups (MC=19:56, SDC=7:21;
ME=13:15, SDE=7:55). As expected, we neither found a significant conditional effect for initial
trust, nor did a significant interaction between condition and initial trust appear.
In line with this result, the regression analysis with efficiency of deciding for the correct
fertilizer solution as criterion variable also revealed, as expected, a significant conditional effect
for the belongingness to a particular condition. The experimental groups needed less time for
finding the correct fertilizer solution compared to the control groups (MC=22:40, SDC=4:42;
ME=17:16, SDE=5:23). Again, as expected we neither found a significant conditional effect for
initial trust, nor did a significant interaction between condition and initial trust appear.
Results on the postulated effects of the interaction between quality of performance
within the group and condition on the development of mutual trust
Because it was expected that the amount of trust also depends on situational factors, the impact
of collaboration quality of the group, depending on the condition, on the developed trust, and
developed skepticism, respectively, was analyzed. An overview of the results of all corre-
sponding moderator analyses can be found in Table 3.
The regression analysis with developed skepticism as the criterion variable revealed a
marginally conditional effect for the solution potential of the individual maps, but not for
the belongingness to a particular condition. With an increasing solution potential of the
individual maps, less skepticism was developed. As hypothesized, a significant interaction
between condition and the solution potential of the individual maps emerged. Simple slope
analyses indicated that lower solution potential of the individual maps significantly increased
the developed skepticism in the control condition, but did not significantly affect the developed
skepticism in the experimental condition.
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Please note that the corresponding regression analysis with developed skepticism as the
criterion variable and condition, the number of correct relations and their interaction as
predictors led to the same result pattern. However, this analysis did not meet the necessary
requirements; that is, the assumptions of the global test statistics were not satisfied. Therefore,
this analysis was not reported here. In addition, regarding the measure correct nodes in the
group map, there was no corresponding significant interaction. Regarding the measures with
developed trust as the criterion variable, no expected interactions were found. Therefore, these
results were not reported here.
An explorative case study
In order to corroborate the expected relations between the amount of mutual initial trust and
mutual control as a function of having access to the KIA approach, we conducted a case study:
For a qualitative analysis within each of the following four categories we randomly selected a
triad: a control group with high initial trust, that is with a trust level above the median (we
randomly selected group CC 7), a control group with low initial trust, that is a trust level below
the median (we randomly selected group CC 2), an experimental condition with high initial
trust (we randomly selected group EC 21) and an experimental condition with low initial trust
(we randomly selected group EC 22). Following Fig. 2 we postulated that in the control
condition, high initial trust will lead to low effectiveness, because of lower mutual control and
thus a low detection rate of errors. The transcripted Camtasia recording of CC 7 seems to
confirm that there is hardly any mutual control in such groups even if the situation requires it.
For example at time code 5:31 f. (see Table 4, CC 7): A question arose by expert C, expert B
wanted to answer it, but C interrupted him to give him drawing suggestions. B, however, had
yet another suggestion. Important here is expert C’s reaction saying “if you say that, then one
gets it.” He did not further try to clarify the situation. Instead he relied on the other expert.
In contrast to such control groups with high initial trust, it was postulated that control
groups with low initial trust would achieve high effectiveness, because checking each other
results in a high detection rate of errors. The excerpt of CC 2’s recording seems to support this
idea (see Table 4, CC 2): Very often the group members instructed their partners to check their
Table 3 The results of the moderator analyses of collaboration quality and condition on the development of
mutual skepticism, including regression analyses and simple slope analyses
Model properties
Criterion variable Predictor variables b SE β p Adj. R2 F(df) p
Developed skepticism Solution potential of
the individual maps
−0.26 0.15 −0.26 0.09 [0.007] [1.14(2, 37)] [0.33]
Condition 0.02 0.15 0.36 0.92
Solution potential of
the individual maps x
condition
0.36 0.15 0.36 0.02 0.12 2.7(3, 36) 0.06
Simple slope CC −0.62 0.22 −0.62 < 0.01
Simple slope EC 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.65
Notes: Values in brackets represent the model properties before the inclusion of the interaction. The predictor
variable “Solution Potential of the Individual Maps” was z-standardized
Simple Slope CC=Simple slope analysis for the control condition
Simple Slope EC=Simple slope analysis for the experimental condition
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Table 4 Excerpts of the Camtasia files of two control and two experimental groups having either low or high
initial trust
Control Condition with high initial trust: CC 7
Time code
(in min.)
Dialog (overall 32:27 min.)
05:22 Expert B: “Wait. The RP2, it’s not right like that, is it?”
05:24 Expert C: “I think, it was just in the way”[…]
05:31 Expert C: “What is this Herm+? Does it generate rank spiders during decomposition?”
05:35 Expert B: “No, just combined with the decomposing rank spider it generates phosphate. I
don’t know how I should …”
05:43 Expert C: “Ah, o.k., you can make another arrow there to here”
05:46 Expert B: “Or I move the Herm”
05:48 Expert C: “Or like that, but yes, o.k., if you say that, then one gets it”
Control Condition with low initial trust: CC 2
Time code
(in min.)
Dialog (overall 35:27 min.)
21:31 Expert C: “By the way, potassium is not produced, when the pests die. It’s nitrate that is
being produced when the pests die, isn’t it?”
21:38 Expert A: “No, potassium …wait… potassium yes. Potassium forms, yes.
Nitrate, too, definitely, of course, but the info is only potassium.”
21:52 Expert C: “Damn. Am I stupid or what? I don’t think I really get it. O.k.
never mind. ”
22:04 Expert A: “In mine its presented as relation 8. Perhaps, it is also in yours… is there nitrate
in
yours, or what?”
22:11 Expert A: “N-yes”
22:15 Expert C: “It’s written in your word document that they produce nitrate? During the
decomposition process?”
22:20 Expert B: “Wait, I can’t find it right now”
23:05 Expert C: “Is it written in yours that dead bugs produce phosphate?”
23:08 Expert B: “I’ve got to take a look. […] No, I think, this is not written in mine.”
23:20 Expert C: “Isn’t it written in your word document under point 8?”
23:23 Expert A: “Under pests?”
23:24 Expert B: “Oh, wait! Sorry, I’ve looked in the wrong place”
27:04 Expert A: “Has anyone read the background information in detail?”
27:08 Expert C: “No, but what do you mean by background information?”
27:10 Expert A: “Well, what is written next to it, because… wait… ah well, o.k., there is actually
nothing interesting there.”
28:30 Expert B: “Well this Herm+and how it is related to the material bug, I’ve got no clue. It was
not written in mine, I believe.”
28:31 Expert A: “It is definitely written in yours. There is a connection depicted for all
others, for sure.”
Experimental Condition with high initial trust: EC 21
Time code
(in min.)
Dialog (overall 21:58 min.)
00:21 Expert C: “I have noticed that some things mutually exclude each other, for example
the pesticides, uhm, the fertilizers. […] Expert A, you have this Topisol, it extracts
nitrate […]
00:38 Expert A: “I think all extract, whatever fertilizer we use. It always supplies one thing and
extracts all the other things.”
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individual information in their individual map or their corresponding word document (see e.g.,
time codes 22:15, 23:20, 27:04 or 28:31).
We expected that members of the experimental condition would control each other inde-
pendently of the amount of initial trust. The excerpts of EC 21’s and EC 22’s confirmed this idea
(see Table 4, EC 21 and EC 22). There seems to be no difference between these two groups.
Independently of the amount of initial trust group members control each other, but not like in
CC 2. In contrast to CC 2 in which partners instructed each other to check their individual files,
partners in both, EC 21 with high trust and EC 22with low trust, use the KIA approach to take a
look at their partners’maps. The comparison of the statements on time codes 00:21 and 1:04 in
EC 21 and the time codes 05:43 and 16:01 in EC 22 indicate that the group members used their
access to the partners’ maps for mutual control, independently of the amount of initial trust.
Discussion
In this paper, we investigated two research questions. The first research question focused on
the impact of mutual trust in virtual groups on group performance depending on whether the
KIA approach is available or not. With regard to group effectiveness, we expected a significant
interaction between condition and initial trust on group effectiveness in a way that increasing
trust will decrease effectiveness in the control condition, while in the experimental condition
trust will not have an effect on group effectiveness (Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2).
To test these hypotheses, along with the others, 120 participants were investigated, grouped
in 20 triads that were provided with the KIA approach and 20 triads collaborating without it.
The analyses confirmed our hypotheses: In the experimental condition, mutual trust did not
significantly affect group effectiveness; however, in the control condition with increasing
mutual trust, group effectiveness, measured as both solution potential of the pesticide problem
in the group map and solution of the pesticide problem, significantly decreased.
These results provide evidence that the negative impact of mutual trust can be counteracted
successfully by the availability of the KIA approach. We explained this result with the
fostering of mutual control when the KIA approach is available. Our explorative case study
seems to confirm this explanation: As expected, in the audio transcript of a control group with
high initial trust there was hardly any mutual control, even if the situation required it. In
contrast, the transcript of a control group with low initial trust showed that the members often
instructed their collaboration partners to check their individual information in their map or in
Table 4 (continued)
01:04 Expert A: “Potassium definitely does, if we decide on RP2 for control, potassium would be
produced through that control, and I read in B’s, that if one uses this Herm+thing, then
it produces phosphate, right?”
01:28 Expert B: “Yes, exactly.”
Experimental Condition with low initial trust: EC 22
Time code (in min.) Dialog (overall 23:55 min.)
05:43 Expert B: “What’s that info added in Expert A‘s? Next to that RP2? There is
something attached. May I read it?”
05:50 A: “Wait, I don’t know.”
15:55 Expert C: “Then it has a moderate effect against the flunder caterpillar?”
15:58 Expert B: “Oh, it also has an effect?”
16:01 Expert C: “Yes, that is what Expert A has written here. It says: ‘the effect against other
pests is moderate.’”
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their word document (cf. Fig. 2). However, as expected, the amount of initial trust seems to
have no effect on the amount of mutual control in the experimental groups. The transcripts of
an experimental group with high mutual trust and of an experimental group with low mutual
trust seemed not to differ regarding the amount of mutual control. Independently of the amount
of initial trust the participants controlled each other. Yet, they differed from the control group
with low initial trust. The experimental group members used the access to their partners’ maps
(i.e., the KIA approach) for mutual control. To sum up, these case study results supported the
assumptions postulated for the control condition (Fig. 2) and the experimental condition.
Another explanation for the significant interaction between initial trust and condition on
group effectiveness might be a stronger structuring of the situation in the experimental
condition, caused by the KIA approach, in which trust did not have an impact (cf. Dirks and
Ferrin 2001; Jarvenpaa et al. 2004). However, further studies are needed to explain the causes
of the present findings in more detail.
It is interesting to note that the present effects were only found with the pesticide problem,
but not with the fertilizer problem. A reason for this could be that the fertilizer problem could
only be solved correctly if the pesticide problem was solved correctly, that is, solving the
fertilizer problem depended more on solving the pesticide problem than on other reasons.
Another reason could be the different task structures of the two problems. The pesticide
problem requires combining some variables with other variables, whereas solving the fertilizer
problem mainly depends on finding the correct solution of the pesticide problem and on
considering the relevant variables of the pesticide problem for the fertilizer problem. In this
way, solving the pesticide problem is more complex than solving the fertilizer problem. This
would mean that the KIA approach only reduces the negative impact of initial trust on solving
complex problems. However, this has to be corroborated by further studies.
One should note that due to its low Cronbach’s α value the factor “initial skepticism” could
not be used in further analyses. Initial trust was based on items such as “In most of the groups
that I have worked with in the past, the group members trusted each other” or “In the past, I
have worked mostly together with trustworthy people”. Therefore, it refers to the amount of
general trust in others developed by prior experience. Initial skepticism was based mainly on
items such as “One should be very careful if working together with strangers” or “In current
times, with so much competition, you should be on the alert or someone will probably take
advantage of you” and, therefore, refers mainly to a generalized skepticism about others, based
more on a general attitude. Whether our findings for initial trust could also hold up for initial
skepticism has to be investigated with a more reliable initial skepticism measure.
With regard to group efficiency, we expected for groups in the control condition with high trust
also low efficiency because efficiency is dependent on effectiveness. For groups in the control
condition with low trust, we also expected low efficiency due to much mutual control that takes
time. For the experimental condition, we expected, independent of the amount of trust, high group
efficiency due to the low process costs for checking the others’ work (Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2).
This hypothesized main effect was found: In line with prior study results (e.g., Engelmann
and Hesse 2010), the experimental groups solved both of the problems sooner compared to the
control groups. As expected, neither a main effect for trust, nor an interaction between trust
and condition, on group efficiency were observed.
Together with the findings on group effectiveness, this result demonstrated that mutual trust
may have an effect on group effectiveness, but not on group efficiency. This is accordant with
Kanawattanachai and Yoo (2002) and Jarvenpaa et al. (2004). Therefore, this paper also
contributes to solving the conflicting findings in literature regarding the effects of trust.
Our hypotheses were derived, among others, from the assumptions regarding mutual
control. However, in this study, we did not analyze mutual control. Future analyses could be
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based on the recorded discussions. However, in order to analyze mutual control in a better way,
eye tracking is needed. Eye tracking results could contribute to further clarifying the postulated
relations.
While in the first research question, trust was investigated as predictor, in the second
research question, it acted as criterion. The second research question addressed whether –
depending on the availability of the KIA approach – differences in the amount of collaboration
quality have an impact on the development of trust after the collaboration.
We hypothesized that in the control condition, poor collaboration quality of the group will
lead to low mutual trust and high mutual skepticism, respectively, because a computer
supported environment does not normally allow for easy mutual control; that is, the work of
others cannot be checked easily; therefore, poor collaboration quality is more likely to be
attributed to the collaborators. In contrast, it was hypothesized that in the experimental
condition, poor collaboration quality was not attributed to the collaborators, whose work has
been checked, but to external factors such as task difficulties and therefore would not affect the
development of mutual trust or mutual skepticism, respectively. To sum up, we expected a
significant interaction between condition and the collaboration quality, the latter measured as a
solution potential of the individual maps and the completeness of the group map, on the
amount of developed trust and developed skepticism, respectively (Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2).
The analyses for answering the second research question led to the hypothesized results: In
the control condition, with decreasing solution potential of the individual maps, the developed
mutual skepticism regarding the collaborators’ performance increased. In the experimental
condition, the collaboration quality of the group had no impact on the development of mutual
skepticism.
It is interesting to note that regarding the second research question, the findings in accord
with our hypothesis were only found with the factor developed skepticism and not with the
factor developed trust. This may be due to a qualitative difference between the two factors. The
factor, developed skepticism, is based on items such as “With another group, the problem
solving phase would have been more successful” and “I often had the impression that the other
experts did not understand their information correctly”. This refers mainly to dissatisfaction
with the other group members’ abilities. In contrast, the factor developed trust was mainly
based on the following items: “The others aimed to successfully contribute to the problem
solving” and “The others had knowledge that contributed to solving the problems”. It refers to
mutual trust in the collaborators’ performance in the sense of their motivation and their ability.
It also should be noted that regarding the second research question, we failed to find the
postulated interaction with variables of the completeness of the group maps. One reason was,
as described, that the needed requirements for conducting the analyses were not met.
There are some limitations of the study that have to be considered: The group members
were not experts with regard to the knowledge needed for solving the problems in the study.
However, each group member was provided with content material, and in an individual phase,
they had time to become familiar with it. In real situations, group members often have to
acquire new knowledge. For example, especially in collaborative learning settings, learners
often divide learning material in such a way that each learner only learns a part of the whole
learning material, and then, in a subsequent collaborative situation, they teach each other in
order for everyone to learn the not yet learned contents. In an empirical study by Lechner and
Engelmann (not yet published), the knowledge and information approach was applied in a
school context in which one class was taught one topic in biology and another class was taught
a different topic also in biology. In a subsequent collaboration phase, one student of one
domain collaborated computer-supported with another student of the other domain, in order to
teach each other the respective contents of each domain. The aim was to enable the students to
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collaboratively solve problems that required the knowledge of the contents of both domains.
As in our study, both dyadic learners did not have prior knowledge of the domain they had to
learn. However, in this study by Lechner and Engelmann, the effect of trust was not
investigated. The impact of trust in real application fields on group performances still needs
to be investigated.
It should be noted further that the domain material was artificial due to experimental
reasons (e.g., excluding the impact of prior knowledge). Nevertheless, as the questionnaire
completed after the collaboration phase has shown, the participants in both conditions stated
that they had enjoyed participating in this study (Mc=4.62, SDC=0.35;ME=4.52, SDE=0.44).
In prior studies, we investigated the impact of the KIA approach on group performances also
by using non-artificial domains. Along with the mentioned study by Lechner and Engelmann
that used content from the biology curriculum in school, in the study by Schreiber and
Engelmann (2010), the group members had to solve a criminal case; however, this study also
did not focus on the factor trust.
In our study, the group members did not know each other, but each individual had a certain
amount of general trust in others, in the sense of a trait (not a state). In the literature (e.g.,
Colquitt et al. 2007), this type of trust is also called trust propensity. Our study has shown that
this type of trust has an impact on group performances, namely, a negative impact in the case
of too much trust. Therefore, trust must be considered to be an impact factor if groups have to
collaborate and solve problems collaboratively.
In several studies, we varied the task structure and always found a positive impact of the KIA
approach on group performances. We varied the domain and the task (for example, in the study
by Schreiber and Engelmann 2010, that used a criminal case task), the setting (for example, in
the school study conducted by Lechner & Engelmann, not yet published), and the separation of
individual and collaborative phases (for example, in the study by Engelmann and Kolodziej
2012). In the study by Engelmann and Kolodziej (2012), it was the decision of the group
members whether they wanted to create an individual map visualizing their own knowledge and
information or not. We could show that group members in the experimental condition that
created their individual maps benefitted in the collaboration phase compared to the groups that
directly started to solve the problems collaboratively. Groups in the control condition, that is,
groups without access to their partners’maps did not benefit if the members created individual
maps. In these earlier studies, the factor trust was, however, not investigated. Yet these studies
have been able to show that the effect of KIA on group performances is relatively robust and
independent of the task structure. Therefore, it can be assumed that the KIA approach will
moderate the effect of trust on group performance also when the task structures are varied.
With regard to the robustness of measures used in the study, we would like to add the
following: Both trust as predictor as well as trust as criterion were measured by self-ratings.
Self-ratings are subjective and can, therefore, differ among individuals. However, the items
used to measure trust were items from established trust scales in the literature. Objective
measures of trust are difficult to construct and, to our knowledge, not yet possible. Perhaps it
can only be measured indirectly, for example, by assessing mutual control. Whether it will be
possible in the future to measure trust neurophysically is still an open question. A lot of
research is needed to find objective measures of trust, and for this reason, we used the
established method for assessing trust. With regard to all of the other measures, we calculated
interrater agreement, which was without exception high. Thus, a suitable robustness regarding
the measures used can be inferred.
With regard to the robustness of the results reported in the current study, we would like to
point to the fact that we only reported results of analyses that met the statistical requirements.
Therefore, robustness of results is ensured.
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With regard to the robustness of interpretations, we would like to point out that we have
only interpreted our significant results. Additionally, we would like to add that the positive
impact of the KIA approach to group performance has been proven in several studies, whereas
with regard to the effect of trust on group performance conflicting findings can be found in the
literature. We argued that the reason for the different findings regarding the impact of trust is
that the variable “errors made by the individuals” has been neglected. This assumption needs
to be validated in further studies, especially in settings with increased ecological validity. In
addition, to our knowledge, this study was the first that combined research on trust and
research on knowledge awareness. Thus, the findings of our study need to be validated by
further studies.
Implications
This study has demonstrated that even in group situations in which the group members do not
know each other, general trust in others (as a personal trait) can have a negative impact on
group performance. This negative impact can be easily solved by providing external repre-
sentations of the collaboration partners’ knowledge structures and the information underlying
these structures. Collaborating with unknown others in ad hoc created groups is becoming
increasingly important due to the complexity of today’s problems that require the different
expertise of several individuals. For collaborating groups, we recommend the externalization
of each member’s task-relevant knowledge and information to motivate the partners to check
over each other’s external representations, especially if they have high mutual trust. This leads
to the detection of mistakes and consequently to better group effectiveness. In addition, having
the possibility to check each other’s work in this way improves group efficiency.
Hindering the development of mutual skepticism in virtual groups is also highly relevant,
especially if groups need to continue to work together. As our study has shown, the KIA
approach can prevent this development.
To sum up, this study demonstrated that the availability of the KIA approach overrides the
negative impact of too much mutual trust and prevents the development of mutual skepticism.
Additionally, this study further contributes to clarify the impact of trust on group effectiveness
and group efficiency in computer-supported collaborative situations depending on different
situational factors such as being provided with a KIA approach or not.
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Appendix: Analytical procedures
Due to the fact that we were interested in interaction effects between condition and variables of
trust, as well as between condition and variables of collaboration quality, regression analyses
were conducted. More concretely, moderator analyses were conducted following Aiken and
West (1991). The necessary requirements for conducting regression analyses were tested in
each time, that is, for each analysis the global test statistic was calculated: The global test
statistic as a function of the model residuals “is formed from four asymptotically independent
statistics, each with the potential to detect a particular violation” (Peña and Slate 2006, p. 353).
These independent statistics are linearity, homoscedasticity, uncorrelatedness, and normality.
In this paper, only those analyses are reported that met the global test statistic.
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For condition as a categorical moderator variable, unweighted effects coding was used (control
condition=−1, experimental condition=+1) because then, the regression coefficients represent the
difference between each condition’s mean and the unweighted mean of both conditions (Cohen
et al. 2002). Z-standardization was applied on all other predictors because they were continuous
variables. Like centering, z-standardization eliminates the problems of multicollinearity between
the categorical moderator variable and the specific continuous predictor variable. In addition to
this, it simplifies the comparison of significant moderator effects on different criterion variables
and eases their plotting (Aiken and West 1991; Cohen et al. 2002; Frazier et al. 2004).
To calculate the moderator analyses according to Aiken and West (1991), a first series of
regression analyses was calculated with only the moderator and another predictor as predictor
variables and an outcome measure as the criterion variable. This first series of regression
analyses was needed to obtain the change in adjusted R2 in a second series of regression
analyses with the same variables and also – by multiplying the moderator with the other z-
standardized predictor – the interaction term for the additional explained variance of the
interaction. To test the significance of the simple slopes for each level of the categorical
moderator variable, two additional regression analyses were conducted (Aiken and West 1991;
Frazier et al. 2004): To test the significance of the simple slope for the control condition, a
dummy coding of control condition=0 and experimental condition=1 was applied. For the
significance of the simple slope for the experimental condition, a dummy coding of control
condition=1 and experimental condition=0 was applied. Regression analyses were calculated
with one of these newly coded moderators, another predictor, as well as their interaction term
as predictor variables, and an outcome measure as the criterion variable.
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Empirical studies have demonstrated that being aware of the knowledge structures and of the underlying
information of other group members improves computer-supported collaborative problem solving. While
such studies used pre-made individual concept maps as awareness tools, empirical studies that used
individual concept maps created by the group members themselves have not shown an advantage for
group performance. An assumed reason is that individual members’ concept maps differ too much
structurally so that using them would need a lot of effort. This experimental study compares 20 triads
whose members can observe the map creation process of the other members in their group with 20 triads
without this possibility. The results demonstrated that access to the map creation process of the other
group members while building one’s own concept map led to a group norm of how to create such a
map. As a result, group members created more structurally similar maps, which led, as in prior studies
with pre-made maps, to improved group performance.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Collaboration: beneﬁts and challenges
In an increasingly globalized world, solutions to problems often
require the collaborative effort of experts who are separated by
great distances, cultural boundaries, and time zones. Physical pres-
ence of each member of a collaborating collective is often difﬁcult
to achieve. In order to solve ad hoc problems, experts from various
parts of the globe can, however, utilize communication technolo-
gies, especially the various possibilities for interaction afforded
by contemporary personal computers. Yet, even though modern
technology facilitates instant communication across the globe, col-
laborating groups using the technology face a number of problems.
These problems can be germane to the virtual setting within which
interaction between group members takes place, or arise from the
potentially volatile nature of the expert group whose members
might not have worked together before nor anticipate interactions
beyond the task at hand (cf. Bromme, Hesse, & Spada, 2005).
1.1. Problems faced by transiently collaborating groups
Even though telecommunication in general and computer med-
iated communication (CMC) in particular is constantly becoming
more and more sophisticated, it is still not possible to convey ver-
bal messages, gestures, or facial expressions at a level that would
be comparable to face-to-face interaction (Buder, 2011; Carroll,
Neale, Isenhour, Rosson, & McCrickard, 2003; Janssen & Bodemer,
2013). Hence, compared to face-to-face interaction, CMC has been
reported to be less satisfying and more confusing (Thompson &
Coovert, 2003). It also seems to generally increase the time and
reduce the effectiveness with which groups can accomplish tasks
(Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, & LaGanke, 2002). However,
given the fast paced strides in communication technologies, the
challenges that technological limitations pose for CMC are likely
to diminish with time.
A more persistent problem for computer mediated collaborative
efforts is therefore more likely to be the interpersonal dynamics
inherent to interactions of transiently collaborating groups. For
example, various lines of research indicate that groups are not very
effective at processing information that is not held by all, or at least
the majority of group members. Thus according to the information
sampling model (Stasser & Titus, 1987; Stasser & Titus, 2003), the
more members of a group are privy to a piece of information, the
more likely this piece of information will be discussed. In a study
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that manipulated the amount of information given to participants
and the portion of that information that was shared among the
group members, it was found that if the information load was high
or if a substantial bulk of information was available to each group
member, unshared information tended to be neglected and forgot-
ten (Stasser & Titus, 1987). The shared information was also found
to bias the judgments of the group. For example, in a study in
which participant groups had to judge the performance of a stu-
dent based on several shared and unshared pieces of information,
judgments were swayed by information that was held by the
majority of the group members (Gigone & Hastie, 1993).
Intuitively, it seems that these problems for CMC based collab-
oration could be ameliorated by keeping the information load low
and making sure that the information which collaborators bring to
the discussion is as diverse as possible. However, while such an
approach indeed tends to promote the possibly critical exchange
of unshared information (Stasser & Titus, 1987), it bears its own
disadvantages. Usually, the very purpose of collaboration is to
address a problem too complex to be solved by any individual
member of the collaborating collective. High information load is
thus inherent to most collaborative tasks. Moreover, the less infor-
mation that collaborators share a priori, the less likely it is that
they will ﬁnd a common ground, a shared knowledge base that
they can build their interaction upon and communicate effectively
(Clark & Brennan, 1991).
1.2. Transiently collaborating groups and transactive memory
Groups collaborating over a time can eventually avoid some of
the pitfalls of having unshared information by developing a trans-
active memory system (Wegner, 1986), that is, a cognitivemap that
all group members have about who in the group holds what infor-
mation. Yet time is needed for group members to gain an under-
standing of the knowledge structures of each member. This time
is often unavailable to virtual groups collaborating via computers.
Absence of a transactive memory system can, in and of itself,
impact the collaborative efforts. Without knowledge about a
communication partner’s knowledge, people tend to infer others’
knowledge based on their own knowledge (Nickerson, 1999). The
frequent inaccuracy of such inferences, for example over- or under-
estimations of the partner’s knowledge level, can lead to miscom-
munication. This issue is particularly poignant in contemporary
CMC in which the ability to notice a communication error and
to compensate for it is constrained by the relative lack of
communication cues such as visible gestures and facial expressions
(cf. Carroll et al., 2003).
A promising approach is to make all task relevant information
and knowledge structures of the group members available to each
other from the outset. This avoids the challenges to communica-
tion which arise from a lack of a mutual knowledge base (e.g.
Clark & Brennan, 1991), from the communication biases inherent
to group members sharing only a portion of the group’s knowledge
(e.g. Nickerson, 1999; Stasser & Titus, 1987), and compensates for a
potential lack of time to establish a transactive memory system
(Wegner, 1986). While this might not be possible in face-to-face
interactions, a boon of CMC is that it affords ways for group mem-
bers to be instantly aware of the relevant knowledge of a collabo-
ration partner. An exemplary way is the content-based knowledge
awareness approach4 (CoKA; e.g. Engelmann et al., 2009;
Engelmann et al., 2010). Within this approach, group members are
provided with visual representations of each other’s knowledge
and information structures. With such a visual representation at
hand, collaborators are able to appreciate from the outset the distri-
bution of information within the group, effectively gaining a form of
transactive memory system (Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010). Simul-
taneously, visualization of the partner’s knowledge arguably pro-
vides collaborators with a common ground upon which to base
their discussion.
1.3. The CoKA approach
CoKA places itself within the broader context of group aware-
ness research, that is, research into how providing collaboration
partners with information about each other improves their joint
effort (Engelmann et al., 2009; Gross, Stary, & Totter, 2005). Yet
CoKA stands out in several respects. First, in contrast to group
awareness approaches aiming to promote social awareness, an
awareness of who is available for interaction, or action awareness,
an awareness of who is doing what at a given time (Carroll et al.,
2003), CoKA does not aim to introduce features into CMC that
would make it more similar to face-to-face communication.
Instead, the CoKA approach directly targets the problems inherent
to transient group interactions, computer mediated or otherwise.
There are other approaches with a similar goal: context based
knowledge awareness approaches providing partners with general
cues about each other’s knowledge levels (e.g. Dehler-Zufferey,
Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2011) and hybrid context/content based
knowledge awareness approaches whereby partners are given
access to each other’s interim results and solutions on a task (e.g.
Bodemer, 2011). CoKA sets itself apart from these, however, by
aiming to provide partners with each other’s knowledge and infor-
mation content from the outset.
A frequently used tool to foster CoKA has been digital concept
maps (cf. Engelmann & Hesse, 2010). Concept maps are graphical
tools that have been developed to represent hierarchical, proposi-
tional knowledge in an accessible and easily comprehensible form
(Novak & Cañas, 2006). In concept maps, individual concepts are
depicted in individual boxes or circles. The concepts are intercon-
nected with lines and arrows, representing the relationship
between the concepts. For example, knowledge that a car has an
engine would be represented by depicting ‘‘car’’ and ‘‘engine’’ in
two separate boxes and connecting these with a line labeled ‘‘has
a’’. Advanced digital concept maps additionally include hyperlinks
with the concepts, enabling users to access information about the
concept beyond what is depicted in the concept map (Tergan,
2005). A box featuring the concept of ‘‘engine’’ could thus contain
a link to an online entry about car engines.
Several studies have demonstrated the value of providing
individuals in collaborating groups with concept maps depicting
their partner’s knowledge structure and the underlying informa-
tion (e.g. Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann et al., 2010;
Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010). For example, in one study
(Engelmann & Hesse, 2010), group members working at a
distance were each presented with a concept map depicting a
portion of their group’s knowledge. After acquainting themselves
with their own assigned concept map, thereby becoming experts
on their respective parts of the group’s knowledge, group mem-
bers were required to pool their knowledge in order to collabora-
tively solve a problem. During this collaborative phase group
members in the experimental condition had access to their
partners’ concept maps, while group members in the control
condition did not. The experimental groups, that is the groups
who had CoKA, outperformed the groups without CoKA on the
collaborative problem-solving task.
4 In previous publications (e.g. Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann & Tergan,
2007; Engelmann, Tergan, & Hesse, 2010; Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010) the term
Knowledge and Information Awareness (KIA) was used. The new term, CoKA, was
adopted to emphasize the unique focus on objective content-based knowledge
awareness of the approach in contrast to the context-based or hybrid knowledge
awareness approaches (cf. Engelmann, Dehler, Bodemer, & Buder, 2009).
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1.4. Challenges for the CoKA approach
In order to increase the external validity of the CoKA paradigm,
several studies (e.g. Engelman&Kolodziej, 2012) refrained fromgiv-
ing participants pre-built concept maps. Instead participants were
asked to construct their own individual concept maps from lists of
concepts and underlying relationships. These lists were intended
to represent real world expert’s notes on the subject. However,
groups in which CoKA was established by giving group members
access to each other’s individually constructed concept maps per-
formed at about the same level as groups without CoKA. This poses
aproblemfor theCoKAapproachsince it suggests that in a realworld
application of CoKA, asking experts to generate representations of
their knowledge structures to sharewith their partners at the begin-
ning of a collaboration will not improve group performance.
A reason for the discrepancy in results between studies fostering
CoKA via pre-mademaps and studies in which CoKA is provided via
individually constructedmapsmight be the individual participants’
differences in map construction techniques. These might be so pro-
nounced that the groups struggle to combine their individual
knowledge during the collaborative phase of the studies. If incom-
patible concept maps are indeed the main reason for the reduction
in CoKA effectiveness, however, then a simple solution could be to
provide group members with awareness about each other’s map
construction process. Arguably, giving each group member insight
into the other groupmembers’ map creation process should prompt
the emergence of uniﬁed rules about the individual maps’ form and
structure. These ‘‘uniﬁed’’ individual maps should be as easy to
integrate as the pre-made maps provided in previous studies. As
observed with pre-made maps then, the CoKA provided through
the uniﬁed maps should beneﬁt group performance.
This approach aligns with previous studies on the development
of norms in groups. According to past research (Feldman, 1984),
groups tend to naturally develop and then adhere to rules which
facilitate reaching the group’s goal. Among other things, such rules
tend make the group members’ behaviors more predictable and
comprehensible to the group. This clearly suggests that partici-
pants with insight into their group members’ concept maps will
develop more uniﬁed maps.
In CMC settings, Postmes, Spears, and Lea (2000) further con-
ﬁrmed the ease with which groups tend to develop homogenous
rules of conduct. Based on their analysis of email exchanges within
groupsof online statistics learners, itwas found that groupmembers
developed rules of interaction that were peculiar to the group they
were in and did not necessarily apply outside of that group. Accord-
ing to Postmes et al. (2000), group norms are induced by mutual
observations and interactionwithin the group.Moreover, the emer-
gent norms in virtual teams tend to evolve from general group
norms to more operationalized group norms (cf. Graham, 2003).
1.5. Summary
In summary, while collaboration can be advantageous, prob-
lems can emerge in particular in transiently collaborating groups
relying on CMC. The CoKA approach has been shown to ameliorate
some of the challenges of transient collaboration via CMC. The cur-
rent study aims to overcome knowledge representation compati-
bility issues that transpired in attempts to increase the external
validity of the paradigm, by giving the collaborators insight into
each other’s CoKA representation construction process.
2. Experimental study
In the present study, spatially distributed group members had
to generate their own concept maps from lists of concepts and
relationships between those concepts that were provided to them.
In contrast to previous studies (e.g. Engelmann & Kolodziej, 2012),
participants in the experimental groups had insight into the other
group members’ concept maps during the map construction phase,
too. Participants in the control groups, on the other hand, were not
given insight into each other’s concept maps. Given the ﬁndings of
Postmes et al. (2000), it was expected for the experimental groups
that a unitary and stable group norm for concept map construction
would emerge. Thus, their individual concept maps should be more
compatible regarding their structure. Further, it was anticipated
that, like CoKA of pre-made concept maps (cf. Engelmann &
Hesse, 2010), having CoKA of the partners’ knowledge, captured
in ‘‘group normalized’’ concept maps, should increase group per-
formance during the collaborative problem-solving phase. Thus
the following hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis 1. Regarding development of group norms and orienta-
tion to group norms, we expected that within the triads of the
experimental condition, more structurally similar individual maps
would be created compared to the maps within the triads of the
control condition. We expect this outcome because individual
members can observe each other’s developing concept map while
creating their own individual maps, which will lead to the
development of a group norm regarding concept map ‘‘form’’.
Hypothesis 2. We expected a signiﬁcant interaction of condition
and structural similarity of the individual maps within the triads
on group effectiveness (Hypothesis 2.1). More concretely, we
expected that in the experimental condition with increasing struc-
tural similarity of the individual maps within the triads (i.e. con-
cept map form convergence), the amount of correct problem
solving will increase. In the control condition, however, the struc-
tural similarity of the individual maps within the triads should not
have an effect on group effectiveness because the group members
will never have access to each other’s maps. In addition, we
expected a signiﬁcant interaction of condition and structural simi-
larity of the individual maps within the triads on group efﬁciency
(Hypothesis 2.2). More concretely, we expected that, in the exper-
imental condition, with increasing structural similarity of the indi-
vidual maps within the triads, the speed of correct problem solving
will increase. In the control condition, however, the structural sim-
ilarity of the individual maps within the triads should not have an
effect on group efﬁciency.
2.1. Method
We compared two conditions each consisting of 20 triads. In the
experimental condition while creating their own individual con-
cept map, the members of the triads were able to observe the
working windows of their group while they were creating their
maps. All three individual concept maps remained visible in the
subsequent collaboration phase. In the control condition, mutual
observation during individual map creation was not possible and
the partners’ maps were not available in the collaboration phase.
Participants: In this study, participants were 120 German uni-
versity students (94 female, 36 male) from different ﬁelds of study.
They were on average 23.7 years (SD = 2.9) old and volunteered to
participate for payment. The participants were randomly assigned
to the conditions. All work was spatially distributed; each partici-
pant had his or her own room and own computer. The groups’ gen-
der composition was balanced between the two conditions (e.g.
the same number of groups with no, one, two, or three men in each
condition). The degree of acquaintance among the members in a
triad was also controlled. For the most part, participants’ reported
that they did not know their collaboration partners; there was no
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signiﬁcant difference between the two conditions regarding
acquaintance among the members (F < 1).
Materials: All materials used were in German (translated into
English for the purpose of this paper). The problem scenario
involved the rescue of a ﬁctitious type of spruce forest comprising
13 concepts, 30 between-concept relations, and 13 pieces of infor-
mation elements. These knowledge items were evenly distributed
among the triad members in a way that each group member had
equivalent amounts of shared and unshared elements. No one
member was given sufﬁcient information to solve the problem.
Control measures and supplementary materials: First, an online
34-item questionnaire was used to establish initial treatment con-
dition equivalence. For example, one item measured participants’
prior concept mapping experience. These items were mostly
designed as ﬁve-point rating scales, ranging from complete agree-
ment (5 points) to no agreement (1 point).
Second, a post-collaboration online knowledge test was used for
measuring the knowledge acquired on one’s own and also the team
members’ transactive knowledge. This test consisted of 24 items
assessing whether a triad member remembered correctly which
group member(s) initially had a speciﬁc piece of knowledge and
how sure the participant was regarding the correctness of his or
her answer. The ﬁrst half of the items investigated memory for
between-concept relations, and the second half investigated mem-
ory for speciﬁc concepts. To calculate the CoKA variable, the partic-
ipants received one point for each correct answer. Each answer to
an item was weighted by the certainty of the members that their
answer was correct. The CoKA score is the sum of these weighted
values. In addition, we calculated such scores for each task type
separately.
Third, a post-collaboration online survey of participants’ per-
ceptions of the investigation was included consisting of 35 items
in the control condition and 54 items in the experimental condi-
tion, with additional items measuring the perceived usefulness of
the possibility to observe the partners’ creation of their individual
concept maps and the availability of CoKA in the collaborative
phase. In addition to these online inventories, the triad members
had access to paper-based instructions for learning to use Cmap-
Tools, a free digital concept mapping software (see http://ftp.ihm-
c.us/), and paper-based instructions to explain the procedure of the
study.
Procedure: After all triad members had met in one room and had
been introduced to the study framework, they were sent to their
separate rooms to sign a written agreement to take part in the
study. The study began by ﬁlling out the online questionnaire for
assessing the control measure items, which was followed by
CmapTools practice. All participants had enough time (up to
20 min) to sufﬁciently learn how to use this software. After this
preparation phase, the main study started. First, the triad members
were individually introduced to the group tasks; that is, that they
were to imagine that they are a team of three experts that had been
enlisted in order to rescue a speciﬁc spruce forest. They were
informed that they have to collaboratively solve two problems,
ﬁrst deciding which pesticide should be used to combat a threat
to the spruce forest, and second, deciding which fertilizer is needed
to mitigate the effects of the pesticide. Thus the fertilizer problem
depended on the decision made regarding the pesticide problem.
In the individual phase, the group members had to create their
individual concept maps based on one of three unique expert doc-
uments (e.g. referred to as documents A, B, and C) with largely non-
overlapping material, containing a portion of the total individual
pieces of knowledge needed to solve the problem scenario. Thus
each member of the triad had different information, and the two
problems could only be solved by combining information (i.e. hid-
den proﬁles). In the experimental condition, participants had
access to the working windows of their collaboration partners
who created their individual maps at the same time (see Fig. 1).
This means that the group members of the experimental condition
while creating their own map could observe the creation process of
their collaboration partners’ maps. However, it was not allowed to
make changes in the partners’ maps or to directly communicate
with the partners. In the control condition, each teammember only
had access to their speciﬁc text document (e.g. A, B, or C) and their
own working window for creating their own individual concept
map. This creating phase lasted 23 min.
Afterwards the triad members had another 3 min to look over
their self-created maps, and in the experimental condition to look
over their own and their collaborators’ individual maps. In the fol-
lowing collaborative phase, the triad members had 35 min to col-
laboratively solve the pesticide and fertilizer problems. To be
able to do this, they had to compile their individual knowledge
and information by creating together a group concept map in their
shared working window. In this phase, they could communicate
via Skype (only audio). The answers to the problem tasks had to
be written on a sheet of paper together with the explanation
regarding why they chose this particular answer. In this phase,
the group members of the control condition had access to the
shared working window for creating the group concept map and
their own working window containing their own individual con-
cept map (i.e. without CoKA). In the experimental condition, the
group members additionally had access to the working windows
of their partners’ concept maps (i.e. with CoKA). After this collabo-
rative phase, each triad member was asked to solve individually an
online knowledge test (without having access to the concept maps)
and to ﬁll out the online evaluation questionnaire, both without
time limits. Finally, the students were debriefed, and then thanked
and rewarded for their participation.
2.2. Predictor measures
Beside the conditions (experimental vs. control condition), the
following predictors for assessing structural similarity of the indi-
vidual concept maps within the triads were used in the study:
Standard deviation regarding number of correct nodes
(SDnumber nodes): To calculate this measure, ﬁrst the number of
correct nodes in each of the three individual maps of a triad was
counted (max. attainable score = 9 points). Second, these three val-
ues of a triad were aggregated by using the standard deviation.
This means that if this value is high, the three maps of a triad were
very different regarding the number of correct nodes, while if this
value is zero, the three maps are identical regarding the number of
included correct nodes.
Standard deviation regarding number of correct relations
(SDnumber relations): To determine this measure, the number of
correct relations in each of the three individual maps of a triad
was counted (max. attainable score = 13 points). These three val-
ues of a triad were also aggregated by using the standard deviation.
This means that with increasing value, the three maps increasingly
differ regarding the number of correct relations.
2.3. To measure content structural similarity of the maps, we used the
following predictor
Content structural similarity based on centrality (SScentrality):
Following a method described by Clariana, Engelmann, and Yu
(2013) for capturing content structural information in concept
maps, individual students’ maps were converted to node degree
vectors using the 15 most frequent important terms. Then these
teammembers’ map vectors were compared to each other by Pear-
son correlation (e.g. members A to B, B to C, A to C). Since Pearson r
values are not additive, these r values were transformed to Fisher z
values, and then the three z values for each team were averaged to
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obtain a team similarity score. For interpretation purposes, note
that for Pearson r values between 0.40 and +0.40, the r and z val-
ues are nearly identical (e.g. Fisher z = 0.151 is Pearson r = 0.150).
Thus each team has a similarity score expressed as an average
Fisher z value where larger values indicate greater similarity (team
member convergence). This approach was also applied to estimate
the content structural similarity between the individual concept
maps and the three referent expert maps of each of the three
expert documents, A, B, and C, that contained the individual pieces
of knowledge that were given to each member in a triad (individ-
ual convergence with the expert document).
2.4. Criterion measures
To test Hypothesis 1, we used the three map similarity mea-
sures SDnumber nodes, SDnumber relations, and SScentrality (described
above) as criterions. In addition, to substantiate this hypothesis,
we also included two log ﬁle measures:
Number of moves of nodes (log ﬁlemove nodes): This measure con-
sists of log ﬁle data with regard to the number of node moves in an
individual map. For each move of a node in an individual map, one
point was given.
Number of moves of relations (log ﬁlemove relations): This measure
refers to log ﬁle data with regard to the number of relation moves
in an individual map. For each move of a relation in an individual
map, one point was given.
Due to the fact that the fertilizer problem could only be solved if
the pesticide problem was solved correctly, and therefore for solv-
ing the pesticide problem exclusively, the three individual concept
maps were critical, in the following we will only report the results
with regard to the pesticide problem. To test Hypotheses 2, collab-
orative problem-solving performance was assessed by the follow-
ing measures:
Solution potential of the group map with regard to the pesticide
problem (Solution potentialgroup map): If a group map created by a
triad contains all relevant information aspects that were needed
to solve the problem, one point was given. If aspects were missing
or if some of them were wrong, no points were given.
Correctness of solving the pesticide problem (group effectiveness):
The calculation of this measure follows two rules: First, one point
was given if a triad chose the correct pesticide (only one correct
solution was possible), while no points were given if a triad chose
a wrong one.
Only if a triad chose the correct solution, the reasons given by
the group to explain why they had chosen this pesticide were ana-
lyzed. A maximal sum of three points was possible to attain for the
correct solution. This means that maximal 4 points were attainable
for a correct solution and all correct reasons, while zero points
were given for a wrong solution.
Speed of correct solving the pesticide problem (group efﬁciency):
For all triads that chose the pesticide problem correctly, the time
was assessed how long they had needed to solve this problem. It
was calculated as the time of the ﬁnal group decision for the
correct pesticide minus the starting time of the collaboration
phase.
3. Results
All analyses presented here are based on the group level
because the members in a triad are not independent of each other.
For data measured on an individual level, group values were calcu-
lated. The analyses of the control measure items showed that we
did not need to include a covariate.
3.1. Manipulation check
We ﬁrst checked whether the group members were able to con-
vert the pieces of information in their expert documents into appo-
site, individual concept maps. To do this, all of the individual map
content structural similarity vectors (SScentrality) were compared to
the vectors of expert maps A, B, and C created based on the expert
documents of A, B, and C (see Table 1). The data clearly shows that
the content structure of participants’ maps strongly aligned with
the appropriate expert map of that information (i.e. estimated
r > .73). For example, those who were given expert document A
created a concept map that matched the expert’s map of content
A, and it did NOT match the expert’s maps of content B or C. This
was true for both the control and the experimental conditions,
even though the maps from the control condition members may
be a little more like their corresponding expert document derived
expert map (e.g. estimated r values, CC = .79 and .85 and .89 vs.
EC = .82 and .73 and .78).
In this study, we manipulated two aspects: First, in the individ-
ual phase, the members of the experimental groups were able to
observe each other’s map construction process, the members of
the control condition had only access to their own working
Fig. 1. Computer screen of the control condition (left side) and the experimental condition (right side) in the individual map construction phase.
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window in which they created their own map. The fact that seeing
the others’ map construction progress was useful is shown by the
items assessed in the online evaluation questionnaire: The mem-
bers of the triads in the experimental condition perceived the pos-
sibility of seeing the partners’ maps construction process while
their own map creation as rather helpful (M = 3.58; SD = .64). They
also stated that they partly compared their ownmap with the part-
ners’ maps during the construction process (M = 3.58; SD = .55) and
that seeing the others’ maps while creating their own maps gave
them in part orientation for their own map creation (M = 3.28;
SD = .49).
However, interesting to mention are the following unexpected
descriptive results: The members of the experimental condition
indicated that they had tried not to create maps that were similar
to those of their partners (M = 2.15; SD = .61) and that they had
created their map in their own way even though they had seen
the others’ maps (M = 3.92; SD = .52). But they did report that the
fact that they were able to observe the creation of the partners’
maps led partly to similar maps (M = 2.97; SD = .55).
Second, in the subsequent collaborative phase, besides the
shared working window and their own working window, the
members of the experimental condition could still see the working
windows of their collaboration partners containing their individual
concepts maps. The members of the control groups had only access
to the shared and their own working window. Descriptive data
assessed by the online evaluation questionnaire demonstrated that
the members of the experimental condition felt conﬁdent navigat-
ing their partners’ maps (M = 3.78; SD = .51) and understood their
partners’ maps well (M = 4.09; SD = .49). In the collaborative prob-
lem-solving phase, the members of the experimental groups stated
that seeing the partners’ maps was helpful (M = 4.08; SD = .69),
helped them to get a clear perception of the partners’ expertise
(M = 3.85; SD = .64), and helped to avoid misunderstandings
(M = 3.78; SD = .64).
The knowledge test used after the collaboration phase resulted
as expected in a signiﬁcant difference between the conditions:
ANOVAs showed that compared to the control condition, the mem-
bers of the experimental condition acquired marginally more CoKA
(MC = 20.20; ME = 24.26; F(1, 38) = 3.88; MSE = 42.63; p = .056).
Especially regarding the second type of knowledge tasks, focusing
on knowing which of the three triad members had information on
particular concepts, the experimental condition groups acquired
signiﬁcantly more CoKA (MC = 10.44; ME = 13.01; F(1, 38) = 5.05;
MSE = 13.06; p = .031).
3.2. Results on differences between the conditions regarding the
structural similarity of individual maps within triads
All statistics for these ﬁndings are presented in Table 2.
Structural similarity of the individual maps was assessed by the
measures SDnumber nodes, SDnumber relations, SScentrality. Due to the fact
that the requirements for conducting ANOVAs were not given,
because of missing variance homogeneity, we calculated Welch
tests:
Standard deviation regarding number of correct nodes: The Welch
test analysis with condition as the independent measure and
SDnumber nodes as the dependent measure demonstrated as expected
that within the triads in the experimental condition more similar
maps were created compared to the maps within the triads of
the control condition.
Standard deviation regarding number of correct relations: The
Welch test analysis with condition as the independent measure
and SDnumber relations as the dependent measure also showed as
expected that within the triads in the experimental condition more
similar maps were created compared to the maps within the triads
of the control condition.
Content Structure Similarity based on centrality: Since the individ-
ual maps in a team should represent information elements from
the expert documents A, B, and C that are to a large extent non-
overlapping elements, these maps should then rarely be related
in the control condition (CC). A larger overlap in the experimental
condition (EC) would have to be the result of information transfer
from the other members’ onscreen maps to that member’s map in
progress. The Welch test analysis with condition as the indepen-
dent measure and SScentrality as the dependent measure showed,
as expected, that map average structure similarity within the triads
in the experimental condition were signiﬁcantly more alike than
those within the triads of the control condition. In fact, the control
condition had nearly zero map content structure similarity.
Further analyses support these ﬁndings of a higher similarity of
the individual maps within the triads in the experimental condi-
tion compared to those of the control condition, namely, our log
ﬁle analyses:
A Welch test analysis of condition on log ﬁlemoving nodes as well
as the one on log ﬁlemoving relations demonstrated signiﬁcantly more
movement of nodes and relations in the individual maps in the
experimental condition compared to the control condition. These
results give evidence for a stronger mutual adaption of the individ-
ual maps in the experimental compared to the control condition.
Table 1
The average content structural similarity of the individual concept maps when compared to the expert maps based on the word documents A, B, and C.
To expert map A To expert map B To expert map C
Fisher z r est. Fisher z r est. Fisher z r est.
CC (control)
Individual maps of experts A 1.06 0.79 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03
n = 20 (0.59) (0.23) (0.24)
Individual maps of experts B 0.07 0.07 1.24 0.85 0.09 0.09
n = 20 (0.22) (0.82) (0.20)
Individual maps of experts C 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.14 1.42 0.89
n = 20 (0.21) (0.21) (0.73)
CE (experimental)
Individual maps of experts 1.16 0.82 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06
n = 20 (0.82) (0.23) (0.23)
Individual maps of experts 0.01 0.01 0.94 0.73 0.04 0.04
n = 20 (0.24) (0.50) (0.23)
Individual maps of experts C 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 1.05 0.78
n = 20 (0.24) (0.25) (0.81)
Note: Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
Pearson r estimate calculated as Fisher inverse using Microsoft Excel FISHERINV function.
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3.3. Results on the interaction of condition and structural similarity of
the individual concept maps on collaborative problem-solving
The details of the analytical procedures are described in the
appendix. All statistics for these ﬁndings are presented in Table 3.
Solution potentialgroup map: The regression analysis with condi-
tion, structural similarity of the individual maps with respect
to the standard deviation regarding number of correct nodes
(SDnumber nodes), and their interaction as predictors and solution
potential of the group map (Solution potentialgroup map) as criterion
did not result in the expected signiﬁcant interaction.
However, the regression analysis with condition, structural sim-
ilarity of the individual maps with respect to the standard deviation
regarding number of correct relations (SDnumber relations), and their
interaction as predictors and solution potentialgroup map as criterion
led to the expected signiﬁcant interaction: The simple slope anal-
ysis resulted in the expected type of interaction: While in the
experimental condition increasing structural similarity within the
individual triad maps regarding the number of relations led to
improved solution potential of the group map, in the control con-
dition the similarity of the individual maps within a triad did not
have an effect on the solution potentialgroup map.
Group effectiveness: The regression analysis with condition,
structural similarity of the individual maps with respect to the
standard deviation regarding number of correct nodes, and their
interaction as predictors and the correctness of solving the pesti-
cide problem as criterion did not result in the assumed signiﬁcant
interaction.
However, the regression analysis with condition, structural sim-
ilarity of the individual maps with respect to the standard deviation
regarding number of correct relations, and their interaction as pre-
dictors and the correctness of solving the pesticide problem as cri-
terion resulted in the expected signiﬁcant interaction. The simple
slopes analysis led to the expected ﬁndings: In the experimental
condition, with increasing structural similarity with regard to rela-
tion numbers within the triads, the group effectiveness increases,
that is, the more map similarity, the more correct collaborative
problem solving arises. In the control condition, however, the
structural similarity regarding relations within the triads had no
effect on the correctness of the collaborative problem-solving.
Group efﬁciency: The statistical requirements for conducting
regression analyses were not given. Therefore, we calculated corre-
lations between structural similarity measures and group efﬁ-
ciency for each condition.
In the experimental condition, the structural similarity of the
individual maps with respect to the standard deviation regarding
number of correct nodes correlated marginally with group efﬁciency
(r = 0.42; p = .07), while in the control condition no signiﬁcant
correlation between these two measures existed (r = 0.23; n.s.),
In addition, as assumed in the experimental condition, the struc-
tural similarity of the individual maps with respect to the standard
deviation regarding number of correct relations correlated signiﬁ-
cantly with group efﬁciency (r = 0.50; p < .05); that is. with
increasing similarity of the individual maps, the problem was
solved faster. However, in the control condition, the structural sim-
ilarity of the individual maps with respect to the standard deviation
regarding number of correct relations did not correlate signiﬁcantly
with group efﬁciency (r = 0.08; n.s.).
4. Discussion
The initial point of the paper was that in studies with self-cre-
ated individual maps as a means for CoKA (i.e., to make group
members aware of what their group partners know and what
underlying information they have), the positive effect on com-
puter-supported collaborative problem solving performance was
diminished (e.g. Engelmann & Kolodziej, 2012). This was in con-
trast to studies using pre-made partial expert maps for CoKA
(e.g. Engelmann & Hesse, 2010). The assumed reason for these dif-
ferent ﬁndings was that the self-created maps are too different to
process them easily.
In this paper, a possible solution for this problem was investi-
gated: While creating their own individual map to visualize their
own knowledge and information presented in an expert document,
the group members of the experimental condition (N = 20 triads)
had the possibility to observe the other members’ map creation
process. This should lead to norm development regarding how to
create such a map, an orienting effect. This should result in more
structurally similar maps and as a consequence an increase in
the effectiveness of the CoKA approach as in studies with pre-made
individual maps. The members of the control groups (N = 20 triads)
did not have this possibility to see the others’ maps. These expec-
tations regarding norm development and norm orientation were
derived from empirical studies, for example, by Postmes et al.
(2000) that demonstrated that groups interacting computer-
supported develop norms naturally among each other by mutual
observations.
The results of the current investigation show that the group
members of both conditions were able to create adequate individ-
ual maps based on elements in their assigned expert document. In
addition, questionnaire items show that the members of the exper-
imental condition did observe the map development of their part-
ners. They also stated that this gave them, in part, orientation for
their own map. It is interesting that they also mention that they
had tried not to createmaps similar to their partners’maps, but they
also report that seeing the partners’ map construction led to similar
maps. These ﬁndings seem to show that participants preferred not
to admit that they oriented themselves to the others, but it seems
that they had perceived that the ﬁnished maps looked similar.
In addition to these subjective impressions, the data demon-
strates that the individual maps of the experimental groups were
signiﬁcantly more structurally similar compared to those of the
control groups. Structural similarity was assessed based on num-
ber of correct nodes and correct relations, while content structural
similarity was assessed by node centrality. These results conﬁrm
Hypothesis 1. These results were also substantiated by the log ﬁle
ﬁndings. The members of the experimental groups did more often
Table 2
Welch’s test results on differences between the conditions regarding the structural similarity of individual maps within triads.
MCC MEC t df p d
Standard deviation number of nodes 2.282 1.459 2.12 29.63 .043 .67
Standard deviation number of relations 3.387 1.961 2.87 27.40 .008 .91
Structural similarity as node degreea 0.029 0.151 5.07 36.12 .030 .70
Mean number of node moves 66.93 139.40 2.18 23.40 .040 .69
Mean number of relation moves 61.18 136.65 2.21 26.53 .036 .70
Notes: CC = Control Condition; EC = Experimental Condition.
a Averaged Fisher z.
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move their nodes and relations in their individual maps compared
to the members of the control groups. This could also be evidence
for a stronger mutual adaption of the individual maps in the exper-
imental condition. These ﬁndings provide evidence that mutual
observation during the map creation process leads, as expected,
to the development of implicit group norms. Our ﬁndings therefore
contribute to the research gap that Graham (2003) had highlighted
as he pointed out the importance of investigating ‘‘how technolog-
ical affordances help to establish implicit norms’’ in virtual teams.
We also expected that with increasing similarity of the individ-
ual maps in the experimental condition, group performance would
increase, while similarity should not have an effect in the control
condition. Group performance was measured by solution potential
of the group map, by group effectiveness, and by group efﬁciency.
Our analyses conﬁrmed the expected interaction between condi-
tion and structural similarity on all three group performance mea-
sures for the similarity variable ‘‘standard deviation regarding the
number of correct relations’’. That is, in the experimental condi-
tion, with increasing structural similarity between the three indi-
vidual maps within a triad, the triads created group maps with
higher solution potential, solved the problem more often correctly,
and were faster in solving the problem correctly. These results sup-
port Hypothesis 2 that being able to see the map creation process
of the partners leads to improved group performance.
These ﬁndings demonstrated that the possibility of observing
the map creation process of partners is a viable way to make
self-created maps effective for the CoKA approach. However, it
should be noted that with increasing similarity of the individual
maps, the group performance improved. This means that the
experimental groups differ regarding the amount of similarity of
their individual maps; that is, the possibility of mutual observation
did not have the same effect in all groups. Future research should
consider which type of groups beneﬁt most from mutual observa-
tion and which type of groups do not.
In contrast to our expectations, we did not ﬁnd this pattern of
results for the similarity measure ‘‘standard deviation regarding
the number of correct nodes’’. One possible explanation could be
that for solving this problem, the between-concept relations are
much more important than the nodes. Findings of a prior study
seem to conﬁrm this explanation. In the study by Engelmann and
Hesse (2011), the experimental groups only had access to the node
information of the others, but not to the relation information. As a
result, the experimental groups did not outperform the control
groups regarding collaborative problem-solving performance.
The analysis of the questionnaire assessed after the collabora-
tion phase corroborates our ﬁndings: The members of the experi-
mental condition stated both that they were conﬁdent regarding
navigating their partners’ maps and that they understood the oth-
ers’ maps. Since in prior studies with individually-created concept
maps, the members had problems in using their partners’ maps
due to their large variance in map structure, this answer provides
evidence that in the present study the implicit fostering of the cre-
ation of similar maps through the possibility of mutual observation
was successful. These ﬁndings are further corroborated by the per-
ceived helpfulness of having access to the partners’ individual
maps during the collaboration phase. The group members of the
experimental condition explained that it helped them to recognize
their partners’ expertise and to avoid misunderstandings. In addi-
tion, the analysis of the knowledge test after the collaboration
phase revealed that the experimental groups acquired more CoKA
compared to the control groups. This is also evidence that the indi-
vidual maps were processed in the experimental groups.
5. Implications
Prior studies (e.g. Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann et al.,
2010) have shown that having access to the collaboration partners’
knowledge structures and underlying information fosters com-
puter-supported problem-solving. But due to the experimental
design of those studies, the awareness content was pre-made by
experts. In order to foster ecological validity of the CoKA approach,
the members need to externalize their knowledge on their own;
that is, they should create the awareness contents by themselves
that would then be provided as CoKA information to their partners.
However, prior studies (e.g. by Engelmann & Kolodziej, 2012) have
observed a large variance within the self-created awareness con-
tents leading to the fact that their use for CoKA was not effective
anymore. This current investigation highlighted the effective strat-
egy of mutual observation during the awareness content creation
process. This simple solution makes the CoKA approach effective
also in a more ecologically valid setting in which the group mem-
bers externalize their knowledge and their information on their
own.
Table 3
The results of the moderator analyses of condition and structural similarity of the individual maps within the triads on collaborative problem-solving.
Criterion variable Predictor variables b SE b p Model properties
Adj. R2 F(df) p
Group effectiveness Standard deviation regarding number of nodes 0.24 0.33 0.15 .47 [.009] [0.83(2,37)] [.45]
Condition 0.10 0.28 0.06 .72
SD number of nodes  condition 0.21 0.33 0.12 .52 .025 0.68(3, 36) .57
Group effectiveness Standard deviation regarding number of relations 0.58 0.36 0.36 .11 [.048] [0.11(2,37)] [.89]
Condition 0.27 0.29 0.17 .37
SD number of relations  condition 0.72 0.36 0.40 .05 .032 1.42(3,36) .25
Simple slope CC 0.14 0.31 0.08 .66
Simple slope EC 1.30 0.64 0.81 .05
Solution potential of the pesticide
problem in the group map
Standard deviation regarding number of nodes 0.18 0.10 0.36 .08
Condition 0.06 0.09 0.12 .50
SD number of nodes  Condition 0.13 0.10 0.25 .19 .012 1.16(3,36) .34
Solution potential of the pesticide
problem in the group map
Standard deviation regarding number of relations 0.25 0.11 0.49 .02 [.039] [0.28(2,37)] [.76]
Condition 0.10 0.08 0.21 .25
SD number of relations  condition 0.29 0.11 0.52 .01 .112 2.64(3, 36) .06
Simple slope CC 0.04 0.09 0.08 .65
Simple slope EC 0.54 0.19 1.06 <.01
Notes: Values in brackets represent the model properties before the inclusion of the interaction. The continuous predictor variable in question was z-standardized.
Simple Slope CC = Simple slope analysis for the control condition.
Simple Slope EC = Simple slope analysis for the experimental condition.
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Appendix A. Analytical procedures
Due to the fact that we were interested in interaction effects
between condition and variables of trust, as well as between con-
dition and variables of collaboration quality, regression analyses
were conducted. More concretely, moderator analyses were con-
ducted following Aiken and West (1991). The necessary require-
ments for conducting regression analyses were tested in each
time, that is, for each analysis the global test statistic was calcu-
lated: The global test statistic as a function of the model residuals
‘‘is formed from four asymptotically independent statistics, each
with the potential to detect a particular violation’’ (Peña & Slate,
2006, p. 353). These independent statistics are linearity, homosce-
dasticity, uncorrelatedness, and normality. In this paper, only those
analyses are reported that met the global test statistic.
For condition as a categorical moderator variable, unweighted
effects coding was used (control condition = 1, experimental
condition = +1) because then, the regression coefﬁcients represent
the difference between each condition’s mean and the unweighted
mean of both conditions (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2002).
Z-standardization was applied on all other predictors because they
were continuous variables. Like centering, z-standardization elimi-
nates the problems of multicollinearity between the categorical
moderator variable and the speciﬁc continuous predictor variable.
In addition to this, it simpliﬁes the comparison of signiﬁcantmoder-
ator effects on different criterion variables and eases their plotting
(Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen et al., 2002; Frazier, Tix, & Barron,
2004).
To calculate the moderator analyses according to Aiken and
West (1991), a ﬁrst series of regression analyses was calculated
with only the moderator and another predictor as predictor vari-
ables and an outcome measure as the criterion variable. This ﬁrst
series of regression analyses was needed to obtain the change in
adjusted R2 in a second series of regression analyses with the same
variables and also – by multiplying the moderator with the other
z-standardized predictor – the interaction term for the additional
explained variance of the interaction. To test the signiﬁcance of
the simple slopes for each level of the categorical moderator
variable, two additional regression analyses were conducted
(Aiken andWest, 1991; Frazier et al., 2004): To test the signiﬁcance
of the simple slope for the control condition, a dummy coding of
control condition = 0 and experimental condition = 1 was applied.
For the signiﬁcance of the simple slope for the experimental condi-
tion, a dummy coding of control condition = 1 and experimental
condition = 0 was applied. Regression analyses were calculated
with one of these newly coded moderators, another predictor, as
well as their interaction term as predictor variables, and an out-
come measure as the criterion variable.
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Abstract 
Being aware of the priorities of the partner has been shown to play a crucial role in successful 
negotiations. More awareness has the potential to further improve different measures of negotiation 
performance, reducing the fixed-sum-error and the incompatibility error and thus leading to a better 
economical outcome. Fostering more awareness with the help of more information and communication 
technology’s abilities runs the risk of failing to improve negotiations. The cognitive load theory, the 
regret theory, and the strategic misrepresentation of information are possible explanations. We compared 
two tacit approaches of creating awareness in a computer-supported negotiation: (1) The priority 
awareness approach, utilizing non-interactive bar charts and (2) the performance awareness approach, 
utilizing interactive bar charts. One hundred and thirty-two participants negotiated in 66 dyads in a car 
buying/selling scenario, 33 dyads per approach. The two awareness approaches neither differed in joint 
outcome nor pareto efficiency; however, the dyads negotiating with the interactive performance 
awareness were less satisfied, liked their partner less, thought their agreement was less fair – although 
there was no difference in fairness – and they were more deceitful in their negotiation, also perceiving 
their partner as more deceitful. Further, they showed a different behavior in dealing with information for 
future negotiations. The potential benefits of more awareness could not be realized. The reasons for this 
could be a too complex approach, feelings of regret witnessing previous possible agreements, and fewer 
opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of information. Non-interactive bar charts are simple and 
cheap; they suffice for improving negotiation performance. 
 
Keywords: awareness, negotiation support system, interactivity, negotiation, performance, 
priority 
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Priority Awareness Outperforms Performance Awareness in Negotiations 
1 Introduction 
Successful negotiations strongly rely on the negotiators dealing with priorities. Taking a car purchase as a 
scenario which most people can relate to, it is easy to imagine that the buyer and seller have different 
priorities of issues that they are going to negotiate and that both want to achieve the best possible outcome 
for themselves. The seller may be interested in a high financing rate and selling many extras, and the 
buyer may be interested in an extended warranty and the latest multimedia system. As no side will just 
give in to the demands of the other without concessions from the other, the most profitable solution would 
be to give in on less important issues and in exchange insist on more important ones. This approach is 
known as integrative negotiation (Barry and Friedman 1998; De Dreu et al. 2007) and leads to agreements 
which are not only more satisfying but economically more beneficial for both. Only when both 
negotiators are aware of their different priorities can they exchange concessions. This awareness is rarely 
the case and even experienced negotiators fall prey to wrong assumptions about priorities which in turn 
lead to suboptimal agreements (Thompson and Hastie 1990). 
In this experimental study, we attempted to find a tacit and unobtrusive way to foster awareness 
in negotiations, adjusting for such wrong assumptions and thus improving negotiation performance. 
Computerized negotiation support systems (Kersten and Lai 2007) exist in real life applications such as 
“Zopaf” (Andinian Inc. 2015) or “Smartsettle” (iCan Systems Inc. 2015) and also in experimental 
applications such as “Inspire” (Kersten and Noronha 1999) or “Negoisst” (Schoop et al. 2003). These 
applications have different means of supporting the negotiators with relevant information and have been 
shown to have a positive effect on negotiation performance (Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Foroughi 
1998; Filzmoser et al. 2010). We have built an experimental negotiation support system with which we 
compare two approaches for creating awareness in a way that does not need any special prerequisites in 
form of explicit instructions or training to carry out an integrative negotiation. Both approaches make use 
of bar charts: One uses non-interactive bar charts as commonly seen in business reports or on the news for 
creating awareness of priorities in a negotiation. The other uses interactive bar charts, changing in size 
with the input of the negotiators and creating awareness about their current performance. Although the 
interactive approach with more awareness has a strong potential to improve agreements further than the 
one with less, there is also a strong risk of it actually hampering benefits or even leading to negative 
consequences. The cognitive load theory (Chandler and Sweller 1991), the regret theory (Loomes and 
Sugden 1982; Bell 1982), and the strategic misrepresentation of information (Steinel and De Dreu 2004) 
give reason to assume negative effects. 
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By the end of this article, we will have shown how these two approaches differ in their effect on 
the actual negotiation performance, whether the amount and interactivity of awareness plays a role, and 
which approach would be the most beneficial – economically or otherwise – for the use in a negotiation. 
 
2 The Importance of Priorities in Negotiations 
The non-awareness of differences in priorities has been shown to lessen the joint outcome of a negotiation 
– the sum of the point values of both negotiators given to their agreement. Thompson and Hastie (1990) 
have coined the terms fixed-sum-error and incompatibility error which are a direct result of not being 
aware of the others priorities. Regarding the first error, the negotiators wrongly assume that they both 
have the same priorities of issues, although they do not. Regarding the second error, the negotiators 
wrongly assume that they have different priorities of options within the issues, although they do not. 
These errors are also made by experienced negotiators (Thompson 1990) and in the case of the 
incompatibility error, they sometimes lead to lose-lose-agreements in which both agree on a common loss 
(Thompson and Hrebec 1996). 
On the other hand, multiple studies have shown, that awareness about the priorities of the other 
negotiation party leads to a higher joint outcome. These studies relied either on the previous experience of 
the negotiators and their knowledge about the importance of priorities (Thompson and Hastie 1990; 
Hyder et al. 2000; Schei et al. 2006) or on explicit instructions to think about priorities (Foroughi et al. 
1995). 
 
3 Fostering Priority and Performance Awareness 
“Priority awareness” is a term formally coined by de Jong, Tuyls, Verbeeck and Roos (2008) in the 
context of negotiations. It is a way of making a negotiation algorithm aware of priorities and model it so 
as to mimic human behavior where sometimes trade-offs are made based on different priorities. Our 
definition replaces the algorithm with a human: Priority awareness is the awareness of the negotiator of 
their priorities. 
Priority awareness can be fostered by presenting the negotiators their different priorities of issues 
with bars sized accordingly. These bars do not change their size by the choice of different options in the 
negotiation. They look the same from the beginning to the end.  
“Performance awareness” is a concept from learning sciences that might be likewise relevant for 
negotiations. It is either understood as the quality of the estimation of performance accomplished in a 
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learning setting (Pressley and Ghatala 1988; Hershey and Wilson 1997; Sağlam 2010) or the monitoring 
of the current performance in a learning setting (Wade and Reynolds 1989; Devolder et al. 1990; Chen et 
al. 2001). In the context of negotiations, performance awareness is the awareness of the negotiator about 
the state of their current performance. 
Performance awareness can be fostered by presenting to the negotiators their different priorities 
of issues with transparent bars sized accordingly and their priorities of options with horizontal lines which 
fill up to bars, dependent on the chosen options. These bars change in size during the process of the 
negotiation.  
We feel a comprehensive order of psychological steps needed for the effectiveness of every 
method for creating awareness (see Table 1). An automatic thinking process should be nudged (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2009) without further guidance.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Both approaches use a graphical decision aid to foster awareness, but while the bar charts for 
fostering priority awareness are non-interactive, as usually encountered in real life or business settings, 
the bar charts for fostering performance awareness make more use of the information and communication 
technology abilities to interactively change in size. Adding interactivity and creating awareness of the 
current performance could have an influence on the first three psychological steps and affect the 
commitment of fixed-sum-error as well as the incompatibility error (Thompson and Hastie 1990): 
Creating priority or performance awareness is dependent on the negotiators perceiving the bar 
chart per se before understanding that it is about differences in priorities, and finally interpreting it 
accordingly, using this information to beneficially integrate their different priorities. Chun (2000) and 
Wolfe and Horowitz (2004) have shown that size and motion undoubtedly draw attention. Compared to 
the non-interactive priority awareness approach, using an interactive approach to directly change the size 
of bars could draw greater attention to the bar chart and increase it being perceived. The additional 
observation of how the bars change with different chosen options could ease the negotiator’s 
understanding of the content of the bar chart. Through the interactivity, the negotiator’s interpretation of 
the bar charts function and utility could be facilitated and further counteract the fixed-sum-error 
(Thompson and Hastie 1990), thus further improving the negotiation performance.  
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Performance awareness is realized along with priority awareness. When referring to priorities in 
negotiations, it is generally a reference to priorities of issues such as, for example, financing or warranty 
in a car buying/selling scenario. With performance awareness, we differentiate between priorities of 
issues and the priorities of options within each issue, for example, the options “6 months”, “12 months”, 
“18 months”, “24 months”, and “30 months” within the issue warranty. The study by Rasch and Schnotz 
(2009) showed that the ability to interactively change the representation of information to find the correct 
differences in a numerical task with a visual representation (finding time-differences between capital 
cities around the world) enabled the participants to represent multiple states which they could not have 
accessed with a non-interactive visualization. This enabled them to process more and achieve a better 
performance in a task in which they had to repeatedly extract information from a large set of different 
solution states. Making not only the priorities of issues but also the priorities of options salient in a 
negotiation could have an influence on the commitment of the incompatibility error, where negotiators 
agree on a suboptimal option for both (Thompson and Hastie 1990). 
Performance awareness has the potential to outperform priority awareness, but interactivity and 
more awareness do not automatically equal better outcomes. The interactive bar charts could also be the 
reason why performance awareness will underperform in comparison. 
The regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982; Bell 1982) states that people may feel regret when 
they reflect on how much more preferable another position would have been, had they chosen differently, 
and this reflection may reduce the pleasure that they derive from their choice. Larrick and Boles (1995) 
have shown the consistency of this effect in a negotiation scenario. Creating awareness about the current 
performance, with the negotiators remembering what was and what could have been, could lead to regret 
and undermine otherwise existent benefits of priority awareness. 
Another point of doubt on why an approach with interactive bar charts might not be as beneficial 
as a non-interactive approach, comes with the cognitive load theory (Chandler and Sweller 1991). 
Interactive bar charts are inherently more complex than non-interactive bar charts; there is just more 
information that has to be processed such as how to change the size of the bar charts, what the change in 
size means, and what the current size means. A higher cognitive load also leads to less satisfaction with a 
computer system (Schmutz et al. 2009). While there is more information available with the performance 
awareness approach, one also needs more cognitive resources for processing, which could have a negative 
influence on negotiation performance. 
A third problem appears with the observed strategic misrepresentation of information in 
negotiations (Steinel and De Dreu 2004). People seem to disclose a lot of information but do not want to 
disclose too much information in order to be able to have some degrees of freedom in performing the 
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negotiation in their favor, meaning that they also want to have the choice of giving or holding back 
information. Performance awareness does make more priority information available for the other 
negotiator and therefore leaves less room for strategic misrepresentation, which could have a negative 
impact on different measures of negotiation performance.  
 
4 Hypotheses 
Although the performance awareness approach has the potential to outperform the priority awareness 
approach, we have to consider the risk explained by the regret theory, the cognitive load theory, and the 
strategic misrepresentation of information. We cannot tell the direction in which the dyads negotiating 
with available performance awareness will differ from dyads negotiating with available priority 
awareness in the different measures of negotiation performance. The most commonly used ways of 
measuring negotiation performance are economic in their nature. Besides measures that directly indicate 
how “good” a negotiation went, from an economical point of view, there are other measures that have an 
indirect influence on a negotiation or on future negotiations (section “5.3 Measures” explains all used 
measures in detail). 
 
The joint outcome and the pareto efficiency are widely used in experimental negotiation studies 
(Thompson and Hastie 1990; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Hyder et al. 2000; Harinck and De Dreu 
2004; Hindriks et al. 2011; Gettinger et al. 2012) and are both extensively documented by Tripp and 
Sondak (1992). The joint outcome is the sum of points both negotiators received for their agreement in 
the negotiation. The pareto efficiency is a calculated numerical value between 0 and 1, showing whether 
there are any agreements with better outcomes for at least one party without them being worse for the 
other party. Section “5.2 Material” holds the details about the point distribution.  
H1: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in the economic outcome 
measures of the negotiation from dyads negotiating with available performance awareness. 
 
The satisfaction with the negotiation is a strong indicator of the willingness for future 
negotiations with the same partner (Oliver et al. 1994). A profitable agreement for both parties loses its 
benefits when the parties were not satisfied and are not willing to participate in any future negotiations 
with each other. Closely related to satisfaction is the perceived likeability of the negotiation partner, 
which also indicates the willingness for future negotiations with the same partner (Lai et al. 2013). 
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H2: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in their satisfaction with the 
negotiation and their partner from dyads negotiating with available performance awareness. 
 
The fairness of an agreement can be split in objective and subjective fairness. The objective 
fairness is sometimes referred to as contract balance (Foroughi 1998; Gettinger et al. 2012) and is a 
comparison of individual outcomes. The subjective fairness is the perceived fairness of the negotiators. 
Negotiators reciprocate unfairness (Ostrom 1998) and unfairness also leads to anger and spite which 
reduces the “frequency of mutually beneficial, negotiated agreements” (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996, p. 
208). The vast majority of people tends to behave fairly and they also tend to have an inequality aversion 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999). 
H3: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in the fairness of the negotiation 
from dyads negotiating with available performance awareness. 
 
Being seen as deceitful or being caught deceiving can lead to the loss of trust in a person or 
organization which is particularly harmful between organizations with repeated interactions (Grover 
2005). In negotiations this can lead to a reduced acceptance of offers as well as costly punishment of the 
deceiver (Croson et al. 2003) and ultimately to less integrative agreements (Shapiro and Bies 1994) and 
thus less profit. 
H4: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in their practiced and perceived 
deceitfulness during the negotiation from dyads negotiating with available performance awareness. 
 
Although full, open, truthful exchange in negotiations exists (Raiffa et al. 2002; Herath et al. 
2010), there seems to be a need for strategic misrepresentation in negotiations (Steinel and De Dreu 2004) 
in which the negotiators are able to withhold information. Besides the willingness to disclose more 
information, another question is about how much information one can remember about the negotiation 
partner. Remembering the priorities of one’s negotiation partner helps in future negotiations with the 
same partner, as the priorities will not have changed much, and thus a faster negotiation with less 
preparation to get to know the other could be possible. 
H5: Dyads negotiating with available priority awareness differ in how they deal with information 
for future negotiations from dyads negotiating with available performance awareness. 
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5 Method 
5.1 Participants and Design 
The sample consisted of 132 university students from different fields of study (100 female, 32 male, Mage 
= 24.01, SDage = 3.70, age range: 19–36). They voluntarily took part in this experimental study for an 
hourly rate of 8 €. Sixty-six dyads were created by randomly assigning the roles of either a potential car 
buyer or seller. This resulted in 33 dyads per condition with either priority awareness and performance 
awareness. The distribution of gender in the dyads was controlled for by alternating the conditions for 
dyads consisting of female-female, male-male, and female-male. 
 
5.2 Material 
5.2.1 Payoff schedule. We modernized the payoff schedule of Thompson and Hastie (1990) for a 
car buying/selling scenario. In most experimental negotiation studies, the payoff schedule plays the 
central part. Participants are given a scenario and a specific role (e. g. a potential car buyer and a seller) 
and they are asked to negotiate over predefined issues with multiple options (Thompson and Hastie 1990; 
e.g. Hyder et al. 2000; Der Foo et al. 2004; Olekalns and Smith 2008; Van der Schalk et al. 2009). The 
payoff schedule is an individual table with the issues to be negotiated and their options, which are 
identical for both negotiators, as well as with the attached points for the options, which differ between the 
negotiators. The goal of each negotiator is to maximize the sum of his or her individual points. Table 2 
holds a full overview of the used payoff schedule. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Of these eight issues with five options each, four issues were integrative: warranty, extras, 
financing and technology/audio could be profitably traded between the negotiators because they had a 
higher priority for one negotiator than for the other. Two issues were distributive: delivery date and price. 
Both negotiators wanted the exactly opposite option in these issues to gain the same amount of points. 
The last two issues were compatible: CO2 emission and color were completely identical for both 
negotiators; they both prioritized the same option.  
 
5.2.2 Bar charts. Bar charts are used worldwide from regular newspapers to business reports to 
scientific articles; they therefore seem to be a good choice for fostering priority and performance 
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awareness. Weber, Kersten and Hine (2006) have already discussed the potential of bar charts for 
fostering awareness of priorities. Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) used bar charts in their negotiation 
support system to visualize the own priorities of issues, but neither did they examine the specific effects 
of this visualization nor did they examine the effects of priority awareness. Bar charts have been shown to 
lead to shorter response times in information retrieval tasks (Quispel and Maes 2014) and also to more 
accurate judgment of proportions (Simkin and Hastie 1987) than other forms of visualization. 
Additionally they lead to better comparisons of values than tables (Jacobs 1994; Jacobs 1999). 
The priorities of issues are visualized through the size of a bar in a bar chart: The higher the 
priority of an issue, the taller its bar. This is either visualized by an opaque bar (priority awareness 
condition) or indicated by a horizontal line (performance awareness condition). The priority of an issue – 
the size of its bar – is based on its option with the most points for the respective negotiator. Here we need 
to mention that only the modulus of the highest scoring option is important for the creation of priorities. 
For the issue “price”, the buyer’s loss of the highest scoring option “24,500 €, -6000 points” is higher 
than for the issue “delivery date” the gain of the highest scoring option “1 month, 2400 points”. “Price” 
would therefore be of higher priority than “delivery date”. Although omitted in many experimental 
negotiation studies, such negative point scores have a valid reason to exist because sometimes negotiators 
also have to agree on who loses less and not only who gains more. 
Raiffa, Richardson and Metcalfe (2002, p. 214) use this approach of creating priorities by ranking 
the issues by the modulus of their highest scoring option in their evaluation of two-party integrative 
negotiations. 
 
5.3 Measures 
The measures used to test the stated hypotheses in its parts were either derived from the agreement made 
by each dyad or they were their answers to questions after the negotiation. The questions were four-point 
rating scales ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 4 “strongly agree”. Some questions were inverted and 
subsequently recoded reversing the score in 4 “strongly disagree” to 1 “strongly agree”. These questions 
are marked here with a minus sign “(-)”. When not stated otherwise, we created mean scores for multiple 
questions of one measure. Other measures were also assessed but are not relevant to the stated hypotheses 
here. 
 
PRIORITY AWARENESS OUTPERFORMS PERFORMANCE AWARENESS 11 
5.3.1 Joint outcome. The options chosen for the agreement were logged in. On this basis, the 
points were calculated for each negotiator and summed to the joint outcome, which could possibly range 
from -3600 to 13200 points. 
 
5.3.2 Pareto efficiency. The pareto efficiency was calculated according to the formula by Tripp 
and Sondak (1992); based on the agreement in each negotiation, the points of each negotiator and the 
calculation of all possible agreements and their outcomes (58 = 390625 possible agreements). A perfectly 
integrated agreement received a pareto efficiency of 1; an agreement in which no worse agreement for 
both parties existed received a pareto efficiency of 0. The used formula is similar to the one presented by 
Hyder et al. (2000): 
 
Pareto Efficiency of Joint Outcome 𝑋 = 1 − [
𝑁𝑏
𝑁𝑏+𝑁𝑤
] 
 
 𝑋 = A negotiated joint outcome. 
 𝑁𝑏 = The number of possible agreements that were strictly better than joint outcome X for at least 
one party without being worse for the other party. 
 𝑁𝑤 = The number of possible agreements that were strictly worse than the joint outcome X for both 
parties. 
 
5.3.3 Satisfaction. We asked two questions about the satisfaction with the negotiation: “I am 
satisfied with our negotiation” and “I am unsatisfied with our negotiation (-)” (rS = .493, p < .001, n = 
130). 
 
5.3.4 Likeability. The likeability of the partner was assessed with the following two questions: 
“My negotiation partner was quite likeable” and “I do not want to negotiate with this partner in the future 
again (-)” (rS = .456, p < .001, n = 130). 
 
5.3.5 Objective fairness. For objective fairness, we divided the individual point difference 
between the negotiators of a dyad by the sum of the points of both negotiators: We divided the contract 
balance by the joint outcome. “Contract balance is not a standardized measure of negotiation fairness” as 
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Goh, Teo, Wu and Wei (2000) conclude. This is the reason why we calculated the percental difference 
between the individual outcomes for each negotiation dyad, making them comparable. 
 
Objective Fairness of Agreement 𝐴 = [
|𝑌𝐵−𝑌𝑆|
𝑋
] 
 
 𝐴 = A negotiated agreement with its individual and joint outcomes. 
 𝑌𝐵 = The individual outcome of negotiator one (the buyer). 
 𝑌𝑆 = The individual outcome of negotiator two (the seller). 
 𝑋 = A negotiated joint outcome. 
 
In this study, the objective fairness could hypothetically range from -250% to 280,3̅%. Assuming 
the buyer achieved a maximum loss of -7800 points and the seller a win of 7200 points, this would create 
a joint outcome of -600 points. The difference between both would amount to 15000 points, which would 
be 25 times the joint outcome of -600 points. The minus-sign of the percentage is only an indicator for an 
agreement which had a loss-making joint outcome. This measure is only applicable for non-zero joint 
outcomes. 
 
5.3.6 Subjective fairness. For subjective fairness, we asked two questions about the perceived 
fairness of the agreement: “I believe that the result of our negotiation is fair” and “Our agreement in the 
negotiation is unfair (-)” (rS = .665, p < .001, n = 130). 
 
5.3.7 Personal deceitfulness. “Honesty is the absence of deception” (Cramton and Dees 1993, p. 
3) and therefore deception can be seen as an inverse of honesty. To obtain an indicator about one’s own 
deceitfulness during the negotiation, we asked these questions: “I was open and truthful to my negotiation 
partner (-)” and “I held back information to get a better result for myself” (rS = .517, p < .001, n = 130). 
 
5.3.8 Perceived deceitfulness. To obtain an indicator about the perception of their partner being 
deceitful during the negotiation, we asked these questions: “My negotiation partner was honest with me (-
)” and “My negotiation partner lied to me” (rS = .605, p < .001, n = 130). 
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5.3.9 Information disclosure. To assess how willing the negotiators were to disclose more 
information – such as their full payoff schedule – in future studies, we asked the following two questions: 
“I would not have wanted my negotiation partner to see my point scores in his/her table” and “It would 
not have bothered me if my negotiation partner would have seen my point scores in his/her table (-)” (rS 
= .652, p < .001, n = 130). 
 
5.3.10 Information memory. We used a graphical test to assess how much the negotiators 
remembered with respect to the priorities of the other after the negotiation was done. The negotiators had 
to drag bars from the upper half of the screen, representing the priorities of issues of their partner, to the 
lower half of the screen, dropping them into placeholders next to their own bars, representing their own 
priorities of issues. For each issue, we calculated a deviation score between every set priority and its true 
priority and summed them up for both negotiators. The deviation score could range from 0 – perfect 
remembering of the priorities of the partner – to 48. 
 
5.4 Procedure 
The whole experiment took place within an experimental negotiation support system created specifically 
to compare the effects of priority awareness and performance awareness. The duration was approximately 
one hour. The experiment was broadly divided in three phases: pre-negotiation (working alone), 
negotiation (working together) and post-negotiation phase (working alone). 
 
5.4.1 Pre-negotiation phase. The participants were greeted and briefed shortly about the 
procedure of the experiment as follows: 
They would work alone in separate rooms. Everything would take place on the computer in front 
of them and all instructions would be presented to them on the monitor. They would first work alone until 
the negotiation phase when they would have to put on a headset for the negotiation. After the negotiation 
phase, both negotiators would once again work separately. 
After the participants filled out a declaration of consent about the data that would be gathered 
about them and how it would be used, they were informed that they could at any time abort the 
experiment and retract their data without incurring any drawbacks; they began with a questionnaire about 
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personal data, such as the field of study, gender, age, prior knowledge, and frequency of usage of 
computers/tables/diagrams and acquaintance with the other negotiator.  
Next, the individual role and the negotiation scenario were described for the first time (here 
exemplary of the seller): 
You are the head of a big automaker and want to sell a fleet of cars. You are negotiating 
with the head of a big insurance company. You have to agree on 8 issues: financing, CO2 
emission, warranty, delivery date, extras, technology/audio, price and color. Every issue 
has 5 options with different point scores corresponding to the wishes of your role. You 
are negotiating for points: Your goal is to maximize your own points! 
After this introduction, a preview of the experimental negotiation support system was presented. 
It looked nearly identical to the screenshot of the experimental negotiation support system in the priority 
awareness condition (Fig. 1) but only showed the individual priorities in the upper half of the screen. The 
only instructions here were: 
You cannot do anything here yet! This is supposed to give you a first impression of the 
negotiation interface. To continue, you may click on “Forward” in one minute. 
To engage the participants with the bar chart, we presented them with a task on the next screen: 
Put the issues in the order IMPORTANT → UNIMPORTANT. Drag the individual bars 
into the lower diagram and begin left with the most important issue, the one with which 
you can win or lose the most points. Click on “Forward” when you are finished. Errors 
will be orange-rimmed and you can correct them. You will have 5 minutes’ time for this. 
There was no further information given on behalf of the bar chart. The words “priority” and 
“performance” never once appeared. 
 
5.4.2 Negotiation phase. After this preview, the individual role and the negotiation scenario were 
described again with further instructions on the following negotiation interface: 
Both participants could independently click on options in the lower half of the screen, which both 
would then see as marked. They could also freely change this marking, independent of who set it. The 
marking of options would be there to help them during the negotiation but also to save their final 
agreement. There were three possibilities to finish the negotiation, namely, (1) finishing by clicking on 
“Agreement”, (2) aborting by clicking on “Abort” when it becomes clear that they would not arrive at an 
PRIORITY AWARENESS OUTPERFORMS PERFORMANCE AWARENESS 15 
agreement, (3) negotiating longer than 35 minutes and being automatically forwarded to the next screen 
where they would be asked whether they agreed, saving the last marked options as the agreement. 
There was one condition-specific piece of information here, telling the participants about the 
layout of the negotiation interface, because the preview only showed their own priorities and did not 
include those of their partner: 
In the upper diagram you can see how important the single issues are, for you and your 
partner. The marking of options does not change the diagram. Priority awareness 
condition. 
In the upper diagram you can see how important the single issues and options are, for 
you and your partner. The marking of options changes the diagram. Performance 
awareness condition. 
Exemplary for the seller, Figures 1 and 2 show a screenshot of the negotiation phase. There were 
no meaningful differences between the buyer and the seller besides their role description and their 
priorities of issues. The negotiators used their headset to communicate over an audio-only Skype 
connection (see Bazerman et al. 2000 for the benefits of an audio-only communication in a negotiation), 
which only lasted for the duration of the negotiation phase. The participants were free to carry out the 
negotiation and communicate as they wished. The negotiation was completely unscripted and there were 
no constraints on what the negotiators could talk about. 
To test the effects of priority awareness and performance awareness, the negotiators saw a bar 
chart with different properties in the upper half of the screen and their own payoff schedule with clickable 
radio buttons in the lower half of the screen. 
The negotiators in the priority awareness condition (Fig. 1) were made aware only of the 
priorities of issues. The bars here were completely opaque and non-interactive. The bar chart visualized 
their own priorities of issues as well as those of the other negotiator. 
The negotiators in the performance awareness condition (Fig. 2) were also made aware of their 
current performance besides the priorities of the issues. The bars here were at first only indicated by 
horizontal lines where the outermost horizontal lines represented the priorities of options. The moment 
one negotiator marked an option of an issue, the bars of this issue filled up to specific horizontal lines. 
The degree of fill level corresponded to the point scores attached to this option for each individual 
negotiator. For example: The option “6%” of the issue “financing” was marked (see Fig. 2) and therefore 
the size of the red bar corresponded to the point score of this option of the seller. The size of the blue bar 
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corresponded to the point score for this option for the buyer. Besides this difference in the upper half of 
the screen, there were no differences between the conditions. 
The payoff schedule in the lower half of the screen was dependent on the role as buyer or seller. 
Both parties only saw their own point scores for the common set of options of each issue. Both could 
mark or change the mark of the options which had different point scores attached to them. The options 
marked were then logged in by the negotiation support system when the negotiators clicked on 
“Agreement”. 
 
[INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.4.3 Post-negotiation phase. After the negotiation, the participants worked alone again, and the 
information memory was tested. The instructions here were: 
Assign the points of your partner to the correct issues. Drag the bars of your partner 
(above) next to your bars (below) in the diagram. You can freely move the bars of your 
partner. There is no error message! Take your time and click only then on “Forward” 
when you believe that the points of your partner have been assigned to the correct issues. 
Finally, the participants were asked to answer questions on their satisfaction with the negotiation, 
the likeability of their partner, their perceived fairness of the agreement, their own honesty, and the 
honesty of their partner. Additionally, they were asked about their willingness to disclose more 
information in a future negotiation. 
Afterwards, the participants were paid and shortly debriefed. 
 
6 Results 
For the analyses we used a Wilcoxon rank-sum test or, where the normality assumption was not violated, 
a t-Test. There were no meaningful differences between the conditions in the control measures age, 
familiarity with the partner, computer abilities, effortlessness, and frequency of using tables or diagrams 
(all Ws > 2077 with N = 132, all ps > .165). Both conditions can be seen as identical and all differences in 
the measures of negotiation performance can be ascribed to the condition. All analyses were conducted on 
the aggregated data on the level of dyads because the individuals were not independent of each other 
(Cress 2008). There were no impasses and all dyads achieved a positive joint outcome. 
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Table 3 holds an overview of the correlations between the used measures of negotiation 
performance. All measures forming one hypothesis are significantly correlated with each other. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
H1 disconfirmed: Both conditions did not differ in the agreed joint outcome (MPriA = 10055, 
SDPriA = 2428, MPerA = 9055, SDPerA = 2796, p = .262) and the achieved pareto efficiency (MPriA = 0.96, 
SDPriA = 0.10, MPerA = 0.89, SDPerA = 0.26, p = .228). 
H2 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 3.23, SD = 0.40) were more 
satisfied with the negotiation than the dyads with performance awareness (M = 2.99, SD = 0.44, W = 690, 
p = .031, r = -.28) and they also found their negotiation partner more likeable (MPriA = 3.49, SDPriA = 0.40, 
MPerA = 3.18, SDPerA = 0.42, W = 749, p = .003, r = -.37) 
H3 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 3.43, SD = 0.41) found their 
agreement subjectively fairer than the dyads with performance awareness (M = 3.20, SD = 0.40, W = 
702.5, p = .020, r = -.41). Objectively, there was no difference in the fairness of the agreement between 
the conditions (MPriA = 16.5%, SDPriA = 22.0%, MPerA = 22.6%, SDPerA = 30.4%, W = 453, p = .237) 
H4 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 1.51, SD = 0.41) not only said 
that they were less deceitful in the negotiation than the dyads with performance awareness (M = 1.88, 
SD = 0.43, W = 283, p = .001, r = -.41), and they also perceived their negotiation partner as less deceitful 
(MPriA = 1.59, SDPriA = 0.40, MProA = 1.80, SDProA = 0.36, t(63) = -2.15, p = .036, d = .53).  
H5 confirmed: The negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 2.27, SD = 0.63) were more 
willing to also present their full payoff schedule to their partner in future negotiations than the dyads with 
performance awareness (M = 2.58, SD = 0.55, t(63) = -2.13, p = .037, d = .53). In replicating the priorities 
from the other party after the negotiation, the negotiation dyads with priority awareness (M = 25.76, SD = 
5.38) remembered fewer correct priorities of the other party than the dyads with performance awareness 
(M = 20.18, SD = 7.49, t(64) = 3.48 , p < .001, d = .86). 
 
7 Discussion 
A successful negotiation strongly relies on the negotiators’ awareness of each other’s priorities. Being 
aware of which issues could be traded off in a beneficial way leads to an integrative negotiation. We 
compared two different kinds of awareness and their influence on different measures of negotiation 
PRIORITY AWARENESS OUTPERFORMS PERFORMANCE AWARENESS 18 
performance in an experimental negotiation support system: (1) priority awareness, tacitly facilitated with 
non-interactive bar charts and (2) performance awareness, tacitly facilitated with interactive bar charts.  
Through its interactivity, the performance awareness approach could have possibly facilitated the 
steps needed to create awareness (see Table 1) and thus diminish the fixed-sum-error. Additionally, it 
could have possibly created another quality of priority awareness on the level of options as well as issues, 
which could have reduced the incompatibility error. Making a more extensive use of information and 
communications technologies, interactive possibilities did not, however, improve the negotiation 
performance; on the contrary, it even had detrimental effects: There was no difference in the joint 
outcome or in the pareto efficiency – being indicators for the fixed-sum-error – and ultimately no 
difference in the commitment of the incompatibility error between dyads negotiating with priority 
awareness or performance awareness. Dyads negotiating with performance awareness were less satisfied 
with their negotiation, found their partner less likable, found their agreement less fair – although there 
was no objective difference in fairness – were more deceitful in the negotiation, and also thought their 
partner was more deceitful. There were two results in which dyads negotiating with performance 
awareness had a higher score than those negotiating with priority awareness. On the one hand, they could 
remember the priorities of their partner better and, on the other hand, they were less willing to disclose 
even more information in form of their payoff schedule. 
Although the performance awareness approach had great potential for being superior to the 
priority awareness approach, it was mostly inferior to it. An explanation of why there was no difference in 
the joint outcome and the pareto efficiency between the conditions lies in the higher complexity of the 
interactive bar charts and their greater need for cognitive resources (Chandler and Sweller 1991). Further, 
although performance awareness created awareness of the priorities of options inside issues, making the 
options discoverable – which both negotiators unanimously preferred – and thus potentially 
circumventing the incompatibility error, we believe that the negotiators were too busy handling the higher 
complexity that accompanied the introduced interactivity to have also noticed these kinds of options. The 
interactivity may have led to too much awareness and too much information to process at once. This is 
also in line with Schmutz et al. (2009) where higher complexity led likewise to less satisfaction with a 
computer system. 
The regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982; Bell 1982) holds an answer to why performance 
awareness had these adverse effects on satisfaction with the negotiation, likeability of the partner, the 
subjective fairness of the agreement, as well as the personal and the perceived deceptiveness. These five 
concepts were significantly correlated with each other, indicating that these are interrelated concepts 
which might have been influenced at once. Performance awareness not only showed the current 
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performance in the negotiation, but also made the transition from a previous state more salient: The 
negotiators were made aware of what they have lost in the transition of one offer to another and what the 
other negotiator had received in return, which may not have been a fair trade. Also, the goal of the 
negotiation was to maximize the individual points – to get the bars to an optimal size. Being made aware 
of a deviation from this goal could have also led to frustration. 
As for the higher deceptiveness and the perceived deceptiveness of the partner in the performance 
awareness condition, there seems to be a need for strategic misrepresentation (Steinel and De Dreu 2004), 
which becomes more visible, the less information there is that the negotiators can hide. In a scenario in 
which each negotiator is made aware of the other’s priorities of issues and options, complete rational and 
fair negotiators would achieve a perfect integrative agreement with the highest possible joint outcome and 
perfect pareto efficiency. But humans are not completely rational and fair (f. e. Henrich et al. 2001). The 
highest individual outcome is only possible at the cost of the negotiation partner’s individual outcome. In 
a scenario in which more detailed information about one’s priorities is available, the only possible way to 
gain a higher individual outcome is to be deceptive. But because the priority information is available, this 
deception is easier to see through. 
The dyads with priority awareness were more willing to even share their individual payoff 
schedule. Dyads with performance awareness already had more awareness and they were less convinced 
of sharing even more information. The correlations with the joint outcome and pareto efficiency indicate 
that a higher willingness to share even more information was connected to a better economical 
negotiation outcome. It seems as if awareness of negotiation relevant information has its benefits and 
people assume that more would be better, but when they have more awareness of negotiation-relevant 
information, they change their mind. This again is an indicator of the need for strategic misrepresentation 
of information because people who have less opportunity to deceive are also less willing to share even 
more information. 
The individual payoff schedule is the basis of every complex negotiation. It attaches measureable 
values to options and creates priorities for issues. Otherwise, negotiators would have to rely on fast 
assumptions of which issue or option is more or less important to them. Giving away the individual 
payoff schedule is a full disclosure of the key information in a negotiation. Our results show that 
negotiators would prefer a partial, open, truthful exchange over a full, open, truthful exchange (Raiffa et 
al. 2002).  
After the negotiation, the dyads with performance awareness knew more about the priorities of 
their negotiation partner than the dyads with priority awareness. Remembering the priorities of the partner 
after the negotiation is useful for recurring negotiations between the same parties as this would save time 
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in coming to terms with the others’ priorities. Other studies on awareness centered on learning and 
problem solving. In these studies, the extent of the knowledge that one group member gained about the 
others was assessed (e. g. Engelmann et al. 2009). In such a context, added interactivity and more detailed 
awareness would be more useful since it has been clearly shown to lead to more engagement with the 
information of the other and better retention. 
A shortcoming of the present study is the mentioned full, open, truthful, exchange of information 
that we granted the negotiators. We did so to be able to compare the effectiveness of the two different 
awareness conditions, which could not have been properly done without giving away all priority 
information about issues (and options). Through a full, open, truthful exchange in a negotiation, the 
negotiators may “gain clarity, simplicity and crispness of definition” (Raiffa et al. 2002, p. 87) about their 
negotiation which also is the case in reality (Raiffa et al. 2002; Herath et al. 2010). A partial, open, 
truthful exchange is also the case in reality: Not all information is exchanged open and truthfully. 
Sometimes a full, open, truthful exchange is not possible with a partner who cannot be trusted and 
sometimes negotiations start out as partially open and truthful but then change to fully open and truthful, 
understanding its benefits (Raiffa et al. 2002). 
Interactive visualizations are broadly used in economical decision making (Dilla et al. 2010). 
Their goal is to interactively visualize different key performance indicators to help decision-makers or 
negotiators to come to a beneficial decision and in the context of a negotiation, a beneficial agreement. 
This study leads to the question how many interactive computer-supported environments could work as 
well as non-interactive ones which are implemented in a faster, cheaper, and simpler way. It is not a 
question of adding more interactive features but removing some. Removing features, reducing the amount 
of information, and limiting the amount of possible interaction could lead to the same or even better 
outcomes. Future studies will have to focus on simpler ways of creating a limited amount of awareness 
and also on a partial, open, truthful exchange of information, answering the question: How much 
voluntarily given awareness about one’s own information is enough to improve negotiation performance? 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
There seems to be the phenomenon of too much awareness. Performance awareness makes the current 
state of the negotiation salient to the negotiators and can clearly help facilitate decision making processes 
in a computer-supported environment. It unfortunately also leads to simply too much information to 
handle at once efficiently, to feelings of regret, and prevents the use of strategic misrepresentation. These 
effects have a negative influence on satisfaction, fairness, and honesty. Such an awareness approach 
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comes with its share of disadvantages that does not justify the additional amount of time and resources 
needed to create and maintain it. Non-interactive awareness approaches are easier and cheaper to create 
and maintain and optimally do not take up much mental effort in using them, do not leave the negotiators 
with feelings of regret, and should still leave the negotiators some room for strategic misrepresentation of 
information. 
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Fig 1. Control condition with priority awareness (as seen by the seller): Non-interactive bar charts that do 
not change by agreeing on one option for each issue 
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Fig 2. Experimental condition with performance awareness (as seen by the seller): Interactive bar charts 
which fill up depending on the one agreed option for each issue 
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Table 1. Psychological Steps Involved in the Effectiveness of Methods of Creating Awareness 
Step Description Example for this Study 
1 Perception The method of creating awareness have 
to be perceived by a person 
The attention of the person has to be 
caught in some way by the bar charts. 
2 Understanding The person has to understand what the 
content of the perceived method is 
It is about the differences in priorities of 
issues (and, additionally, options for 
performance awareness) 
3 Interpretation The person has to interpret the content in 
the context of the situation 
Understanding what the differences in 
priorities mean for the negotiation 
4 Behavior The person has to change his/her 
behavior based on the interpretation 
Engaging in integrative negotiation 
Table 1 Click here to download Table 2016-07-07_Table_1.docx 
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Table 2. Overview of Payoff Schedule with all Issues and their Options with Attached Individual Point Scores 
Financing Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
CO2 Emission Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Warranty Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Delivery 
Date 
Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
8 % 1600 4000 88 g/km  0  0 6 months 0 1600 5 months 0 2400 
6 % 1200 3000 126 g/km -600 -600 12 months 1000 1200 4 months 600 1800 
4 % 800 2000 164 g/km -1200 -1200 18 months 2000 800 3 months 1200 1200 
2 % 400 1000 202 g/km -1800 -1800 24 months 3000 400 2 months 1800 600 
0 % 0 0 240 g/km -2400 -2400 30 months 4000 0 1 month 2400 0 
Extras Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Technology/Audio Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Price Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Color Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
1 0 3200 None 0 800 24.500 € -6000  0 Grey 1200 1200 
2 200 2400 Audio base equipment 800 600 23.520 € -4500 -1500 White 900 900 
3 400 1600 Multimedia equipment 1600 400 22.540 € -3000 -3000 Red 600 600 
4 600 800 Multimedia equipment + car computer 2400 200 21.560 € -1500 -4500 Black 300 300 
5 800 0 Multimedia equipment + car computer + navigation 3200 0 20.580 €  0 -6000 Silver 0 0 
The buyer and the seller could only see their own point scores during the negotiation, independent of the condition. There were no restrictions made on the communication of 
the negotiators, including the sharing of any of this information. 
Table 2 Click here to download Table 2016-07-07_Table_2.docx 
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Table 3. Overall Correlations between the Used Measures of Negotiation Performance 
 
Joint 
outcome 
Pareto 
efficiency Satisfaction Likeability 
Objective 
fairness 
Subjective 
fairness 
Personal 
deceitfulness 
Perceived 
deceitfulness 
Information 
disclosure 
Information 
memory 
Joint outcome 
 
 0.996***  0.060  0.019 -0.175  0.018  0.085  0.032  0.319** -0.009 
Pareto efficiency 0.996*** 
 
 0.069  0.030 -0.195  0.031  0.074  0.042  0.324** -0.029 
Satisfaction  0.060 0.069 
 
 0.493*** -0.212  0.660*** -0.480*** -0.473*** -0.137 -0.047 
Likeability  0.019  0.030 0.493*** 
 
-0.199  0.566*** -0.547*** -0.567*** -0.330** -0.112 
Objective fairness -0.175 -0.195 -0.212 -0.199 
 
-0.319**  0.265*  0.255*  0.027  0.350** 
Subjective fairness  0.018  0.031  0.660***  0.566*** -0.319** 
 
-0.604*** -0.602*** -0.282* -0.211 
Personal deceitfulness  0.085  0.074 -0.480*** -0.547***  0.265* -0.604*** 
 
 0.701***  0.482*** 0.216 
Perceived deceitfulness  0.032  0.042 -0.473*** -0.567***  0.255* -0.602*** 0.701*** 
 
 0.471***  0.076 
Information disclosure  0.319**  0.324** -0.137 -0.330**  0.027 -0.282*  0.482*** 0.471*** 
 
 0.298* 
Information memory -0.009 -0.029 -0.047 -0.112  0.350** -0.211  0.216  0.076 0.298* 
 Spearman’s correlation with pairwise-deletion. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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Abstract 4 
Computer-supported negotiations are gaining traction in business interactions. Previous studies 5 
have demonstrated mixed findings on how negotiators’ personality traits influence the individual 6 
outcomes. Research has not investigated the HEXACO so far and has not tested for the 7 
interdependent effects of the negotiators’ personalities. We use the actor-partner interdependence 8 
model to test the influence of different personality traits, figural intelligence, and social value 9 
orientation on the individual outcomes in computer-supported negotiations. Two conditions 10 
differing in the interactive capabilities and amount of information of the used negotiation support 11 
system were implemented. One hundred thirty-two participants in 66 dyads negotiated in their 12 
roles as seller or buyer. Analyses show that a negotiator’s own personality traits, figural 13 
intelligence, and social value orientation have no influence on his or her own individual outcome. 14 
However, individuals’ outcomes are positively affected by their partners’ lower emotionality – 15 
lower dependence and sentimentality – their higher social value orientation and higher figural 16 
intelligence. The characteristics of the opposing partner are crucial for one’s own individual 17 
outcome: emotional stability, a distinct ability to interpret figures, and a more prosocial attitude 18 
are important for a beneficial agreement. Possible explanations for these results are discussed 19 
and the shortcomings of this study addressed. 20 
 21 
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HEXACO Personality Traits That Shape the Individual Outcome in Computer-Supported 24 
Negotiations 25 
1 Introduction 26 
Regardless of the subject of a negotiation –be it over a new car, over the amount of wages, over a 27 
multimillion business contract – every negotiation party has the clear goal of achieving a 28 
beneficial agreement and maximizing its individual outcome. Partners enter a negotiation with 29 
their individual personality which might not only shape their own outcome but might also do so 30 
for the outcome of the partner. Previous studies concerning personality – as measured with the 31 
“big five” – and individual negotiation outcomes have shown inconsistent results. They also did 32 
not examine the influence within a computer-supported environment and did not take the mutual 33 
influence of the partners’ personality into account. 34 
Barry and Friedman (1998) found that extraversion and agreeableness had no influence 35 
on individual outcomes, but they did find that higher conscientiousness improved individual 36 
outcomes. Liu, Friedman an Chi (2005) also found no effects of extraversion but of one of 37 
agreeableness: the more agreeable a negotiator, the lower his or her individual outcome. Ma and 38 
Jaeger (2005) found that higher extraversion was associated with a higher individual outcome as 39 
was openness to experience. Neuroticism had no influence on the individual outcome here. The 40 
study by Foo, Elfenbein, Tan and Aik (2004) found a positive influence of neuroticism on the 41 
individual outcome. 42 
Business to business negotiations are now nearly not possible to imagine without some 43 
kind of computer-support. Specific negotiation support systems can facilitate negotiations by 44 
making relevant information available (Kolodziej, Hesse, & Engelmann, 2015; Rangaswamy & 45 
Shell, 1997; Schoop et al., 2014; Weber, Kersten, & Hine, 2006), but such computer-support can 46 
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also foster private self-awareness which leads to a focus on personal perceptions and thoughts 47 
(Sassenberg, Boos, & Rabung, 2005) and thus might have an influence on the effects of 48 
personality in computer-supported negotiations. 49 
Only recently the focus of negotiation studies shifted to the interindividual influences 50 
using the actor-partner interdependence model (APIM; Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006) as the 51 
appropriate statistical method for the analysis (Turel, 2010). 52 
With this experimental study, we are seeking to shed some light on the inconsistent 53 
findings of different personality traits on the individual outcome and find mutual effects in 54 
computer-supported negotiations. Additionally, we are looking for the effects of figural 55 
intelligence and social value orientation, which play an important a role in this setup. To our 56 
knowledge, the HEXACO personality scales (Ashton & Lee, 2009) and the actor-partner 57 
interdependence model (Kenny et al., 2006) have never before been applied in computer- 58 
supported negotiations. 59 
 60 
2 The HEXACO Personality Inventory 61 
The freely available HEXACO scales (Ashton & Lee, 2009) are the most up to date model of 62 
personality structure. They are still fairly new in the scientific community at large and the 63 
negotiation community specifically. 64 
They are nearly identical to the widely known big five: extraversion, agreeableness, 65 
conscientiousness, openness to experience and neuroticism (f. e. NEO-PI-3; McCrae, Costa, & 66 
Martin, 2005). The HEXACO consists of six scales: extraversion, agreeableness, 67 
conscientiousness, openness to experience and – instead of neuroticism – honesty-humility and 68 
emotionality. Every scale has four subscales. 69 
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Extensive and precise descriptions of the scales and subscales can be found on the official 70 
HEXACO website (Ashton & Lee, 2016). We will briefly describe relevant scales and subscales 71 
in the Results section. 72 
 73 
3 Computer-Supported Negotiations 74 
Decision makers are increasingly relying on negotiation support systems which facilitate 75 
communication and coordination of individual activities (Kersten & Lai, 2007). Multiple 76 
negotiation support systems exist in real life negotiation settings such as Zopaf (Andinian Inc., 77 
2015) or Smartsettle (iCan Systems Inc., 2015) and in experimental negotiation settings such as 78 
Inspire (Kersten & Noronha, 1999) or Negoisst (Schoop, Jertila, & List, 2003), which structure 79 
the negotiation and create awareness for crucial information. 80 
Multiple studies conducted on different negotiation support systems have confirmed the 81 
utility of these systems and their positive influence on different negotiation outcomes (Kolodziej 82 
et al., 2015; Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997; Schoop et al., 2014; Weber et al., 2006).  83 
These studies used negotiation support systems with a different number of features 84 
having different interactive capabilities and different amounts of available information. 85 
 86 
4 Research Questions 87 
To test the interdependent effects of the HEXACO personality traits, we used an experimental 88 
negotiation support system with a graphical decision aid (Gettinger & Koeszegi, 2012). As part 89 
of a larger study described elsewhere, we compared two conditions differing in the interactive 90 
capability and the amount of available information of the negotiation support system. We used a 91 
scenario in which the roles of a buyer and a seller negotiate in dyads over a vehicle fleet. 92 
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Besides the HEXACO scales, we assessed other characteristics which could have an 93 
interindividual influence on the individual outcomes and which could interact with the two 94 
experimental conditions. Considering the heterogeneity of previous findings, we will not 95 
formulate specific hypotheses but rather several research questions: 96 
How does personality affect the individual outcomes? (RQ1)  97 
As mentioned above, the findings to date on the influence of personality on a particular 98 
way of measuring individual outcome have been ambiguous and the interindividual differences 99 
have not been taken into account. Also, the HEXACO scales have not been used in a negotiation 100 
study before. We are seeking to find an answer to this. 101 
How does the individual social value orientation affect the individual outcomes? (RQ2)  102 
The social value orientation is a set of “motivations that underlie interdependent decision 103 
behavior” (Murphy, Ackerman, & Handgraaf, 2011, p. 711) and is a measure of the magnitude of 104 
the concern people have for others (Murphy et al., 2011). It already has a big influence on the 105 
joint outcome in negotiations (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). The interindividual effects on 106 
the individual outcome have not been tested until now. 107 
How does figural intelligence affect the individual outcomes? (RQ3)  108 
As negotiation support systems generally rely on graphical decision aids, there is a strong 109 
connection to one’s general ability to understand and process graphically represented information. 110 
How this influences the individual outcome has not been tested before. 111 
 112 
5 Method 113 
The method section is held short because the specificities of the graphical decision aid, the 114 
different possibility of interaction, and the different amount of information, as well as their 115 
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influence on different dyadic measures of negotiation performance are documented in another 116 
publication elsewhere. These do not fit the scope of this journal or the topic of this paper. 117 
Additionally, the two conditions had no influence on the reported results; therefore, we do not 118 
differentiate any further between them. 119 
 120 
5.1 Measures 121 
There are multiple hard and soft skills needed to perform a financially successful negotiation (e.g. 122 
De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & van Kleef, 2007; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010); however, the 123 
relevant ones in our study – which uses a negotiation support systems with a graphical decision 124 
aid – are figural intelligence and social value orientation. Other measures were also assessed but 125 
are not relevant to the stated research questions. 126 
 127 
5.1.1 Individual outcome. On the basis of the chosen options for the agreement in a 128 
negotiation, individual points were given depending on the role’s payoff schedule (see Table 1 129 
and the “Material” subsection). The individual points could possibly range from -8400 to 13200. 130 
 131 
5.1.2 HEXACO. The six scales and their four subscales each were found in lexical 132 
studies of personality structure and have been cross-culturally replicated (Ashton & Lee, 2007). 133 
The internal consistency for the scales and subscales ranges from  = .75 to  = .92 (Lee & 134 
Ashton, 2004). The convergent validity was tested for with five scales from the International 135 
Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999) and the Primary Psychopathy scale (Levenson, Kiehl, & 136 
Fitzpatrick, 1995). It ranged from  = .80 to  = .90 (Ashton & Lee, 2007). The HEXACO-60 137 
consists of 60 items, 10 per scale and within these, two to three per subscale. The items are five-138 
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point rated ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. Some items were reversed 139 
where a score of 1 resembles “strongly agree” and 5 “strongly disagree”. 140 
 141 
5.1.3 Social value orientation. The SVO slider measure by Murphy et al. (2011) consists 142 
of six items in which one of nine predefined resource allocations has to be chosen; for example, 143 
the decision maker can chose a fictitious value of 85 for him or herself and for another person a 144 
value between 15 and 85. The SVO slider measure has a test-retest reliability of r = .92 and a 145 
predictive validity tested against the binary choices in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game of rpb = .24 146 
(Murphy & Ackermann, 2012). A higher value represents a more prosocial attitude. 147 
 148 
5.1.4 Figural intelligence. We used the figure selection task form A of the intelligence 149 
structure test 2000 R (Liepmann, Beauducel, Brocke, & Amthauer, 2007) to assess the kind of 150 
figural intelligence suitable for our study and examined its influence on the individual outcomes. 151 
Because we digitally adapted the analog paper and pencil test and did not strictly control the 152 
participants as needed for an intelligence test, we only used the raw points ranging from 0 to a 153 
maximum sum of 20. The internal consistency of the figure selection task form A is  = .77 and 154 
the split-half reliability is r = .80 (Liepmann et al., 2007). 155 
 156 
5.2 Material and Design 157 
For our car buying/selling negotiation scenario, we modernized the payoff schedule by 158 
Thompson and Hastie (1990). The payoff schedule holds the predefined issues and options for 159 
both negotiators in which individual points are attached that are only visible to the specific role. 160 
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The goal of each negotiator is to maximize the sum of his or her individual points. Table 1 holds 161 
a full overview of the used payoff schedule. 162 
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Table 1 
Overview Payoff Schedule With all Issues and Their Options With Attached Individual Point Scores 
Financing Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
CO² Emission Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Warranty Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Delivery 
Date 
Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
8 % 1600 4000 88 g/km  0  0 6 months 0 1600 5 months 0 2400 
6 % 1200 3000 126 g/km -600 -600 12 months 1000 1200 4 months 600 1800 
4 % 800 2000 164 g/km -1200 -1200 18 months 2000 800 3 months 1200 1200 
2 % 400 1000 202 g/km -1800 -1800 24 months 3000 400 2 months 1800 600 
0 % 0 0 240 g/km -2400 -2400 30 months 4000 0 1 month 2400 0 
Extras Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Technology/Audio Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Price Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
Color Points 
Buyer 
Points 
Seller 
1 0 3200 None 0 800 24.500 € -6000  0 Grey 1200 1200 
2 200 2400 Audio base equipment 800 600 23.520 € -4500 -1500 White 900 900 
3 400 1600 Multimedia equipment 1600 400 22.540 € -3000 -3000 Red 600 600 
4 600 800 Multimedia equipment + car computer 2400 200 21.560 € -1500 -4500 Black 300 300 
5 800 0 Multimedia equipment + car computer + navigation 3200 0 20.580 €  0 -6000 Silver 0 0 
The buyer and the seller could only see their own point scores during the negotiation, independent of the condition. There were no restrictions made on the communication of 
the negotiators, including the sharing of any of this information. 
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The payoff schedule was accompanied by a graphical decision aid showing bar charts for 163 
each issue in the height of their highest scoring option (e. g. 4000 points for the buyer and 1600 164 
points for the seller of the issue “financing”). These bar charts differed in their interactive 165 
capabilities and amount of information between the two conditions. Figure 1 shows a screenshot 166 
(translated from German) of the negotiation screen with graphical decision aid. 167 
 168 
Figure 1. Negotiation Screen with Graphical Decision Aid (as seen by the seller). 169 
 170 
 171 
5.3 Participants 172 
One hundred thirty-two university students from different fields of study (100 female, 32 male, 173 
Mage = 24.01, SDage = 3.70, age range: 19–36) voluntarily took part in this experimental study for 174 
an hourly rate of 8 €. We randomly assigned the roles of either the buyer or seller and thus 66 175 
dyads were created, 33 dyads per condition with either less information and interactivity or more 176 
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information and interactivity. The distribution of gender in the dyads was controlled for by 177 
alternating the conditions for dyads consisting of female-female, male-male and female-male. 178 
 179 
5.4 Procedure 180 
The whole experiment took place within an experimental negotiation support system with three 181 
phases: pre-negotiation, negotiation, post-negotiation. Besides the negotiation phase, the 182 
participants worked alone. The duration was approximately one hour. 183 
The participants were greeted and briefed shortly about the procedure of the experiment 184 
and the upcoming negotiation. After filling out a declaration of consent, they went into individual 185 
rooms and sat down in front of a computer. 186 
 187 
5.4.1 Pre-negotiation phase. First, the participants took the figural intelligence test. 188 
After that, they answered descriptive questions about, for example, gender or age followed by 189 
questions on the perceived computer skill, effortlessness, and previous frequency of using 190 
tables/charts.  191 
Next, the individual role and the negotiation scenario were described and the participants 192 
introduced to the graphical decision aid. 193 
 194 
5.4.2 Negotiation phase. Further instructions were given on the negotiation interface, 195 
after which the participants put on their headsets and could begin. They had 35 minutes to find 196 
an agreement on the eight issues with five options each. They could abort the negotiation or 197 
come to an agreement at any time. The common set of marked options was logged by the 198 
experimental negotiation support system as the agreement. 199 
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 200 
5.4.3 Post-negotiation phase. The participants again worked alone after the negotiation. 201 
They were asked about details of the negotiation just concluded. 202 
Finally, the social value orientation test was given. It was applied after the negotiation as 203 
to not influence negotiation outcomes beforehand. 204 
In the end, the participants were paid and shortly debriefed. 205 
 206 
5.5 Analyses 207 
We used the actor-partner interdependence model (APIM; Kenny et al., 2006) for analyses on the 208 
individual level: to be more specific, the multilevel modelling approach (Kenny & Ledermann, 209 
2015). 210 
The negotiation dyads were not independent of each other and, therefore, we could not 211 
analyze the effects of different measures on the individual outcomes without taking the partner 212 
into account. The buyer and the seller have both an actor effect – the effect of one of the 213 
partner’s own characteristic of a measure on his or her own individual outcome – and a partner 214 
effect – the effect of one of the partner’s own characteristic of a measure on the individual 215 
outcome of the other partner. Every APIM analysis included the condition as a covariate and was 216 
repeated for each of the three different codings: 217 
(1) Dummy coded (-1|1) to see the overall effects of a control measure on the individual 218 
outcome independent of the condition and to test for a possible interaction between the condition 219 
and the control measure. 220 
(2) Effects coded for the non-interactive condition (0|1) to see the effects of the control 221 
measure on the individual outcome in the non-interactive condition, in case of an interaction. 222 
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(3), like (2) but effects coded for the interactive condition (1|0). 223 
All actor-partner interdependence model analyses are based on indistinguishable dyads 224 
because the test of indistinguishability for all control measures confirmed that the individuals in 225 
the dyads were truly indistinguishable as intended by the experimental setup.  226 
 227 
6 Results 228 
Table 2 holds an overview of all significant results of the actor-partner interdependence model 229 
analyses. There were no condition specific results found. 230 
Table 2 
Overview of Results of the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model Analyses 
Measure 
Actor Effect 
on Individual Outcome 
 
Partner Effect 
on Individual Outcome 
β  β  b  r 
HEXACO Emotionality .036  -.173  -337  -.173 
    Dependence -.039  -.188  -368  -.184 
    Sentimentality -.087  -.225  -438  -.221 
    Anxiety .112  -.044     
    Fearfulness .154  -.074     
HEXACO Honesty Humility -.079  .070     
    Sincerity -.159  .101     
    Fairness -.073  -.056     
    Greed Avoidance -.041  .070     
    Modesty .039  .121     
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HEXACO Extraversion -.096  -.024     
    Social Self-Esteem -.160  .068     
    Social Boldness -.092  -.080     
    Sociability -.018  -.053     
    Liveliness -.030  -.047     
HEXACO Agreeableness -.076  -.044     
    Forgiveness .030  .030     
    Gentleness -.082  -.088     
    Flexibility -.104  -.016     
    Patience -.113  -.068     
HEXACO Conscientiousness .073  -.060     
    Organization -.038  -.068     
    Diligence .038  .007     
    Perfectionism .119  -.054     
    Prudence .084  -.097     
HEXACO Openness to Experience -.085  .122     
    Aesthetic Appreciation -.051  .059     
    Inquisitiveness -.097  .121     
    Creativity -.043  .091     
    Unconventionality -.029  .076     
Social Value Orientation .020  .206  401  .195 
Figural Intelligence .004  .199  389  .191 
Besides Social Value Orientation with N = 130 individuals in N = 65 dyads (due to technical 
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errors) all N = 132 individuals in N = 66 dyads. Effects marked bold are significant with p < .05. 
 231 
6.1 HEXACO 232 
The individual characteristic of the HEXACO scale emotionality had a partner effect on the 233 
individual outcome. A negotiator’s own emotionality had no influence on his or her own 234 
individual outcome but the more emotional the opposing partner was, the lower the negotiator’s 235 
own individual outcome turned out to be. Two subscales of emotionality, namely, dependence 236 
and sentimentality had similar effects. 237 
The individual characteristic of the subscale dependence also had a partner effect on the 238 
individual outcome. A negotiator’s own need for emotional support from others had no influence 239 
on his or her own individual outcome but the more the opposing partner needed emotional 240 
support, the lower the negotiator’s own individual outcome became. 241 
The individual characteristic of the subscale sentimentality had a partner effect on the 242 
individual outcome too. A negotiator’s own strength of feeling an emotional bond had no 243 
influence on his or her own individual outcome but the higher the strength of feeling an 244 
emotional bond of the opposing partner was, the lower the negotiator’s own individual outcome 245 
turned out to be. 246 
 247 
6.2 Social Value Orientation 248 
The individual characteristic of the social value orientation had a partner effect on the individual 249 
outcome. A negotiator’s own social orientation had no influence on his or her own individual 250 
outcome but the more social the orientation of the opposing partner was, the higher the 251 
negotiator’s own individual outcome was. 252 
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 253 
6.3 Figural Intelligence 254 
The individual characteristic of the figural intelligence had a partner effect on the individual 255 
outcome. A negotiator’s own figural intelligence had no influence on his or her own individual 256 
outcome but the higher the figural intelligence of the opposing partner was, the higher the 257 
negotiator’s own individual outcome was. 258 
 259 
7 Discussion 260 
In this experimental study, we sought to find answers on how the HEXACO personality scales 261 
and relevant measures such as figural intelligence and social value orientation affected the 262 
individual outcomes in a computer-supported negotiation. To accomplish this, we compared two 263 
conditions with negotiation support system, differing in their amount of information and 264 
interactive capabilities, which ultimately did not differ in their results. Interestingly, a 265 
negotiator’s own personality traits had no influence on his or her own individual outcome. A 266 
negotiator’s own individual outcome lies mostly in the hands of the opposing partner. Table 3 267 
holds an overview of the partner’s characteristics which may improve a negotiator’s own 268 
individual outcome in a computer-supported negotiation. 269 
 270 
Table 3 
Partner’s Characteristics that Improve a Negotiator’s Own Individual Outcome 
Within a Negotiation Support System 
Measure Partner’s characteristic 
HEXACO Emotionality Lower emotionality 
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    Dependence Lower need for emotional support 
    Sentimentality Lower strength of feeling and emotional bond 
Social Value Orientation Higher prosocial attitude 
Figural Intelligence Higher figural intelligence 
 271 
Higher emotionality, a higher need for emotional support, and a higher feeling of an 272 
emotional bond are personality traits of one negotiation partner which could elicit caring 273 
behavior in the other negotiator or a stronger emotional bond, resulting in more concessions from 274 
the other negotiator. The only other study using the direct individual outcome in connection with 275 
personality traits, as we did, showed that a higher emotionality – or neuroticism – improved the 276 
individual outcome (Foo et al., 2004). However, it seems to be true that the high emotionality of 277 
one negotiation partner does not improve his or her own individual outcome, but it instead 278 
worsens the individual outcome of the less emotional negotiation partner. Further studies are 279 
needed to fully understand the individual influence of emotionality on the individual outcomes as 280 
a higher score in this personality trait is common in the population and has a high economic cost 281 
for society (Cuijpers et al., 2010). 282 
The higher social value orientation of one negotiation partner, improving only the 283 
individual outcome of the other, fell in line with previous research: Prosocial individuals were 284 
less demanding but simultaneously more giving and considerate (Dreu & Lange, 1995). This 285 
would explain the higher individual outcome of their negotiation partner. It is still interesting to 286 
see that social orientation of a negotiator had no influence on his or her own individual outcome. 287 
The higher figural intelligence of the partner played an important role in the negotiation 288 
with a negotiation support system using a graphical decision aid: The understanding of the 289 
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graphical decision aid is crucial for beneficial trade-offs, and lacking the general ability to 290 
understand figural representations might hinder this process. We believe that the negotiator with 291 
a better understanding of the graphical decision aid offered more profitable concessions to the 292 
other negotiator, but in return received less profitable concessions back due to the other’s lower 293 
general ability to understand the figures in form of bar charts.  294 
One shortcoming of this experimental study is that these findings for the HEXACO 295 
scales and the findings for the Big Five are not fully comparable: (1) Although the HEXACO is 296 
very similar to the Big Five, it is not identical. (2) Previous studies did not use the actor-partner 297 
interdependence model but lesser methods to test the influence on individual outcomes. (3) 298 
Previous studies did not use the direct individual outcome measured in points but the individual 299 
deviation from a preset individual target. 300 
More studies researching the HEXACO scales in a computer-supported negotiation, using 301 
the actor-partner-interdependence model for analysis of the direct individual outcome are needed 302 
to create a more complete knowledge base on the influence of personality traits on individual 303 
outcomes in negotiations. Also, further research is needed to fully assess the reasons, why the 304 
negotiator’s own individual outcome lies mostly in the hand of the partner and stays 305 
uninfluenced by one’s own characteristics. 306 
 307 
7.1 Conclusion 308 
Negotiators seem to compensate the deficiencies of their partner with their own share of the gain 309 
in a negotiation. Furthermore, the individual outcome of one partner seems highly dependent 310 
upon the personality and prosocial behavior of the opposing partner. The worst negotiation 311 
partner using a negotiation support system with graphical decision aids would be the one who is 312 
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emotionally unstable and competitive and who has problems interpreting figures. This 313 
negotiation partner will not feel the effects of his or her shortcomings, but the one negotiating 314 
with this partner will suffer a lower individual outcome. Asking for an experienced negotiator is 315 
therefore advisable, especially when using a computer-supported environment. 316 
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